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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
A. The Problem of this Dissertation.
The problem of this dissertation is that of expoiinciing
and criticizing John Locke's conception of freedom. There
is in men's minds a misunderstanding to the effect that
one's conception of the self (whether determined or free,
for example, and the nature of that determination or free-
dom) is irrelevant to one's social view. No doubt it is
irrelevant in practice; but in adequate theory, it is rele-
vant indeed. This examination of Locke's conception of
freedom is made in the light of that mistaken viev/; and
part of the aim of this dissertation is to suggest the vital
relation that does hold betv/een one's view of man and his
social theory. Since Locke's thought affords an excellent
illustration of thit problem, special emphasis v/111 be placed
on the relation of his conception of man to his theory of
the social order. The central problem of this dissertation,
then, is Locke's conception of freedom. But the problem
consists of several essential parts, namely, an examination
of Locke's view of the freedom of the sel^ as such, an
examination of his theory of social freedom, as such, and
the relations existing betaveen the two; another brief con-
sideration of this dissertation will be the influence of
Locke's conception of freedom on certain areas of subsequent

2thought and history, though this is but incidental to the
central problem of the paper.
B. Definition of Terms.
The meaning of the terras used in this dissertation
will become clear as the discussion proceeds; hov/ever, two
terms which are fimdamental to the whole dissertation v/ill
be defined in advance. One of these is the term, freedom ,
and the other is the related term, democracy .
Here freedom is used in two clearly differing senses.
In one sense, it pertains to the nature of the self's ac-
tivity, particularly in relation to its experience of will-
ing. In the other sense, it is related to political and
social organization. In Chapter II, it is used essentially
in the first sense; in Chapter III, it is used largely in
the second.
In the third chapter, especially, in connection with
the discussion of social freedom, the term democracy is
used. Throughout, that term is ta-cen to mean not the democ-
racy of popular assembly, which Plato ardently condemned
and v/hich is certainly impracticable for any community of
large membership, but, rather, representative government in
v/hich sovereignty resides in the people v/ho elect their
leaders by majority rule to bring the people's will to ex-
pression in the lav/s v/hich the leaders are thus empowered
to legislate.
II,
3C. The Procedure for Gathering Data
and the Structure of the Dissertation.
1. The procedure for gathering data.
The procedure for gathering data for this study in-
volved the examination of nvimerous bibliographical sources.
They included Rand's Bibliography of Philosophy, Psychology ,
and Cognate Subjects ; encyclopaedias and dictionaries such
as Hastings's Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics , Baldv/in's
Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology , and The Encyclo-
^ paedia Britannica ; histories of philosophy by Windelband
and Ueberw egj library files, particularly those of the
Boston public Library and the Harry Elkins V/idener Library
of Harvard in Cambridge; suggestions from varied readings
too numerous to mention, and other suggestions gleaned
from conversations.
2, The structure of this dissertation.
The remainder of this brief introductory chapter v/ill
include a short synopsis of Locke's life and a general
survey of his v/r.i tings and of the literature related to the
problem of this dissertation. The second chapter will deal
v;ith Locke's conception of the freedom of the self and v/ill
fall into three major parts: a preliminary discussion of
the general problem of the self's freedom, an exposition and
criticism of Locke's viev/ and a suggestion as to the influ-
ence of his view on the philosophic v/ri tings on that subject
in his own day and after. The third chapter will consider

4Lookers conception of social freedom. It will begin by
relating his social theory to his conception of man and
v/ill continue with a detailed exposition and evaluation of
the major theses of his viev/ of social freedom; it will
close with a brief exposition of the influence of this as-
pect of Locke's thought on the French and American revolu-
tions. This chapter will be followed by a bibliography
which, in turn, v/ill be followed by an abstract of the most
important conclusions of this dissertation*
1
D. Synopsis of Locke's Life.
John Locke v/as born at pensford, near v/rington, Eng-
land, on August 29, 1632. Little is known of his childhood;
but from 1646 to 1652 he attended Westminster School. From
1652 to 1656 he attended Christ Church, Oxford, where he
was critical of the scholastic mood of the instruction
received. Immediately, after graduation, hov/ever, he took
his master's degree and began teaching at Oxford.
In 1665 he became the secretary of Sir Walter Vane and,
with him, went to the Continent, returning to England in
1666. Shortly thereafter, he entered the secretarial serv-
ice of Lord Ashley and later, having studied science and
medicine, became a member of the Royal Academy. In a dis-
cussion among his friend^ in 1770, suggestions were made
which prompted him to undertake his v/riting of the monumental
1. Bourne, LJL, especially II, 565-568«

5Essay » Prom 1675 to 1679 he lived on the Continent; upon
retvirning, he assisted Shaftsbury in jjoli'tlcal work. ATter
Shaftsbury's death in 1683 (having left his service the year
"before), Locke settled in Hollajid where he developed his
friendship v;ith Limborch, In 1689, the Glorious Revolution
over, Locke returned to England, and shortly thereafter in
1690, published his significant works, the Essay , the Two
Treatises on Government , and A Second Letter Concerning
Toleration
,
(the first and most important having been pub-
lished in 1885 or 1889).
In 1691, Locke settled at Gates and through his remain-
ing years enjoyed the privileges of reflection and friend-
ship, the latter Vsrith such persons as Limborch, Clarke,
Tillotson, William and Thomas Molyneux, Betty Clarke, and
Anthony Collins. During these last years, in spite of
failing health, Locke maintained an active interest in
political and commercial affairs and gave much time to
theological and biblical studies. He even v/rote v;ith care
about, and planned for, the building of a chaise for lils
old-age evening rides in the country.
Deeply sincere, generous and humble, affectionate in
friendship to the end, the songs of the Psalms singing in
his mind, Locke died on October 28, 1704. Of him it v/as
aptly said:
"He was always, in the greatest and in the small-
est affairs of human life, as well as in specula-
tive opinions, disposed to follow reason, v;hosoever
fI
t
I
6it were that suggested it; he being ever a faith-
f-ul servant— I had almost said a slave—to Truth;
never abandoning her for anything else, and fol-
lowing her, for her own sake, purely. "2
As he partook of the last elements of the holy communion
v;hich were ever to touch his lips he, himself, had said:
"I am in perfect Charity with all men and in
sincere communion v/ith the v/hole church of Christ,
by v;hatever names Christ's follov/ers call them-
selves. "3
There it is, the spirit that sustained him and survived the
centuries; the spirit of an earnest follov/er of truth, vi/ho
desired the well-being of all mankind, and warmed the modern
world with the glowing flame of tolerance.
£• Survey of the Literature.
The literature pertaining to this investigation con-
sists of tv;o main groups. Lockers ovm works, and writings
about his thought, the latter dividing naturally into four
other groups.
1. Locke's v/ri tings.
A highly satisfactory edition of Locke's works, used
in this study, is the ne';:, corrected edition, published in
London by Thomas Tegg, W. Sharpe and Sons, in 1823. A. G,
Eraser's edition of Locke's Essaj j published at Oxford by
the Clarendon Press in 1894, is valuable, too, because of
its stimulating commentary on Locke's thought.
2, Bourne, LJL, II, 540.
3. Bourne, LJL II, 557.

7Locke's v/rl tings as a ¥/hole were quite extensive. The
1823 edition, alone, containing Locke's most important works,
consists of ten heavy vol-umes. But an even more detailed
record of Locke's writings is outlined in H. R. Fox Bourne's
4
tv/o volume The Life of John Locke « The most significant
4
of these are the follov/ing: part of "The Fundamental Con-
stitutions of Carolina" (1669-1670); Epistola de Tolerantia
(1885?); An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690);
Tvfo Treatises of Government (1690); A Second Letter Concern-
ing Toleration (1690); Some Considerations of the Conse-
quences of the Lov/ering of Interest and Raising the Value
of Money (1692); A Third Letter for Toleration (1692);
Some Thoughts Concerning Education (1693); The Reasonable-
ness of Christianity as delivered in the Scriptures (1695);
"Remarks unon some of ¥r. ^orris's Books'' (1695); An Examina-
tion of Malebranche ' s Opinion of Seeing all Things in God
(1695); A Letter to the Bishop of Worcester ( Stilllngfleet;
1697), Reply .... (1697). Reply ....( 1699) ; Of the Conduct of
the Understanding (written during and after the spring of
1697 and published after his death in 1706 by his cousin,
5
Peter King) ; "Elements of Natural Philosophy, " published in
6
A Collection of Several Pieces of Mr. John Locke , in 1720;
An Essay for the Understanding of St. Paul's Epistles (1707);
4. LJL, II, 569-570,
5. Bourne, LJL, II, 443, and n. 1 and 2.
6. Bourne, LJL, II, 449, n. 2#
j4
8and A Fourth Letter for Toleration published after his
death, in 1706. In addition, Locke carried on a voluminous
and illuminating correspondence. But Locke's many writings
seem few in number as contrasted v/ith the great abundance
of works that have been v/ritten about him.
2. Viforks on Locke's thought.
It is probably not far from the truth to say that al-
most every philosopher of significance since Locke's day,
and many v/ho were not philosopher's, have had occasion, some-
where in their writings, to mention Locke. The materials on
Locke consulted for this study, therefore, have been selected
in the light of the particular subject of freedom. Nothing
has as yet been uncovered which bears such a title as the
title of this dissertation; but works have been found and
used which suggested some kind of relation to the problem
at hand. The extent of the survey of these works is indi-
cated In the bibliography attached to the dissertation. The
present purpose, therefore, is by no means to duplicate
that bibliography. It is rather to suggest and illustrate
the four major types of literature about Locke's thought that
have entered into this study.
a. There are, first of all, those works v/iiich are re-
lated to a consideration of the freedom of the self. Some
of them deal v/ith the problem in general; some with Locke's
treatment of it in particular. Among the former are such
v/orks as Hobbes's Leviathan (1651) and On Liberty and Necessity
I
9(1654); Berkeley's Treatise (1710); Kant's Kritik der praktischen
Vemunft (1788); Bowne's Metaphysics (1882) and Introduotion
to Psychological Theory (1887); James's "Dilemma of
Determinism" (1884); McTaggart's Some Dogmas of Religion
(1906); Palmer's The Problem of Freedom (1911); Thomson's
The Springs of Human Action (1927); Hocking's The Self: Its
Body and Freedom (1928); Spaulding's What Am I? (1928);
Brightman's Moral Laws (1933) and "Freedom, Purpose, and
Value" (1940); and Arthur Gompton's The Freedom of Man (1935).
Among the books which deal specifically with Locke's con-
ception of the self are such works as Fraser's disconnected
comments on Locke's Essay (1894); Rickaby's Free Will in
Four English Philosophers (1906); and Hudson's Personal ity
in Locke, Berkeley, and Hume (1911>.
b. The second type of books is those which deal with
Locke's social theory in particular, but include, as well,
general works on social philosophy such as Borgeaud's Rise
of Modem Democracy (1894; a translation of two articles
published originally in French, one in 1893 and the other in
1891) and Anshen's compilation of the views of various
philosophers, entitled Freedom, Its Meaning (1940). Books
which give Locke particular consideration are illustrated by
Stephen's History of English Thought in the Eighteenth
Century (1876); Gooch's The History of Knglish Democratic
Ideas in the Seventeenth Century (1898) ; Graham's English
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Political Philosophy (1899); Laski's Political Thought in
England from Locke to Bentham (1920); Sorley's A History
of English Philosophy (1920); and Larkin's Property in the
Eighteenth Century (1930).
c. The third t3rpe of literature is literature which
reveals the nature of Lockers influence on the French Revo-
lution. This group is illustrated uj the following works:
De Tocqueville 's On the State of Society in France (1856;
excerpts from his French work, L'ancien regime et la
revolution
,
second edition, 1856); Lecky's Democracy and
Liberty (1890) and The French Revolution (1904; excerpts
from his A History of England in the Eighteenth Century
,
1878-1890); Lov/ell's The Eve of the French Revolution (1892);
Texte ' s Jean-Jacques Rousseau et les origines du cosmopolitisme
litteraire (1895; English translation, 1899); H&ffding's
Jean Jacques Rousseau (the earliest reference noted is to a
German edition of 1897); Aulard's Histoire politique
de la Revolution Francaise (1901); Faquet's La politique
comparee de Montesquieu, Rousseau et Voltaire (1902);
and Fletcher's Montesquieu and English Politics (1939).
The writings of Voltaire and Rousseau are also included here.
d. The fourth division of literature about Locke con-
tains those works which shed light on his influence on the
American Revolution. Significant among these are Hazen's
"The French Revolution as Seen by the Americans of the

Eighteenth Century" (read in public meeting in 1895 and
published in 1896) ; Brailsford's Shelley, Godwin, and their
Circle (1914?); Adama's Political Ideas of the American
Revolution (1922); Egerton's The Causes and Character of
the American Revolution (1923); Charles Beard's An Economic
Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States (1935)
;
and writings by Madison, Hamilton, Jay, Jefferson, and Paine.
The aim and fundamental definitions of this disserta-
tion have been set forth; the, procedure for gathering data
has been noted and the structure of the general outline has
been mentioned; Locke's life has been reviewed; and an
illustrative survey of the literature related to this study
has been made. It is now, therefore, appropriate to turn
specifically to Locke's thought and to examine, in the next
chapter, his conception of the freedom of the self.
1
CHAPTER II
LOCKE'S COKCEPTION OF THE FREEDOM OF THE SELF
It is the purpose of this chapter to examine John
Locke's conception of power, the conception about which he
clusters his viev/s on humeji freedom. Because it lends much
to clarity and a reader's understejiding of the precise mean-
ing of the subsequent criticism of Locke's views on this
subject, a positive view of the meaning of the self's
freedom will first fee presented*
A. The Freedom of the Self.
1« The nature of the problem and the thesis.
True it is that "from axij theoretical point of view
1
the question is insoluble," One csjnnot, in mam's present
state of knowledge, come to a decisive conclusion which is
grounded on a perfect argument. But the possibility of in-
sight into the problem, even with James, is not as slight as
Ms words suggest. One can have no absolutely certain
r
knov/ledge of ajiything. But one can have degrees of knov/ledge,
can attain to different degrees of coherence sjid adequacy in
an interpretation of his total experience. So with the
particular problem of freedom. One can come to no com.pletely
certain theoretical solution; but one can come to v/hat m.ay
prove- to be the most coherent conclusion attainable. It is,
«
1, James, V/B, 159.
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therefore, the standpoint of this chapter that freedom is
not self-ovidently and v/ithout difficulty the winner in the
debate concerning the nature of the self; it is, rather,
that, while the theory of determinism is extremely compel-
ling and in certain respects is more readily conceivable
than is freedom, in more fundamental respects, the argument
for freedom is even more compelling and the reality of
freedom., however difficult to define, is indispensable to
personality and is the basic presupposition of mesxdngful
experience.
In spite of Berkeley's keen observation that in lusjij
matters "v/e have, first raised a dust and then complain v/e
2
cannot see," certain problems can approach solution or
even adequate consideration only after a dust has been raised.
It Is possible to see v/ithout raising a dust— though sun-
shine glistens most impressively v/hen it shines dov/n shsjfts
of sparkling specks. Likewise, it is possible to come to
quick conclusions v/ithout being troubled by perplexi.ng prob-
lems; but the problem at hand is most illumined only when
dusty questions are raised, even though, at first, they blind
the eyes and serve to make confusion the more confounded.
It is possible to affinn, without equivocation, the primacy
of freedom and to proceed, from that assumption, to criticize
a]-l other views; but it is better to contend v/ith the strength
2. Berkeley, Treatise
,
Intro., 3.

of determini sn-1 before one argues that freedom is real. It
is, then, v/lth av/areness of the strength of determinism,
that the resJ.ity of 'freedom, is argued here. But what is the
m.eanlng of determinism and what is the preliminary defini-
tion of freedom with which this discussion starts?
2. Definitions.
Determinism, as used here in its broadest sense, in-
cludes every kind of theory of the self which denies that,
in some v/ay and in some degree, the self is exempt from the
inexorable draft of the principle of universal, necessary
causality. Put in a more positive form, determinism here is
taken to m.ean that the total life of the self is included in
and wholly explained by the principle of necessary cause and
effect. It affims that whatsoever a self or a person does
or wills or thinks is v./holly determined by the past; in no
sense is there ever a new beginning; there is no law of
reason or of spirit v/hich differs even slightly from the lav/
of mechajiism. One who believes in materialism as Hobbes did,
one who believes in behaviorism as did ¥/atson, one who, like
Locke, in one vein at least, affirmed psychological hedonism,
and those who, like Hume and Mill, expounded theories based
on character as well as circumstance, are equally de termini sts
Whether the level of m.echanlsm be physical or mental, whether
5. Cf . Gajnertsfelder end Evans, PP, 587-388.
1
it be dressed in "hard" or "soft" colors, acknov/ledged to "be
determinism or subtly called freedom—like those theories
of v/hich Bo\TOe writes, in which "inner necessity is extended
to the entire activity" and "v/e have nothing of freedom left
4
but the name, " every theory which denies that, in some sense
or in some manner, hov^rever mysterious or evasive, the spirit
of man is literally free, is a deterministic theory of the
5
self. In short, by determinism is meant any theory which
affirm.s or implies, in its presuppositions or consequences,
that man is a Drocess, an effect, rather than a self or
6
person^
Now whatever, in addition, freedom is suggested subse-
quently to mean, 3 t is here held to mean that the human self,
in some manner and to an indefinable degree, is independent
of the process of mechanistic causality, physical and mental.
It means that the self is the ultim.ate reality which, far
from being the slave, is the source of principles such, even,
as that of necessary causality. It means that the self,
v/ithin the limits of relevant mechanisms and the content of
specific occasions of experience, m.ay choose among possi-
bilities and is not inevitably driven to an inescapable
necessity. It does not mean mere chance, either; it means
-the spiritual power of a self to choose among possibilities
4. Bov/ne, IPT, 223; quoted by Hildrbrand, BSSF, 102.
5. Cf. Thomson, SHA, 188-189; Palmer, PP, 46-69, 185.
6. Cf. Blanshard, NT, I, 477.
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according to the person's own, freely pronoimced, decree.
It does not mean that it defies the principle of causality
or that it is vi/holly indifferent to and free frora mechanistic
processes; it affinr.s, rather, that every event, every "free
act has a cause as much as any other" but that "its cause is
7
the free spirit."
It remains, then to consider the relative adequacy of
the theories of determinism, and freedom, to indicate, if
possible, v/here and how freedom finds expression in the
self, and to set forth a theory of the form in vi^hich that
freedom may be conceived,
3. The relative adequacy of determinism and freedom.
Tv/o reasons, at least, account for the fact that the
question of freedom has been a point of unceasing controv-
ersy in the history of thought. One is the haunting, though
sometimes evaded, awareness of the necessity of freedom.
The other, and the one to be considered nov/, is "the invet-
erate habit of looking at processes of life and mind through
8
unrealized mechanical sjialogy." That is, the assumption of
the universality of the law of necessary causality. If it
were universally valid, freedom, of course, would be impos-
sible. Wittingly or uj^v/ittingly thinking it to be so, some
philosophers have found freedom to be inconceivable or, as
9
Hobbes has said, absurd, meaningless. Obsessed with the
7. Bov/ne, IPT, 229; Quoted by Hildebrand, BSSF, 102.
8. Blanshard, NT, I, 482.
9. Hobbes, Lev., 52-33.
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Idea of the absolute rule of meche-nical causality, then,
determini sts not only deny freedom, but thinl<:ers v/ho sense
the necessity of it hesitate to acknowledge it. Later it
will appear that Locke is one of this latter group who are
forever haunted by the ghost of freedom yet cannot shake off
the trammels of necessity,
EnthreJLling, captivating, overv/helming though the altar
of necessity be, it is an altar to an unlcnov/n god whose
universality has never been proved and, by the nature of the
concept, never can be proved by finite minds • The principle
of nature!, causality, even when not intended as universal,
is a postulate which goes far beyond the given facts in order
best to interpret the meanings of a restricted area of ex-
perience. It applies basically to the physical realm, but
even here it is a postulate never v;holly proved, \{tien applied
not only to the physical realm, but also to the psychological,
and affirmed, in addition, as exhausting the activity of the
rational, spiritual, personal realms; when it is insisted
that it is a principle universally valid, then the gulf be-
tv;een well-warranted postulation and unwarranted dogmatism
10
widens fearfully. Then mechanism becomes an empty name,
11
"a mere conception fulminated as a dogma" and suggesting in
its adherents
10. James, V/B, 147.
11. Ibid., 156.
I\
only a temper of Intellectual absolutism, a demand
that the world shall he a solid block, subject to
one control, --v/hich temper, which demand, the
world may not be bound to gratify at all.^^
The thesis to be defended here is that that demand is not
gratified at all.
a. Stated in the form of the negative argument for
freedom, the thesis is this, that the principle of univer-
sal, necessary causality is an imwarranted postulate. This
may be said first of all because
(1) It lacks much that is required to sustain its claim
to universal validity.
(a) Primary, elemental experience, as such, gives no
such law and' necessitates it not. Sigwart explicitly states
the truth of the matter:
So tmzweifelhaft es ist, dass alle Welt aus bekannten
P&llen auf unbekannte schliesst, ebenso gewiss
ist dass gerade dieses Verfshren, so lange es
sich nur an das von selbst sich darbietende hRlt,
nicht zu der Aanshme einer allgemeinen Gleich-
f6miigkeit, sondern nur zu der Annahme fdhren kann,
dass Kegel und Regellosigkeit in buntem Wechsel
die Y/elt beherrschen. Fiir den Standpunkt des
strengen Erapirismus gibt es aber nichts als die
Summe der einzelnen V/ahrnehmungen mit ihren
Coincidenzen einerseits, ihren Widerspr'^chen
andrerseits. Dass mehr Ordnung in der Welt ist,
als sie auf den ersten Anblick darbietet, wird
erst erkannt, wenn die Ordnung gesucht wird.l'^
(b) Closely related to this is the fact that, even
though the data available be admitted to imply causal
12. Ibid., 157-158.
15. Sigwart, Logik
,
II, 381-582; quoted by James, V/B, 148, n.
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necessity in the physical realm, it does not dogmatically
prove that it is universal—or even that it is indubitably
absolute in that realm. For vast areas of information about
the activity of the universe are as yet unexplored, perhaps
unthought of. To say dogmatically, in advance of such knowl-
edge, that necessity is a universal law is to go Inconceivable
distances beyond the warrant of the facts. But worse than
that, it is to fly in the face of the facts of a large and
Important area of experience, the area of human choice. It
is one thing, and indispensable, to think beyond the given
data; but it is another thing to be so devoted to a single
explanatory principle as to permit it to cast its glow over
the totality of our experience, so that its color appears to
be the color of everything, even if, perhaps, in fact, reality
has colors more than one.
But v/hen one suggests the possibility that the realm of
persons may somehow be exempt from complete conscription by
the office of mechanism, on the grounds that inadequate
knmvledge challenges the universality of mechanism's authority,
determinists, like McTaggart, may reply:
All our most careful examination fails to show us
the whole sum of conditions v/hich are necessary in
order that a particular volition should be com-
pletely determined. But this by no means proves
that the whole sum of conditions is not there. For
there is another alternative— that we have not
powers of observation sufficient to discover them.

20
And, except in bhe case of the huitiejn will, this
alternative is alv/ays adopted.-'^
Several objections must be raised against this. For
one thing, the mere absence of .complete knowledge is not the
only or decisive argument against the determlnist * s assertion
of universal mechajiisra. The essential contention is that
there is a realm of experience, a realm of spiritual persons,
in which, though it explain all the activity of the rest of
the universe, the principle of necessary causality does not
hold. The argument for freedom is not only negative; it is
primarily positive; but even its negative argument has weight.
And in this instajice it may be asserted as follows:
First, if the absence of necessary infomatlon does not
disprove a j^oint, it even more certainly does not r^rove it.
Second, if one quietly followed McTaggart's suggestion
and assumed the absolute dognia of determinism, he, with
McTaggart, would simply pass by the issue. For the issue is
just that question of v/hether determinism, universal, necessary,
causality, _is true I The seed of controversy is the suspicion
that the principle does not hold for spirits or persons*
It is more than a suspicion; it is a v/ell-warranted hypothe-
sis, grounded in empirical data, which, though thought by some
to be illusory, are, nevertheless, staunch stumbling-blocks
for thoroughgoing determinism. In fact, the situation being
14. KcTaggart, SDR, 148-149.

what it is, it is on the detemlnist, rather than on the free-
domist, that the burden of proof would seem to rest. Even in
the absence of the infinite inforraation necessary to the
proof of a universal necessity, one might concede the proba-
bility of absolute determinism were it not for the stubborn
facts of personal activity. But there's the rub I The prim8.ry
challenge is not to the detemiinist or freedomist to argue
from ignorance either toward or away from the principle of
universal mechanism; it is, rather, for the deterralnist to
prove that the experience of seeming free choice is an illu-
sion (even though it is not only spontaneously felt to be
free but is also held, by certain thinkers, to point to a
principle of freedom v/hich, to them, appears to be indispen-
sable to a coherent and meaningful interpretation of man's,
not to mention the universe's, total avtivity)
.
In the third place, though custom, as McTaggart suggests,
does favor complete surrender to the principle of necessary
causality, competent and independent thinkers do not always
yield to its lotus lure, Arthur Com-oton, Sir Arthur Eddington,
15
Sir James Jeans, and o,ther experimenters on Heisenberg's
principle of indeterminacy (whether rightly or wrongly) inter-
pret that principle in such a way as to tainper with tradition.
Preedomists in all ages, wittingly or unwittingly, have denied
the universality of mechanistic determinism. Analogously,
15. Jeans, NBS, 271-272,
I
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believers in a finite God reject the urgings of the absolu-
tists to accept the attitude of science and concede that all
is good and evil mere illusion.
In the general context of the words of McTaggart just
criticized, that author argues fur-ther:
It is perfectly impossible for any one to e:xplain
why a particular drop of rain falls v/here it does
rather than haJLf an inch away. Yet no one supposes
Quite true. But how false is the implication he would have
men draw. In spite of the suggestive leading of this state-
ment, the fact is that no one surjposes that that event is of
exactly the saine nature as an event in the human mind. Nor
does anyone seriously insist (surely it is not necessary that
we believe) that the rain drop del3.berated, in reflective
thought, for hours or days, perhaps for weeks, as to where,
precisisly, it would finally drop down.
(c) Inadequate information was the second obstacle to
a complete proof of universal mechanism; the third is the
fact, already touched on, that even in the physical realm the
data available to men of science sjce differently interpreted;
so that, while many still hold to the rjostulate of necessary
causality, others hold to a principle of indeterminacy, claim-
ing, in at least one instance, that this nev/ principle "is the
most significant revolution in the history of scientific
16. McTaggart, SDR, 149.
that this event
1
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thought." How much significance is to be attached to this
revolutionary view is not yet clear and may not be for many
years, but it is pertinent to remark that leaders in science
are willing to risk their reputations in affirming it and that,
if it is not conceded as successfully csjicelling the principle
of determinism, it tends at least to remove it farther from
18
the sanctified cloisters of dogmatism. One thing is clear
beyond a doubt, and that is that science no longer conceives
its laws as statements of absolute necessities; it holds them,
rather, to be statements of "the probable behaviour of enor-
19
mous aggregates of particles," of the "chance" of an event's
20 21
occurrence, of statistical approximations* As a consequence,
something of the a priori strength of the deterministic argu-
ment is bled away. In the light of the charge of Hudson that
indeterminacy in nature would malce prediction and, therefore,
freedom impossible, it must be affirmed, to the contrary,
that such indeterminacy as is in any sense admissible obvi-
ously does not dissolve the fact of the dominance of uniformity
in nature; uniformity, Drobability, are all that freedom
22
requires.
(d) But even more decisive against the determinist »
s
17. Gompton, FM, 7; cf. Brightman, ML, 77.
18. Goinpton, FM, 23-24; cf. Brightman, ML, 20.
19. Blanshard, NT, I, 477.
20. Gompton, FI£, 25, 31.
21. Brightman, IHj, 280.
22. Hudson, PLBH, 38.
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theory of the self is the clear truth that, by virtue of the
nature of the subject-matter, science cannot pronounce the
final word. For science not 6nly deals primarily with events
25
that have actually occurred, but, in dealing v/ith human
choice, seeks to interpret events which, in each instance,
are absolutely unique, never repeated. Such events can never
be reconstructed and objectively examined under ideal condi-
tions at the convenience of investigators. When a person
malces a choice, he is never again the saine. Nov,^ science form-
ulates its laws on the basis of data which can be "isolated,
24
observed, and controlled," and, at least equally important,
repeatedl As a consequence, though science has been able to
lay down laws for the physical, and, in some measure, for the
psj^chological realms of activity, it has not yet, because of
the elusive and ever-changing character of rjersons, been able
24
to discover any scientific lav/s of human choice,
(e) Finally, that the postulate of determinism goes be-
yond its v;arrant is seen in this. In the absence of decisive
proof to the contrary and of another principle which is even
more useful in the abstract realm of science, scientists and
philosophers, if they find it advances Icnov/ledge, are justi-
fied in assuming necessary causality to be the law of nature;
for by its assumption, "an objective order as distinguished
23. James, SB, 152.
24. Brightman, l^L, 278-279, 282.
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from chaotic subjective experience," with which they can deal
constructively, is assured. But the same argument does not
hold for subjective experience. The fact of subjective ex-
perience is undeniable, "however it is ordered. The type of
causality to be found in it therefore remains an open ques-
25
tion."
(2) Yet mechanism is a principle relatively true.
Simply because the principle of mechanism is suggested
to be less than universally valid, it is not to be under-
stood that it does not apply at all; for this latter cannot
be proved, and is by no means essential to freedom. Like
other abstractions, it may well hold for abstracted realms
of experience; but even if true for science, it is only
relatively true. It may be granted, too, that it holds in
certain areas of psychology; but it must also be insisted
that there are many data, even in the physical and psycholog-
ical, but especially in the spiritual, realms (organisms,
purposes, values. Ideals, empirical freedom) that appear to
require another principle, or other orinclples (not only
26
mechanism, but organism, co-operation, conscious purpose)
of explanation. So that mechanism must be recognized, at
27
best, as but explaining only a part of the whole of reality.
25. Ibid., 279.
26. Sorley, MV, Chapter XVI; Gamertsfelder and Evans, FP, 567.
27. Brlghtman, ITP, 310-311.
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(o) Mechanism, as a conception, is dependent on mind.
Another consideration, v/hich not only implies the rela-
tivity of mechanism tout also asserts the primacy of another
principle, is the fact that mechanism, in order even to toe.
conceived, depends on a principle of selective and creative
thought. When the scientist formulates the law of causal-
ity, he not only abstracts from the data of purpose, value,
and the like, tout he fully recognizes that his data are
selected; not only in this sense does he select, tout also
in the sense that, vvithin the realm of his atostraction, his
data are only partial. Prom this limited, abstracted toody
of data, the scientist formulates his law—toy means of the
creative power of thought, Neither the data singly nor the
data as a group, apart from the activity of mind, are more
28
than isolated perceptions. But toy its creative activity,
the mind formulates, from these data, the lav/ of causality.
The principle of mechanistic causality, logically and, quite
possitoly, ontologically, depends on a thinking mind. And
the attritoute of creativity is not incidental or insigni-
ficant. It is vital. It means that, though there may toe
logical necessity in thinking, mechanistic necessity is an
inadequate principle of explanation. It means that, whereas
thinking is indispensatole to the formulation of the lav/ of
mechanism, mechanism is insufficient to account for the
28. Cf. Sigwart, Logik
, II, 381-382

nature of thought. For creativity means that the conclu-
sion attained--in this instance, the principle of mechajiism
—
is more than all that is contained In the parts, the given
data in themselves. If the mind selects certain data, it
should arrive at a certain conclusion; if it selects other
data, it should arrive at another conclusion; hut in any
event, the conclusion v/ill contain more than is given to
the mind. So the very formiilation of the law of mechanism
is dependent on the creative activity of thought wliich the
lav; of mechanism cannot explain. Not only is mechanism
unable, then, to accoimt for the nature of thought, but it
exists as an intelligible principle only because thought
goes beyond the data given and creatively forms it, brings
into existence a whole , a law, which is greater than all
29
the parts that are comprehended by it. Mechanical causation
30
"is a category of human intelligence"; it is an "expression
31
of rationality." As such, mind or intelligence is r^rior to
it; mechanism is dependent on it, Tliis is a fact.
(4) Hechenism, like any theoi^y, can be proved only if
freedom is real.
But more important than the fact, then, is the sig-
nificance of the fact. Not only is it true that the prin-
ciple of mechanism depends for its existence on mind and
29. Cf
.
Hocking, SEP, 161, on the one law to which all others
are relative—the lav/ of m-eening.
30. G-amertsfelder ojid Evans, FP, 567.
31. Brightman, ITP, 313.

intelligence, and that the creative activity of thought can
scarcely he explained short of a degree of freedom from
mechanistic necessity; but it appears that neither mechan-
ism nor freedom (or the principles of creativity, emergence,
52
organization, co-operation, organicism, and evolution)
could he intelligibly affirmed to be true or false unless
53
the freedom of the m.ind is i)re supposed, unless it is conceded
that normal minds may, if they freely v/ill it, impose on
them.selves the objective ideal of logic or coherence, carry
on investigation and discussion, check each other's errors
in reasoning, in short, affirm or deny the ob j ective truth
of the claim.s made for any hypothesis. If men were not
free to do this, if men were completely determined by v/hat
had gone before, all conclusions would be equally necessary,
equally effe.cts of causes, neither true nor false, simply
facts. Any pretense or claim to "knowledge" would be absurd;
men mdght conceivably rjossess truth, but they could not
know which of their conclusions were the true ones and they
would be utterly incapable of proving anything they affirmed,
.
If this be true, the determinist has the unpleasant
disadvantage of inadvertently insisting that his argument
is no more to be accepted than any other, that his principle
is but a necessary effect, neither true nor false, a mere
32. Gamertsfelder and Evans, FP, 567.
33. Erightman, Art. (1940), 504.

fact; whereas the freedonist has the distinct satisfaction
of providing a principle v/ith which his own clnim may be
tested and ¥/ithout which neither it nor any other can be
proved. In fact, it is this consideration, this dileriima
in v/hich one must choose between freedom and skepticism,
that completely undermines the otherwise impressive and
quite persuasive claims of determinism, and, strange language
34
though it may seem, necessitates the postulate of freedom,
b. The positive a-rgument for freedom, then, is simply
this, that it makes possible a more canplete, consistent,
and coherent interpretation of experience than mechanism
could conceivably allow.
It was suggested that one of the roots of the tradi-
tional controversy about freedom was the assumption of uni-
versal, necessary causality; and it v/as asserted that that
assumption was unwarrexited. And by the coll op se of that
dogma, the principle of freedom was seen to be at least
possible. In this negative manner, in fact, it was affirmed
to be indispensable. But it is not enough to try to support
freedom simply by denying determinism; it is better to set
forth, as well, positive arguments which justify it. It
must be acknowledged iminediately that, like determinism,
freedom is a postulate which cannot be completely proved on
the basis of comprehensive empirical data. Just as the
34. Of. SpaAilding, WAI, 42-44, v/here he argues similarly.

determinlst cannot prove the deteminis tic nature of the
self's choices, so the freedomist is imable to deraonstrate
the claim that choices are made freely. But the principle
of freedom can be shov/n to possess a higher degree of pro-
bability because, unlike the theory of determinism which,
in its implications, is self-destructive and self-contra-
dictory, the principle of freedom is indispensable to a
consistent, coherent interpretation of man's total exper-
ience.
(1) Freedom is the presupposition of all proving.
One of the most decisive reasons for this affirmation
of freedom, as has already been suggested, is the fact that
freedom is the presupposition of all knov/ledge and every
claim that a conclusion is true or false. Unless freedom
is presupposed, every thought and. claim of every man in
every degree of health end sanity, at every age and in
every century, is equally necessitated, equally an effect,
and men are not only left without any way of knowing truth
from error and, thus, with those all-important concepts
altogether meaningless, but must stand in wonder and amaze-
ment before the bev/ildering fact that out of unique selves
characterized by unique orders of exxjerience ( the order of
events being decisive in determining what the outcome of
the causal series from moment to moment will be) come con-
clusions held aJj'aost in common. Tv/o different persons,
unique selves, (Darwim and Wallace), come independently to

sirailar conclusions concerning evolution; at different
places in Europe and at the same tine, and even earlier
in China, tmique persons v/lth unique orders of experience
cone to the s aiiie effect— the discovery of gunpov/der. On
the basis of determinism, the consequence of men's being
ujiique selves with unique orders of experience is unique
effects, unique conclusions; yet the stubborn and unalter-
able fact is that m.en hold many conclusions almost in common.
So determinism not only destroys all possibility of proof
and leads to skepticism, at the sar.ie time being burdened
v/ith explaining hov/ unique series of C8u.ses come constsntly
to numerous common effects; but freedom makes proof pos-
sible and readily explains how it is that unique experi-
ences can, in spite of their imiqueness, come to common
"effects," common conclusions. Without freedom, argument
descends from the presentation and weighing of evidence and
reasons to the causal, the cause to effect, relation of the
determined pounding of men's determined minds against each
55
other. In other v/ords, only because men are free are they
able to impose on themselves at any moment, and in spite of
nature's tendency to drive them in a different direction
than that of thinking, the ideal of logic, or coherence, or
scientific method. Nature scarcely drives men to them,
else hov/ widespread Y/ould men's wisdom bel And only as men
35. Spaulding, WAI, 42-44.
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do surrender to the objective ideal of logic, or coherence,
or scientific method can they test the validity of any
claim, distinguish between degrees of truth and error, and
come to a body of objectively valid laiov/ledge. Man gets
beyond skepticism and is capable of knov/ledge only because
he is free.
(2) Freedom is the presupposition of morality.
Without freedom, all men^s choices are equally neces-
sitated and there is no essentially moral difference between
right and wrong, good and bad, end "there are no moral
grounds for praise and blame. Apart from an objective
standard in the light of v/hich men can judge right and
v/rong, in the light of which they can decide to act rightly
or wrongly, how can there be any v/arranted sense of respon-
sibility and, therefore, justified praise and blame?
The determinist, again in the v/ords of McTaggart,
ansv/ers : "We approve or condemn v/hatever tends to produce
56
good or evil results, v.dthout further consideration."
But if men are inescapably deterinined to such and such pre-
ferences concerning what is good and evil, v/ho is to say
what is good? An objective (as opposing subjective and
purely Individual) standard is essential to men»s making
judgments of good or bad. But more important still, even
If McTaggart 's needs are granted and the above criticism is
36. McTaggart, SDR, 154.

not enforced, the fact remains that the "good" and "evil"
of the detemiinist ' s usage carries nothing of the meaning
essentiaJ. to morality. Though m.en be completely determined
they can do things that seemed good to themselves and other
but if men are determined, they never merit praise or blame
Such judgments are- no less relevant to sticks and stones
that serve or frustrate the realization of our purposes, to
soothing rain in a desert or aji earthquake when a city is
already on fire, than to the activities of deterra.ined auto-
matons. For equally, the activity could have been no other
the autoEiatons could not have done differently. On the
other hand, because men are free, they can be prohibited
from doing a good act that they willed, yet merit praise
because they willed it; they may, of necessity, do evil in
McTaggart's sense, in spite of a good v/ill, yet merit no
blame; or they may will evil and unv/ittingly do good, yet
never m^erit commendation for it. Though actual achievement
is of great practical importance, morality essentially
roots in the vdll and its freedom to choose between better
and worse. Thus, though punisliment is warranted even for
determinists—because it acts as a determinant ag;ainst men's
doing "evil," it carries, for them, no overtone of moral
37
censure, for the person could do no other.
Another moraJL datum which is intelligible only on the
37. Rickaby, PIV, 23-24.

basis ,of freedom is the inescapable experience • of responsi-
bility as it is associated with regret* Either these are
real or illusory; but, if illusory, hov/ ironic that v;e
should possess them so persistently, imd if illusory, how
utterly unintelligible in the light of the theory of evolu-
tion which holds that the useless and meaningless surely
38
pass away. How strange, indeed, that, not passing away,
they rather become more surely a part of men as the centur-
ies unfold I Hov/ utterly fiendish and absurd they are on
the determlnist^ s presupposition—men agonizing for errors
that they could not avoid, men remorseful for crimes they
had to corai.iitl But how thoroughly consistent are responsi-
bility and regret with the presupposition of freedom, the
assumption that, within limits, that v/hich men left undone
they might have done, that which they did they need not
have done— on many occasions possessing free choice among
39
several alternative possibilities. It is enough for present
purposes to show that freedom is the presupposition of
significant morality, but it is not irrelevant to add that,
if men took the deterministic theory seriously and believed
they were not responsible for their actions and not able to
select freely among alternatives, they v/ould, in good num-
bers at least, swiftly surrender to lower living, sensuously
38. Gamertsfelder and Evans, FP, 569,
39. James, V/B, 175.
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rejoicing in their treasured irresponsibility,
(5) Freedom is the presupposition of men's controlling
mechani sm.
Closely related to thought end morality is the tech-
nique of control. Like them, it is most intelligible on
the presupposition of freedom. If men are mere puppets
pulled by the strings of the cosmic process and necessary
causal lav;s, hov/ strange it is that these puppets should,
themselves, pull strings on the cosmic mechanism and pull
them tovre.rd v/hat appear to be nonmechanical, nonnecessitated
ideal ends. Admittedly, one mechanism might control another
as v/hen an erupting volcano, by its lava flow alters the
processes unfolding on the surface of the earth over wliich
it moves; but this v/ould not be control according to an
ideal end not necessitated by the mechanism's necessai^y
nature. But m.an's control seem.s to be aimed at any one of
a great variety of ends, not one necessitated end, and
utilizes innumerable specific mechanisms.
(a) Men are continually subordinating both physical
and psychological mechanisms to their purposes. Men of
science, through thought and experimentation under the self-
imposed ideal of logic end scientific method, have come to
understand and, as a consequence, to control and direct the
mechanism-s of the physical world. Simple illustrations of
40. Gauiertsfelder and Evans, PP, 569.

such occurrences are at every hand. By the choice of msn,
by his ovm will's decision, two flowers are combined in a
third, two fruits are blended into a third, a horse and an
ass are united to produce a mule, one's arm is raised ratheo?
then lov/ered, 'one holds his breath instead of breathing.
In every case, mechanisms are at v/ork, but man has deter-
mined the direction of nature from all the possibilities
within nature and her lav/s. Psychologists, by free inquiry,
have discovered m.echanisms of consciousness wlilch the mind
uses in carrying out its purposes. V/hen one strives to
recall, he often proceeds by using the mechanism of the
association of ideas; in. the ''realization of values.... if
there were no physiological mechanisms, we could not depend
41
on any striving's having any success...." B^^ means of
these mechanisms, one may freely choose to align his will
with the beautiful instead of the ugly, the good instead
of the evil, the true instead of the false. In short, men
control and use, for the realization of their own purposes,
the mechanisms of the physical and psychological realms.
ITow if men's minds were completely determined by these lav/s
and xjrocesses, hov/, possibly, could they determine, control,
and utilize them, except mechanically as lava influences
the earth which it covers or as fire blindly and mechanically
41, Brightmaii, ITP, 312,

"burns v/ood? The most coherent an^swer is that men's minds
are not v/hol3.y determined, are in a measure free, and may,
42
therefore, become the masters of mechanisms, freely subor-
dinating them to their ov/n freely forr.iulated purposes.
(b) Man considers himself rightfully the master not
only of inanimate things, but of all living creatures; the
v/hole \7orld was made for man, not man for the world. Even
irreligious men, living by the song of the psalmist, \mwlt-
tlngly sing:
For thou hast made him a little lower than the
angels, and hast crowned him. with glory and
honour. Thou madest him to have dominion over
the v/orks of thy hands; thou hast put all tilings
under his feet; All sheep and oxen, yea, and
the bGasts of the field; The fowl of the air,
and the fish of the sea, and whatsoever pas^eth
through the paths of the seas. 43
But \7hy? VJhat single reason can defend this intuition if
men are not of a higher order than sticks and stones,
swordflsh and sheep? This intuition is best defended on the
presupposition of man's spiritual nature and his membership •
t
in an order which stands, in essence, above the chain of
44
determined things and animals v/hich subserve his purposes.
In the light of what has been said concerning a principle
which is indispensable to reason and morality, what better
justifies his intuition of dominance, what better grounds
42. Cf. Spaulding, WAX, 65; Brightman, ITP 513.
43. Psalm 8:5-8.
44. Anshen, ¥1.1, 3. .

his spirituality, than the reality of liian's freedom, Man
is warranted in subjecting the V'/orld, including its animal
life, because he is spiritual, because he is free; man,
though physically weslc by comparison, is able to subject
the world in large degree, especially its animal life,
because his freedom enables him to think and to create
•
(c) More important still, why man's eternal concern for
the well-being of humanity (why, especially, the everlast-
ing struggle for the freedom and peace of men in the world
and the construction of rational and ethical governments)
if, for one thing, man is not the free spirit of dignity
and v/orth ("born in freedom and meriting freedom) that this
socia2 concern presupposes and if, in the second place, he
is completely determined by the past and, thus, in reality
(whatever his illusions may be), wholly Incapable of shap-
ing the future one tiny bit?
It is the point of these corainents that it is reasonable
for men to attempt to direct and possible for them to suc-
ceed in controlling the mechanisms of xDhysical, psycholog-
ical, animal, and social realms only because they are free.
(4) Freedom is the presupposition of idealism and
religion.
Freedom is indispensable to a rational universe and
the existence of a significant God; it is essential to
idealism and religion. V/illiain James points this argument
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in his volur;ie entitled The Wil]. to Believe * It roots in
the clear implication of de termini sin that all raen*s acts
are equally necessitated by the natural and necessary pro-
cesses of the cosmos. Christ's death on Calvary, Socrates
drinlcing the hemlock, James's impressive "Brockton murder,"
and the cruelties of the Nazi party under Hitler and Himmler,
are equally inevitable, inescapable, predestined effects of
the cosmic nature or the v/ill of its creator or sustainer.
ITot only natural, but "moral" evil, too, are the necessary
consequences of the nature of reality. So the universe or
(if, with Goethe, one dare express it) God either makes no
distinction between good and evil or is quite incapable of
avoiding evils so widespread and of such magnitude that
life becomes meaningless and God is seen limited to such an
extent, in spirituality or power or both, that he turns out
to be wholly unworthy of worship. For a being of the nature
imjplied by determinism is a fearful, fantastic fiend, or
hopelessly weak, or v/orthlessly nonmoral. And, as though
that v/ere not enough, this deterministic universe must be
seen as adding woeful insult to injury by giving man a sense
of moral right and \7r0ng when there is no basis in reality
for them and by permeating their spirits with an indestruc-
tible ought in a world in vdiich its realization is impos-
sible. But on the basis of the freedom of the self, man
45. 161-162.

becomes in large degree responsible for the evils of the
moral life he lives, the ought becomes intelligible, and
the universe is vindicated of direct responsibility for
man's failures while God, though perhaps still finite, is
certainly much worthier of v/orship.
(5) Freedom is the more coDiprehensive theory.
A concluding positive argument for the theory of free-
46
dom, in addition to its deep theoretical significance
47
end the fact that it is assumed by all in practice, is this,
that it not only preserves mechanism (in its appropriate
48
realms) as well as free spirits, but actually requires it.
Consequently, while determinism dogmatically denies the
latter and absolutely affirms the former, freedom coherently
relates both. For it recognizes that, while spirits are
free, their freedom is made possible and is limited by the
reality of mechanisms or, at least, uniformities in nature
which malve prediction and, therefore, rational choice pos-
49
sible.
4, How freedom expresses itself.
It has been argued that determinism is an untenable
theory and that the freedom of the self is an indispensable
reality. The next task is the more difficult one of indi-
46. Gaiiiertsfelder and Evans, FP, 571.
47. Cf. Brightman, ML, 78; Rickaby, F/if, 26.
48. Cf. Praser, LE, I, 372, n.
49. Cf. Brightman, Art. (1940), 494; PR, 381; Rickaby, m, 4,
dubiously states "that some acts are "altogether" free.

eating hov/ that freedom finds expression. Here, again, it
is impossible to cite every specific detail of empirical
evidence that one might desire; consequently, all that can
be done is to describe v/hat appears to be the real state of
things and let the reader decide whether it is a reasonable
interpretation.
a. It is affirmed, first of all, that freedom manifests
itself in thinking.
(1) V/hat is not affirmed.
(a) It v/ill not be argued that logical necessity is an
illusion or that a perfect being, in perfect thinlcing,
would fail to be necessits.ted to one inescapable conclu-
sion; rather, it will be conceded that logical necessity is
a reality and that perfect coherence would involve complete
50
necessitation in the relation of all ideas. It v;ill further
be conceded that, when men think under the ideal of logic,
to the degree to which logic is actually obeyed and the con-
tent of their minds is adequate, their conclusions will be
determined and adequate. But all such determination is
essentially logical, not causal, and does not oppose the
freedom of the self.
(b) It v/ill also be admitted that all men are limited
and, in this sense and in this degree, determined by the
quickness of the responses of their psychological mechanisms.
50. Blanshard, NT, I, 485; II, 264-266, 435.

their available physical and raentel energy on each occasion,
slips in memory, notation, measurement, and vision, by
health, habits, and integration of xDersonality, by their
ov/n potentiality for thinking, their former training and
skill in thinking, the scope of the world of ideas and de-
sires into which they have thus far entered, and the skill
they have developed in directing and holding their attention
51
to a task. These limitations and determinations are not
denied.
(2) '/That is 8-ffimed.
(a) In spite of and in the light of the past of hered-
ity and enviromiient and, in many instances, in spite of the
strongest desire of the present, men are free to think or
not to think about speculative problems or choices to be
made. In spite of the strongest urgings to the contrary,
men can, by the power of their v/llls, commit their atten-
tion and energies to the arduous task of thinking; or, in
spite of the fact that they know they ought to stox^ and think,
they can freely surrender to impulse. ^;7hether the laws of
logic are discerned by men at a certain stage in their
development purely of necessity is a moot question. In any
eventuality, it is not a decisive one for freedom. For
(and this is the point of importance) the laws of logic (a)
are themselves uncaused, eternally given, and, therefore.
51. Cf. Spaulding, WAX, 48; Thomson, SHA, 190.

apart from all our uneasinesses or drives or desires, are
objectively valid and, when properly employed, lead men not
to subjectively necessary effects, but to objective truth,
and (b) even if men are compelled to discover these laws
of logic, men, obviously, are not compelled either to serve
them or to reject them. It is in the objectivity of logic
and other ideals and in the freedom to impose them on one-
self or to reject them that men's freedom consists so far
52
as thinking is concerned.
(b) Having freely chosen to impose on himself the
ideal of logic or coherence or scientific method or mathe-
matics, one is able to continue the exercise of his freedom,
in that he may think hastily, and come to one conclusion;
or he may tliinl^ more carefully about the data that spring
spontaneously to his mind, and come to another conclusion;
or he may freely choose to withhold his judgment until he
has freely labored to recall all he can possibly recapture
of relevant data (at the same time rejecting ideas that he
counts irrelevant), and thereby come to another conclusion,
or he may deliberately decide to spend several months or
several years acquiring additional relevant data on the
basis of which he will be driven to still another conclusion.
So a man is, even after he has surrendered to the determining
52. Cf. Bowne, Per., 161, 205; Brightman, Art. (1940), 492;
BIL, 282-283; Hildebrand, ^bSSF, v.

lav/s of logic, in a good measure, free. And a mmi's conclu-
sions aboLit a problem will be one thing or another, depend-
ing not only on factors over v/hlch he has little or no
control but on the intensity and attentiveness with v/hich
he investigates and thinks about his problem or his alter-
natives. The thesis here affirmed is that that intensity
and attentiveness are factors which can be freely determined
by the free self; it is in harmony v/ith Blanshard's state-
ment that "mind itself is irreduclbly purposive and will
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elude the grasp of mechanism always." Much as one might '
wish the contrary, truth is not simply forced upon us; we
arrive at a measure of it only as we freely will to pay the
price for it. And the more rigorously and coherently we
exert ourselves, all other things being equal, the more v/e
com.e to knov/. How we m-ight v/ish sometimes that, in a sense
at least, we were determined to think and to thinlc thor-
oughly and accurately; hov/ we might wish that thinlcing did
not require such a resolute direction of our v/ills—though
our strongest desire urges us strenuously in another direc-
tion; hov/ we might wish that, to succeed in thinking, v/e
simply surrendered to our greatest present uneasiness or
our strongest desire; hov/ great the advantages would seem
if the same results could be secured by the determination
from the -past as by the laborious commitment of ourselves
53. Blanshard, NT, I, 480.
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to the demands of logic when it v/ould be so much easier
spontaneously to pl8.y or sing or lose ourselves in dreaming.
But the sober truth is that the way of the thinlcer is hard;
he is not driven of necessity to thinking or to soundly
coherent conclusions, but is given to thinking and attains
to conslusions primarily as he freely chooses to pursue
thought
•
(3) The significance of the theory.
Such a conception of the self in its thinking not only
makes knowledge and its verification possible and truth and
error intelligible. It also gives meaning to the otherwise
fruitless activity of hesitation, doubt, questioning, med-
itation, evaluation, reflection; for if the self's whole
activity and unfolding experience are completely determined
in advance, these experiences are superfluous gymnastics,
to v/hich, nevertheless, those who are considered the v/isest
and most virtuous give themselves most extravagantly and,
on determinlst terms, quite foolishly. If these experiences
are utterly inconsequential and insignificant, it would
seem that nature would not long tolerate such delaying
blockages, would rather ride, roughshod and irresistible,
dov/n its destined v/ay. But it was also said that this way
of looking at the self in Its thinl\:ing makes truth and error
Intelligible; and it does* But they must be conceived, on
tl'ils theory, never as absolutes but always as degrees of
truth, as more or less adequately coherent Interpretations

which, for finite minds, are never complete and perfect.
^Yhatever else coraspires to make for truth and error, then,
a highly significant factor is the intensity of purpose
with which the self freely pursues the task of enlarging
its experience and ordering it under the selMmposed ideal
of logic, coherence, scientific method, or mathematics.
Because this task can he freely taken up or laid down from
time to time, because men csji return to their old data, or
add new data, and bring them all before the same objective
bar of logic and coherence v/henever they freely will to do
so (again, other things being normsJ.), they csji verify their
knowledge and add to it from day to day.
b. Freedom manifests itself in choosing.
It has been argued that freedom manifests itself in
thinking. It m.ust now be explicitly emphasized (though it
has already been suggested) that that freedom to think or
not to think, that freedom which accompanies every moment
of the process of thinking despite its determination under
the lav/s of logic, is identical vi/ith the self's freedom to
choose emong alternatives in practical and moral situations.
Hot only is the self free in thinking about theoretical
problems; it. is free also to judge alternative courses of
overt action and to choose to follow any of the possible
alternatives. As Erightraan suggests, the word "possible"
may be adequately defined as meaning that which is "think-
able 8Jnd consistent with the facts and lav;s of the field in
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which the choice is made." Just as, on r.iany occasions, the
self can consider the alternatives of sweet surrender to
spontaneous desire or critical exaiiiination, of drearaing and
drifting in pleasant reverie or attentive reflection on a
theoretical problem, so the self can consider the various
alternatives presented by enj occasion end, as in the in-
stances Just referred to, having considered, csn freely
select the one that it v/ill follow,
(1) Deliberation and possibilities.
Now it is often argued that all this is sn illusion,
that this seeming freedom to choose among seeming possibili-
ties is not real. In the view of certain thinkers, such a
theory is absurd. Hobbes and his deterministic successors,
for example, among whom, in important respect's, Locke is
one, insist that every moment end movement of one's mater-
ialistic existence is absolutely determined; every act of
deliberation is but a conflict of emotions and desires. It
v;ill be conceded to the determinist that deliberation is a
state of conflict; but it must be speedily added that it is
no m.ere emotional upheaval or blind contending of forces
for sheer selfish pleasure. It is the sign of a free spirit
blocking the spontaneous and (if it v/ere so) irresistible
onv^rard drive of an otherwise puppet-person; it is the clear
indication that men are more than puppets. They are not
54. Brightman, Art. (1940), 487.
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merely pushed end pulled (though admittedly they are that
in part); they also push and pulll They are mechanistically
driven to a spontaneous act; rather, they would be--were it
not that the self can stop the whole drive and, in many
instances, suspend its onward movement indefinitely.
Again, as has been remarked in ajiother connection, if
deliberation is a wholly insignificant, nonspiri tual,
natural, expression of a wholly determined self, how is it
that nature's relentless course tolerates such trifling at
all? How is it that evolution preserves it? How is it
that, instead of discarding it and going on smoothly, nature,
in the form, of almost every self on the human level, gives
so m.uch of her time and energy to it? Is it not a more
coherent interpretation to acknowledge deliberation for
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what it not only seems to be, but for what it must be if
thought
j| morality, social reconstruction, and religion are
to embody the signif5.csiice men insist they have?
Further than this, if it be admitted that in delibera-
tion about 82tern£.tives men do actually suspend the onv/ard
m.ovem.ent and fulfillment of so-called necessary mechajiical
processes, then it would seem more reasonable to acknowl-
edge the seeming possibilities to be real ones. For it is
less antagonisitc to the idea of process that causes be
fraught with possible effects than that the process should
55. Rickaby, F1;V, 104.

be blocked completely. In other v/ords, it seems a far
greater achievement for a free spirit to stop the whole
process and jjower of nature's course than for it merely to
utilize nature's power and control it only so much as to
steer it slightly into any one of several alternative direc-
tions. Yet even deteminists admit empirical deliberation;
but they completely deny real alternatives.
Further still, though it be conceded that determinism
is a readily conceivable principle in abstraction, it must
be insisted that on specific occasions of even trivial
choices, such as Jairies's choice of the street he v/ill take
home, it requires the extremest v/ill to believe that the
choice of either street would not have been equally compat-
ible with all that had gone before in the universe and in
himself.
(2) Limits end rigors of deliberation.
Concerning this matter of one's deliberating about
possible alternatives, Schneider v/rites:
Being obliged to "stop and think" is often an
embarrassing predicament rather than an oppor-
timity. And even when welcome, the necessity
of choosing between alternatives is not ipso
facto "free determination"; it is often a
genuine end external obstacle.
These remarks prompt the re-emphasis of points that are
pertinent here, namely, that (1) on a freedomistic theory.
56. Schneider, Art. (1940

one is by no means "obliged" to thinkj he is often free,
hoY/ever, to think or not to think end to think v/ith various
degrees of intensity; (2) freedom does not m.ean caprice , com'
plete unrelatedness of the self's activity to ideas, satis-
factions, mechanisms, consequences, ideals, ends, persons,
or lack of limitation by the present field of choice; (5)
freedom, rather, requires lav/, order, uniformity, predic-
tability. That which partially limits and determines the
self also mekes its freedom possible.
(3) Ideals, ideas, and desires.
In relation to the affirmation that deliberate, free
choice is possible, one critical remark v/hich the determin-
ist may malce is this: V^lien you think you are judging de-
sires, impulses, and alternatives and, in the light thereof,
making free choices from among them, what you are really
doing is rationalizing, objectifying, your present desire.
That raises the question whether ideals are mere objectifi-
cations of desire, projections of slyly v/orking, necessary,
motives, and whether they, either as objective ideals or
necessary motives, inevitably determine us. If, in both
instances, the answer in the negative can be supported, real
freedom will have been shown to be probable; that ansv/er in
the negative can be supported.
(a) Ideals are more than values experienced or desires
realized; they go beyond, are not exhausted by, the complex
experiences of value already attained. To be sure, ideals
II
are formulated from our crude spontaneous value experiences;
but ideals are values criticized ejid crovmed with a beauty
never yet experienced as such; like theoretical postulates
that go beyond the given data, so moral ideals go beyond
the given data of value. Ideals are not exhausted in their
contributing causes; they are complex causes or values ex-
perienced, plus something beyond. Values experienced are
57
present; ideals are yet to be realized. As Sorley says;
The moral idea or ideal, for example, "is a selective prin-
ciple v/hich fimctions as a guide to striving and which may
58
determine as v/ell as be determined by feeling," This some-
thing new that goes beyond all that is given in mere feeling
or values experienced is a discovery of a free spirit in
its ideal-comprehending activity. Ideals are rationally
criticized and formulated concepts which may or may not in
present fact be desired. The ideal of goodness, even if
not desired, is recognized as having "undoubted authority
59
for the direction of" men's lives. And as men yield in
obedience to it, they excape from enslavement to natural
necessity. Sometimes such ideals are neither desired nor
pursued; sometimes they are not desired but are neverthe-
less pursued (though some natural appeal be exceedingly
strong); sometimes they may not be desired at first but, by
57. Sorley, IN, 190-192.
58. Ibid., 69.
59. Sorley, MV, 552-353.

some mysterious activity involved in contemplation of them,
come to "be desired. One reason why ideals end ideas free
men from natural necessity is already beginning to appear
and will be discussed shortly, • namely, that ideas frequently
precede desire and that even desires may be created by the
free self. Hedonism is seen, then, as a misuse of words or
as a basically inadequate theory of the self. But the cen-
tral point is that ideals are not m_ere rationalizations or
ob Rectifications of desire; they are rationally formulated
60
and objectively valid concepts v/hich are related to causes
but which are something more.
(b) More important, however, is the fact that even as
logical laws are objectively valid but need not necessar-
ily be imposed on oneself, so novel ideals, though acknowl-
edged to be binding on all enlightened mankind, need not
necessarily be pursued or obeyed. In other words, a self
is free (Locke to the contrary) either to accept or reject
an acknow^ledged m.oral ideal as an end to be sought and
served, whether it is most strongly desired or not. If a
determini st denies that one is free to do this, admitting
that he is determined by his present purpose to prove that
he is free, one may give himself indifferently but freely,
one after another, to devotion to the ideals, first, of
honesty, then of courage, then of cruelty, then of industry.
60. Brightman, PI, 89.

and still later of self-sacrifice. He can mske any one of
severaJL consciously considered ideals, hov/ever contradic-
tory, the Imiriediate end of his actions; and a man who can
freely do this in relation to ideals that have objective
validity is what is meant by a free man.
(c) This recalls again the significant fact that ideas
frequently precede desires; so that apart from desires,
ideas and ideals can be rationally criticized in tenns of
their coherence v/ith a man's total experience and possibili-
'ties. George E. Moore notes the significance of this fact,
though he affirms the idea to exist simultaneously with the
desire (which it often does) and fails to note that it
often precedes it, vdien he admits that the idea mav be said
61
"to be a cause of that desire," To express it otherv/lse
and to suggest its full significance, this means that, apart
from any necessary motive, ideas may be considered in term.s
of what they are and v/hat they imply when executed in ac-
tion; and, in the light of such criticis'.i, one of them may
be selected and raised by the clioosing self into a motive csr
end to be sought. In such circumstances, too (if only to
prove that one is free to do it), one m.ay select amd pursue
an idea which leads to the greatest misfortune while re-
jecting another which promised the highest happiness.
61. Art. (1940), 665; cf. Locke, 47; all subsequent footnotes,
in which only an Arabic number is used, refer to Locke's
Essay, II, xxi, the Arabic number denoting the section
of the chapter.
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(d) All this leads to another consideration that hedon-
istic determini sts overlook, narnely, that there is a differ-
ence "between desire and obligation and that only in a free
spirit does obligation become intelligible. According to
the determinist, obedience to desire is necessitated. But
if (as he must to deflnd his theory) he includes the sense
of obligation \mder the concept of "uneasiness" and desire,
his argument is undermined by this other consideration that
the uneasiness of obligation never quite necessitates ful-
fillment. How often one feels a sense of obligation, yet
ignores it. The determinist says this occurs because a
still greater unea.siness comiDelled him. But one raa^r also
fulfill a sense of obligation in spite of the fact that his
fulfilling it (he knows full well) will bring him the great-
est possible uneasiness. Certainly the sacrifice of Christ
on Calvary is such an illustration; it may have satisfied
his ovm soul—but his own satisfaction surely was not the
prime motive in his act. How impotent v/ould be his natne haH.
it been. As T. S. Eliot has expressed it in his Murder in
the Cathedral ;
The last temptation is the greatest treason:
To do the right deed for the v/rong reason.
Yet how pov/erful has been his name through succeeding cen-
turies I Both biography and psychology make it clear beyond
a doubt that self-sacrifice distinctly differs from the
satisfaction of desire and that surrender to the strongest

uneasiness is fe.v different from resolution to fulfill an
obligation. It is Jaries, again, v/ho maJces significant com-
ment on the difference betv/een the experience of desire and
the experience of responding to. a sense of ought when he
reminds us that
v;e feel , in all hard cases of volition, as if the
line tsicen, v/hen the rarer and more ideal motives
prevail, were the line of greater resistance, and
8.S if the line of .coarser motivation were the
more previous and easy one, even at the moment
when v/e refuse to follow it .SB
Tliere is a real difference between desire and ought xvhich
the hedonistic determinist does not amply consider; and the
fact is, as Brightmam has expressed it, that "the claim that
'all persons ought' to do so and so is logically and ethi-
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cally futile imless all persons can do what they ought to,"
(4) A free self is neither unrelated to nor wholly
determined by necessary motives.
It is perhaps well to re-emphasize that this argument
is not based on any such idea as that the free self is un-
related to desires and motives. Certainly it is related to
them.; but equally certainly it is not completely determined
64
by them, as would be an automaton or puppet. It can judge
them and it can select from them in the light of their
coherence with an ideal of life that one holds, having
62. James, PP, II, 548; suggested by Thomson, SrIA, 183; cf
,
Kant, KpV, A210-gl2.
63. Brightm.an, I£L, 283.
64. Bowne, Met.', 169; cited by Hildebrand, BSSP, 101; cf
.
McTaggart, SDR, 142-143.
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freely chosen it for himself. So long as he resolves to he
loyal to that ldeal--if he consciously imposes one on him-
self--so long he is determined by it, whether his ideal ig
his surrendering to impulses end uncriticized motives and
desires, or his proving that hedonism is false hy deliber-
66
ately enduring suffering which he might readily avoid, or
his judging certain things to be best and defiantly doing
67
their opposites, or his judging things to be best and faith-
fully pursuing them. So long as he thoughtlessly surren-
' ders to impulse (foregoing his freedom to think) and so
long as, having selected an ideal, he faithfully pursues
it, he is determined by it; but the important point to be
noted is that a man is free to decide for himself , within
limits, of course, what it is that shall determine him.
For even imder the determination of an ideal to which
one has surrendered, thereby transforming an ideal into his
motive, a person has a large measure of freedom in deciding
on the specific means by which he will seek to achieve his
grand ideal. He may want to lead the most reasonable life
possible, or to serve Christ, or to increase the well-being
of humanity. But how? Shall he teach, preach, become a
chaplain, man a gun., v/rite for the nev/spaper, enter politics?
Par from being wholly deten-alned to follow one v/ay, he may
65. Cf. Compton, PM, 55; Rickaby, RY/, 27.
66. Even McTaggart acknowledges that this is oossible;
SDR, 149.
67. Cf. Gross, Art. (1940), 167.

have great difficulty in deciding on any one of them, so
perplexed and so uncertain he may be as to v/hich is best
suited to serve his end. imd the difficulty is not emo-
tional; it is a matter of laiov/ledge; and the matter of
knowledge is imnecessitated and may be decisive in determin-
ing the v/ay he will go.
68
It has already been shown how in instances of thinking
end judging such as this, varied conclusions are all equally
possible depending in good measure on the intensity and com-
prehensiveness with v/hlch one freely wills to pursue a
solution to his problem. As Brand Blanshard has said: This
"process of discerning on end to be realized more fully in
one good than in another is certainly far removed from the
process of being driven by the stronger impulse" or "any
movement or collision of atoms or conflict of forces which
69
occur in the physical world."
It is even different from complete determination by
the grand motive or ideal of one's life.
(5) Possibilities and necessity.
Thus the argument leads to the conclusion that, in cer-
tain respects, a self or person is free to choose among
possibilities given on any specific occasion, and that,
therefore, reality must be conceived as not exclusively
68. A, 4, a, (2).
69. NT, I, 484.

necessary in its causal processes, but as a causality v/hici^
at many junctures, because men are spirits, embodies possi-
bilities. "Do not all the motives that assail us spring
equally from the soil of the past; and would not either
of them, whether realized through chance or through neces-
sity, the moment it v;as realized, seem to us to fit that
70
past?"
In choosing, then, a person does not defy nature; he
simply chooses one of several possibilities potentially
contained in and compatible v;ith reality. Thus, though
human choices cannot be absolutely predicted, they can be
explained after the event*
(6) The limitations of freedom.
But these possibilities are at the same time the marks
of the limitations to freedom. Though these liiTiitatlons
have been touched upon throughout this discussion, it is
not unprofitable now to consider them under a separate head-
ing. Clearly freedom is not mere caprice, spontaneous
activity, without rhyme or reason or any bounds; such free-
dom would be madness, not spiritual personality. What,
then, are the limitations of freedom?
(a) Logical limitations.
Men, like God, cannot do the logically impossible.
Further than that, while one's freedom is constituted in
70. James, V/B, 157; cf. Russell, FO, VII-VIII; Gompton, Fli,
63-65.

part by his ability to surrender to the ideal of logic, he
is, v/hen pursuing thought, bound by the principles of logic.
To the degree to which he is loyal to them, he is bound by
them; he has freely chosen, in thinking, to be so bound,
(b) Personal limitations.
Men's freedom is definitely 15.mited by the potentiali-
ties v^ith y/hich their physical and psychological heredity
has endowed them. Their personalities, their likes and dis-
likes, their ideals and hopes, are in good measure deter-
mined by the environment in v/hich they have been reared,
71
The cultural pattern of their family, their church, their
tovm, state, country, v/orld, villi definitely contribute to
the shaping of one's life and limiting of one's freedom.
Here the possibilities of freedom appear to be somewhat
proportimate to knowledge; one's limitations are decreased
and his possibilities of freedom are enlarged as he gathers
information, for example, about the mores of his family,
church, community, state, country, world, and the purposes
of the imiverse, and freely and critically thinks about them.
By so doing, he deepens his insight and broadens his field
of meanings and of ideals from which to select his own.
Heredity, environment, cultural influences, and, as well,
one's particular personal condition in any moment of deci-
sion, all these are limitations of one's freedom.
71. Cf. Boaz, Art. (1940), 375-380.

In more explicit detail, then, there are, in addition
to the logical limitations, personal limitations such as the
quickness of one's psychological mechanisms, present avail-
able physical and mental energy> slips in memory, notation,
m.easurement, evaluation, present health, habits of thought
and action, personal integration, original and potential
capacity for thinking, previous training and experience In
thinking, the desires and ideals one has come to know, the
extent to which one has developed will pov/er and patience
'and persistence.
(c) Limitations contained in the physical nature of
things.
It is the laws of nature and the possibility of jDredic-
tion that make freedom possible; but it is also the lav/s of
nature which limit human freedom. Persons are not free to
eliminate that phenomenon which is called the law of gravi-
tation; persons cannot alter the fact that human beings
beget human beings, horses beget horses, and asses beget
asses. Yet, human beings can manipulate the i^rocesses of
nature so that, by crossing an ass and a horse a mule may
be born. Freedom is possible, but it is limited, in this
direction, by v/hat nature will permit. So, also, the fact
that fire burns cannot be altered by human wit or freedom;
but, through freedom, persons may determine just what that
process of burning will be applied to, wooc= . or cloth,
pel aces or hovels, the cooking of food end the warming of

houses, or the devastation of cities,
(ci) Tlie limitations of the field of choice.
Another ever-present limitation to freedom is the alter-
natives presented by the field of choice. In the instance
of breeding, if there are two asses and tv^^o horses (in each
type, male and female), man's freedom is limited to just
three alternatives; namely, another ass, another horse, or
a mule. In the choice of a vocation, one without the nec-
essary professional training would find his freedom limited
by alternatives which did not include the ministry, law,
or medicine. In the choice of the particular form of
Christian service a minister will render, v/hether he will
enter the chaplaincy, or teach, or preach, or devote his
energies to v/riting, his freedom in choosing will be lim-
ited by his own qualifications; he may be physically unfit
for the army; he may be academically unprepared for teach-
ing. In that event, his freedom would be limited to just
tv/o possibilities, preaching or writing. Freedom is lim-
ited by the given alternatives, that is, those that are
conceivable end consistent v/ith the laws of the universe.
(e) Freedom is limited to the initiation of acts.
Another important limitation must be noted, that fact
that freedom revolves about moments of choice and decision
and goes no farther. One is free to decide to cross a
horse end an ass; but after that, nature takes its relent-
less course and there is little reasonable freedom left to

man to alter it; eventually a mule is born. If a man de-
cides to join the array as a chaplain, his freedom to decide
whether he will remain in the service until his term of en-
listment has expired is negligible. He freely chooses
whether he v/ill submit himself to the jurisdiction of the
army; but after that the army makes important decisions
for him.. After the acts of free persons are initiated,
the processes of the imiverse taJce control. Medicine is
administered by a doctor; nature's processes carry on from
there. An aviator drops a bomb; thereafter his freedom is
gone as far as the consequences of the act are concerned;
the bomb bursts as nature necessitates. One chooses freely
to tal:e this train rather than that, but after the deci-
sion is made, and one boards the train, the train takes
him. One makes his free decisions and the processes and
lav/s of the universe carry them on to their necessary con-
sequences, logical, moral, psychological, and physical.
But, limited as it is, man's freedom is not destroyed;
in fact, the same factors that limit it make his freedom
possible; for v/ithout uniformity and prediction, there could
be no rational freedom. Man's freedom is comparable to a
bird flying about in a cage; it is free to fly; but it is
not free to fly every^.vhere . So man is free; but he is not
free to defy the necessities of logic, the peculiar per-
sonal limitations im.posed by his heredity, envlronii-ient, and
general cultural pattern, the unv/avering processes of nature.

the limitations of possible alternatives in a specific
field of choice, or the inevitable consequences of an act
once the act is initiated and is beyond man's pov/er to can-
cel or recall.
c. Freedom is manifested in action.
Freedom, expresses itself in relrftion to one's pov/er to
perform. In a discussion preliminary to a consideration of
Locke's freedom, it is imperative that this implication be
mentioned for, as will be shown later, Locke very often
implies that this is the only significant way in which free-
d.om may be attributed to man» The view is that man's free-
dom consists not in thinking or in willing (these may be
determined absolutely), but in the iDOv/er to perform that
which his will decrees. That is, a man is free when, if he
v/illfj to raise his hand, he is able to do so, if, when he
wishes to think, his physical and mental state is such as
to enable to do so. Specifically, in the realm of morality,
this view implies that man's intentions are not essential
to morality; it is only the overt consequences of actions
that count. If a man wishes to save a life, but has physi-
cal handicaps that prohibit it, the act is bad; if a man
seeks to take a life, but mistakienly gives his intended
victim and companion in the desert v/ater, rather than a
water-like, but poisonous liquid, the act is good.
Freedom is not related to a free spirit, as such, but
to a man's pov/er to execute v/hat he v;ills to do, to his
I
ability to control his own "body, for example. In the ful-
filling of his purposes (even though his purposes he com-
pletely determined), to his skill and strength in success-
fully utilizing or opposing the' forces of external nature.
Does he wish to cross a raging torrent? If he succeeds,
he is free. Does he wish to lift a fo.llen tree from the
legs of his comrade? If he is able to do so, he is free*
Now as a matter of fact, this power to rierform what one
wills is a pov/er of tremendous importance to freedom; with-
out it, any freedom of the will itself would be quite unre-
lated to everyday experience—for the heart of one's life
is one's performing of acts. Both the determinist and
freedomist agree that the pov/er to do what one wil.ls, with-
in ep)parent limits, is vital to the expression of man's
will. But the determinist may stop here and affirm, as
Locke at times does, that this is the exclusive realm and
the precise nature of freedom; "where either of them (the
pov/er to do or forbear any i^articular action) is not in the
power of the agent to be produced by him according to his
72
volition, there he is not at liberty." But, when he is
able to perforrA that v/hich his will decrees, he is free.
This might be called effective freedom; but freedom is not
essentially this; end effective though this may be, apart
from freedom in its essential nature, it is not freedom at
72. 8; parentheses inserted by the writer of this disserta-
tion; cf. 9, 10, 15, 16, 21, 27.
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all, "but the mere physical or mental activity of an auto-
maton. For all practical purposes this effective pov/er to
execute one's will is of inestimable importsjice, Taut it is
an appendage or instrument of freedom rather than its es-
sence. For freedom is inherent not in mechanisms or auto-
73
matons, but in spiritual agents or persons.
5. How freedom is to be conceived.
Y^hat remains nov; is the most difflcTolt task with which
one is confronted when he undertakes to deal with the q^uestion
of freedomism versus determiniaiw The terms detemlnism ^d
freedom, have been defined; it has been argued that the
principle of causality cannot be held universally and that
freedom is Indispensable to an -understanding of the self;
it has been suggested that freedom manifests itself in
thinking and in choosing and is related to a man's pov/er to
perform that which he freely wills. It remains nov/ to indi-
cate just how the freedom, of the self is to be conceived
and described.
a. It may defy portrayal.
In attempting such a task, one recalls the v/ide differ-
ence of opinion on the subject; one remembers that the idea
was so difficult that liobbes called it absurd and Locke
assumed that, because of its difficulty, freedom could not
73. Cf. Palmier, PP, 192-193, v/here this view is expressed
in alm.ost the same way.
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exist. One, therefore, listens attentively to the words of
Bovme v/hen he suinmarizes the matter by saying that, on the
one hand, freedom is altogether necessary and, on the
75
other, wholly defies analysis or construction,
b, V/hat the theory is not.
How even if thi.s does turn out to be the necessary
conclusion, it is not unprofitable, in the closing section
of a discussion preliminary to a consideration of Locke's
viev/s of power, to try to indicate the nature of freedom
suggested by the viev/ expounded here. Most certainly it is
not Kobbes's viev/; its thoroughgoing, selfish, hedomistic
determinism leaves too much out of account—action to one's
own detriment, self-sacrifice, altruism. As clearly, it
is not Locke's, as em.phasized thus far; the freedom to
perform scarcely touches the problem of freedom at all.
Hot can it be the soft deterministic viev/s of Hume and Mill
their faith in the idea of necessity from a closed past
—
though it Include character as vvell as circumstance
—
pre-
serves no freedom unless character is Interpreted as having
future possibilities ; otherwise, it reduces to hard deter-
minism in which at birth the v/hole history of a self might
be predicted if full knov/ledge of that self vw'ere then at
76
hand, A tightly closed past, however described, v/holly
74. 75.
75. Bowne, Per; 210,
76. Praser, LE, I, 372, n.; cf. Palmer, PP, 83, 185, 107;
Hudson, PLBH, 5,
I
excludes freedom. Neither Is it the view of Immanuel Kant
In which action according to reason is the essence of free-
dom; but this view that man is free only when he thinlcs and
acts rationally is another kind of determinism, rightly
called, by Palmer, idealistic determinism* It is an advance
on detennlnisms in general, but It is not the equivalent of
real spiritual freedom. Similarly, though appealing in
m.any respects, George Herbert Palmer's conception of freedom
is scarcely adequate; for it, too, iiltimately roots freedom
77
in necessary loyalty to reason, softening it by adding,
over Kant and Hegel, only that men can forsake freedom by
refusing to be rational, but at the saine time erroneously
affirming that they thereby yield up their nature as persons.
c. V/hat the theory is.
(1) In general.
Nov/ personality is personality even though it be irra-
tional; a person is a self capable of reason and ideal
values whether or not it employs it or pursues them. Like-
vfise, in the broadest though ethically Insignificant sense,
freedom is, potentially, in every normal man and is there,
actually (whether he generally employs reason or not), ever
after he becomes av/are that, by using reason, he can deflect
himself from, the pathv/ay through which his past history
alone would drive him. In other words one can freely choose
77. PP, 170-171

to surrender to basic impulses and refrain from taking the
pains to think about them; further still, after one has re-
flected on various alternative actions one way remain a
free person— though immoral, and may deliberately choose
(contrary to Palmer) that which is judged less than the
best and work against reason rather than v/ith it. In shorty
freedom exists potentially in all nor-mal men, end actually
78
in them after they are aware of their power to think
v»'hether they freely choose to employ it or not and whether
after they use it, they heed its decrees or freely select
79
what reason disapproves. Reason is indispensable to the
noble employment of freedom, but plain freedom is a reality
in men v;hether they heed the voice of reason or v/illfully
stop their ears I
(2) Kindred theories.
The theory of freeddm expounded here is closer to such
80
views as those of Hudson or Spaulding, though even these
81
are not wholly satisfactory. Hudson's, like Kant's theory
of a transcendental self, seeks to place the essential self
82
in an isolated or super tempor aJ. world; his aim is right (the
self must somehow be its own master not rigidly deterrained
in its future either by its past or by a present rigidly
78. Cf. Hocking, SEP, 150-151.
79. Cf. Brightman, Art. (1940), 496,
80. PLBH, 40, 43.
81. KpV, AlO-12; KrV, A537-538, MM, 86; cf. Calkins, PP, 257.
82. Cf. Bridgman, Art. (1940), 534.
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determined by its past), but this solution is inadequate in
that it creates the problem of the connection betv/een this
83
isolated self and the v/orld of exi^erience, Spaulding's
84
theory that the mind, though closely connected v/ith the
causal order, operates according to a law of reason which
makes it essentially independent of the causal law, is more
suggestive of the truth; but the difficulty here is to laiov; iic'^v the
two ]aws are related (but this may prove to be the insurmount-
able difficulty for all theories, so obsessed our minds are
v;ith the faith that not even a self acts without prior and
necessary causes )
1
(3) This theory analyzed in detail.
V/hat, then, is the theory proposed here? It is this.
A self may freely choose one course rather than another;
it may shape its course contrary to complete, natural necea-
sitation from its historic past. In that choice, though
the possibilities are f\irnished by the past and by environ-
ment, the ideal one operates under (v;hich is more than the
total of his past experience as such), the motivation which
prompts him to pursue that ideal, and the specific decision
made under that ideal, are in a decisive measure free from
complete compulsion and determination iintil the decision
itself is made.
85. Cf. Schneider, Art, (1940), 657; Hocking, SBF, 157.
84. Spaulding, V/AI, 68-69.

(a) How prediction is impossible and freedom conceivable
How it is possible that a self, even In a small but
decisive respect, may be an independent or first or creative
cause is difficult to perceive, especially in the light of
this theory* s aclcnov/ledgment that the self and its choices,
though not determined completely by the past, are possible
only because of the wealth of possibilities end isolated
data presented by the past. Perhaps, at last, it must be
85
left in the realm of mystery. Yet a theory will first be
suggested. Though this theory is not intended to demonstrate
the form of a free decision on more complicated moral and
spiritual levels, it is intended to suggest something of
how such independence might express itself and how it might
be conceived. Let it be presented in an illustration.
Under the immediate grand motive of proving to you
that, somehow
,
any one of various possibilities grov/ing out
of my past and present may be equally chosen or realized, I
call up for consideration ten ideals, represented by ten
balls on a table. You, with full knov;ledge of my past and
present self and circiimstances, conclude that my choice
must be number eight. You even tell me of your conclusion.
85. Bowne, Per
, 210; cf. Palmer, PP, chapter IX, especially
180-181, where he cites the mysteries his theory involves
note, particularly. Porter, Art, (1874), 418, v/here he
paraphrases Sir William Hamilton as follows: This "is
true of our belief in God and Free-Will. ¥/e cannot con-
ceive of an uncaused or self-exi stent Being, but we can
believe that such a Being exists. Similarly, vie cannot
conceive of a free act, i.e., an absolute comraencement,
but we are compelled to believe it."

and then add this, my nev/ knowledge, to the data considered
in predicting ray action. Knowing my e:q)llclt present pur-
pose and all other things about me, Including the fact that
I choose to select one of the ideals by chance , by haphaz-
ard, all you can predict with absolute certainty is that I
will not choose number eight. Or, if I close my eyes and
chose blindly, your full knowledge cannot predict even that.
Any one of the other nine might equally be chosen. The
Information necessary to the prediction (v/hich then is but
after-description) of my choice is non-existent and unavail-
able until my will actually chooses* What is necessary to
an exhaustive explanation of the act (and what makes pre-
diction impossible) is the act itself .
In some such sense as this, the self is uniquely free.
In some such difficult sense (far more difficult v/hen
raised to a moral and spiritual level in which preferences
and purposes in large measure grow out of the past yet do
not completely bind the future in iron shackles), in some
such difficult sense it is that, in the life of a self as
in the development of thought "the form of what emerges con-
86
trols the course of its ovm emergence." In some such way
as this, decisions "are altogether peculiar psychic facts.
Self-luminous and self-justifying at the living moment at
87
which they occur .»"» In some such manner as this it is "that
86. Blanshard, NT, I, 482-483.
87. James, V/B, 158.

any given act of choice Is not unequivocally determined by
the Immediately preceding situation, but that the person
himself determines his choice by a spontaneous selective
act Its causation is internal to the act and purely
88
personal, not impersonal or external to it." It is something
like this of which Bowne was thinking when he said: "By
definition a free act is an absolute beginning, and as such
is not represented by anything before its occurrence * We
trace it to a specific volition, and beyond that it has
89
neither existence nor representation." It is something
like this to v/hich Spaulding referred when he v/rote: "The
real scheme of things is, I maintain, one that involves
90
every now and then a break v/ith the past»" And it is to
preserve what this theory suggests the necessity of pre-
serving that Palmer v/rites:
If any present desire and purpose are altogether
controlled by those which preceded, the inner
life is as inevitable as the outer and the
operations of my character no less fated than
those of planetary motion. ^1
Now this freedom of indifference or chance , illus-
trated here, is not, as such, much to be coveted; but it is
important as suggesting the inadequacy of this most chal-
lenging theory that men's actions are so rigidly determined.
88. Brightman, ML, 277 j italics by the v;riter of this dis
sertation
89. The ; 189; italics by the writer of this dissertation.
• Quoted by Hildebrand, BSSF, 103; cf . BSSF, 265.
90. ?/AI, 61.
91. PP, 185.

that, with full knov^ledge of past and present (present
preceding^ the imminent act of will which is not present
or existent except as it comes to exist in the future and
in itself supplies nevr data, being both the thing explained
and the explanation), one might perfectly predict the
future. And that is all that it is intended to clarify;
to this, hov/ever, is appended the suggestion that, if the
past and present (preceding the act of will itself) cannot
account completely for all acts--such as acts of chance
—
they may no better be able to account completely for (and
thus shov/ them to be necessitated) other moral and spirit-
92
ual decisions of the vd.ll, thus making possible that condi-
tion which reason and morality require, namely, that a
person »s character be "his ov/n" and not merely "the product
93
of a process," It also illumines further the fact that,
for a self, the past is freighted with possibilities from
v^hich it may freely choose—in conformity with a plan or
purpose or ideal freely formed, or in opposition to it—
rather than be bound by a rigid chain of necessity. And it
warrants the conclusion that, whereas before the event,
absolute prediction is theoretically impossible, after the
event, complete explanation is theoretically conceivable,
(b) The nature of this free self.
That some such element of the novel or creative or
92. Cf. Palmer, PF, 83.
93. Hudson, PLBH, 5.
I
formative and unnecessitated enters Into a seir»s free
choice appears probable. But v/hat is the nature of the
self which makes this possible, this partial independence
from necessity? Possibly the fact is that the self or
agent is not a conjunction of separate pov/ers but is rather
a complex unity which simultaneously expresses itself in
several ways—in thinking, v/illing and feeling. It is
consciousness which recognizes itself as belonging together
as a whole and v/hlch knows itself as thinking, willing and
feeling all at once. iBut these are not separable pov/ers or
faculties; they are abstracted only for thought; they exist
as one conscious unity.
Tlie self»s freedom may be constituted, however myster-
ious it precisely is, by the whole, whose very nature is
the pov/er, as a v/hole, to be more than, and independent of
the parts, independent of the chain of natural feeling and
impulse and desire, and of necessary obedience, too, to
the dictates of reason, even though, at the same time, it
is essentially related to them, is, in fact, constituted
by them. This self is not cut off from necessity; nor is
it wholly enslaved by it. It is not enslaved by reason;
nor is it unable to utilize it. While, on the one hand,
there can be neither feeling nor v/llling without conscious-
ness or a minimum of "thinking," there cm, on the other
hand, be no directed thinl^ing v/hich is rigorously subordin-
ated to the ideal of logic unless the will
—
guided by at

least a minimum of thinklng--directs the self to this most
rigorous thinking. So in a sense, thought is dependent on
will, while neither vd.ll nor feeling can exist where there
is not at least a minimian of thought. The empirical prob-
lem, then, is to determine whether feeling, which is depen-
dent on conscious thought, determines the will v/hich cannot
exist apart from a minimxwn of thinking or consciousness or
v/hether thinlcing, which is impossible on the plane of rea-
son unless the v/ill directs it, determines the will, or
whether and how the self, as a whole, somehov/ embodies,
yet transcends both. Here is the empirical paradox that
defies analysis; here, in the mystery of the relation of
thinking, willing, and feeling, three types of experience
in one, may be enfolded the secret of the nature of freedom.
Perhaps it roots, somehow, in the nature of the whole mind
or whole spirit as compared v/ith any of its abstracted
94
parts. There may be a natural necessity and there is a
logical necessity as well as a world of spirit as opposed
to nature; but how these proceed in their mingled activi-
ties along the course that leads to thought, decision, and
action, can anyone surely say? Yet the fact that two
worlds exist and function in interrelations is, itself,
enough to make a clear and persuasive idea of a thoroughing
necessity exceedingly difficult to conceive; enough to urge
94. Of. Whitehead, AI, 59, where he expounds a similar view.

the insight that the self, as a v/hole, is a mysterious and
free master of processes rather than a v/holly necessitated
process itself.
(c) Necessity, its infinite regress, and God,
If these attempts to show how freedom, which defies
prediction, is possible and hov/ the self is constituted so
as to make itself, as a whole, significantly, though, par-
tially. Independent of a process or processes that affect
it or go on in It, If these attempts fall in either clarity
or persuasiveness or both (as they well might because, on
the plane of empirical analysis, the problem appears ulti-
mately insoluble, the mystery Impenetrable), it must be
pointed out that, though on a limited segment of the empiri-
cal plane the principle of necessity is clear and compel-
ling, v/hen the plane is extended to the limits which thought
demands, or v/hen the argument Is placed (v/here it must
finally be placed) on the metaphysical plane, the mystery
of necessity becomes equally baffling, and has the additional
disadvantage of solving less problems than does the theory
of freedom. Let these difficulties be considered specifi-
cally.
1. The difficulty with necessity is that it is a self-
contradictory principle. Its basic thesis is, every effect
has a necessary cause; nothing can begin v^hich is uncaused.
As a consequence, the embarrassing truth becomes clear that
the concept cannot be thought, since it disintegrates in an
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infinite regress. Nov/ if, as one might, the determinist
believes in God and says: the eternal God, who needed no
beginning, began the necessary series of the universe, then
he is grounding his principle, but he is grounding it on a
principle which clearly discounts the universality and the
primacy of necessity. Hobbes, for example, compromises the
universality of necessity, though he clings to necessity,
when he says: Nothing can "begin v/lthout a cause...
96
unless it was eternal." In this argument, the deter-
minist Is asserting, first, that there is an iinnecessitated
cause, an eternal God, and, in the second place, that the
unnecessitated cause, the eternal creative spirit, is the
superior cause, v/ithout v;hlch necessity could not exist at
all.
So necessity, as sole explanation, is outlawed because
its infinite regress is unthinlcable and (if its supporter
resorts to God) because it becomes purely relative and
subordinated to spirit*
11, Now freedom is likewise an evasive concept, espe-
cially on the basis of analysis of the self; but it has the
advantage on the metaphysical plane, on the basis of the
argument from God, of being more readily conceivable and
intelligible. For on this view, it may be argued that God,
v;ho orders the -universe by a principle of necessity, also
95. Gf. Praser, LE, I, 367, n.
96. LN, 276.
II
I
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orders the existence of persons and, creating them in his
own Image, creates them as free, creative, spirits, in
essence, in fundamental reality, like himself. They, like
him, recognize necessity in certain realms of the universe,
but they, like him, know themselves as spirit, in basic
nature, in the life of their selves as spirits, to be inde-
pendent of the unspiritual, natural, principle of necessity.
Here, one is brought back again to the earlier thesis of
this paper, namely, that necessity is only relatively true.
And one Is reminded, too, that not only is necessity ordered
by God, but it is recognized by human spirits as in another
sense, given to nature by themselves, by their own minds.
It is important to note that the theory expounded here
sharply contradicts the views asserted by Hudson in his
97
discussion of Locke. Hudson Insists that spiritual freedom
is possible only for persons who are eternal, that persons
created by God could not be free. Now, for one thing, it is
no more difficult to conceive of God creating free spirits
than to conceive of him creating spirits at all; it is not
rash to presume that he could create things equal in v/onder
to himself, a free spirit. Vi/hereas he is free as eternal
and uncreated, man might well be free as created in God»s
ov/n image by him who possessed the power to ordain it so*
Further than this, if Hudson thinks he has solved the problem
97. PLBH, 40-42.

of freedom by presupposing eternal, uncreated persons, he
should see, too, that he has created several tremendous
problems wnlch may be even greater than the one he subtly
solves. Hov/ amazing it is that persons, living eternally,
should not have the slightest consciousness or memory of it;
how discouraging too, to intellectual and moral effort,
and hov; disastrous for moral experience that persons should
have consciously carried to this life nothing that they
learned through a whole eternal life and should have not
the slightest sense of personal responsibility for anything
they did before. Vifhere and in v/hat form did they pass their
previous existence? Why, if men are eternal spirits, do
they not have an eternal vision and insight about reality?
Why, if men are, like God, eternal, are they so utterly
ignorant of the eternal nature of things, so limited in
understanding as to be almost completely ignorant as com-
pared with v/hat God must know. Surely existence is an un-
profitable venture if, after the labor of eternity, persons
(now human) have attained to no more than this. It may be
unsatisfactory to some to ground persons in the creative
work of God, but hov/ much more arbitrary— and unprofitable--
it is to affirm free persons on the ground of their eter-
nal, uncreated, existence, when there is no experience what-
soever v/hich supports such a claim and v/hen it creates more
problems than it solves.

(d) Si3inm£iry«
This, then, is the vlev/ of freedom argued here. Spirit
is real; nature and necessity are subordinated to it and
ordered by It, Spirit is, in measure, free, as opposed to
nature which is necessitated; spirit is free as eternally
existing in God and, mysteriously created in man, in God*s
own image, by God himself
As spirit, man is m.oved by processes and desires that
arise from nature and is challenged by spiritual realities
that arise from one's ovm spiritual nature and from the
spiritual realm in and beyond nature, which Includes God»s
purposes, the well-being of other persons, the challenge of
ideals objectively real and authoritative. Ml these are
voiced by and follov/ed not on the call of desire but on the
distinctly different and essentiaily spiritual Imperative
of the ought, Man is a free spirit who may yield to count-
less desires foisted on liim naturally, or may assert liis
v/ill to follov/ in the way he believes he ought to go.
Reason is the ldea2 guide employed both by desire and by
ought; reason, however v/eak in certain persons its light
may be, is able to reveal to all normal men that they are
free. And in the light of this knowledge, they may act
freely, in response to the ought urged by the ideal world
or the desire urged by the realm of nature. Freedom is
nobly used, however, v/hen the spirit pursues the line of
obligation and subordinates the urging of desire; though

often, of course, the tv/o may go hand in hand. Even lowly
persons who accept traditions or intuitions as guides to
what they ought to do are free in that they, too, know the
difference "between oiight and mere desire, and, according to
their light (for which alone they are morally responsible),
freely choose between them. Man is free because he is
spirit and superior to nature which may be necessitated;
as spirit, he may freely surrender to reason or Ignore it,
do v/hat he ought to do or what he desires to do, has moral
responsibility, is a person, not a process.
As Puvls de Chavannes's famous painting of Plato, in
the Boston Public Library, symbolizes, man is, ia Plato's phrase,
"une pi ante du ciel non de la terre"; man is spirit, not
matter, and it is this that makes him free.
However inadequate or unllluminating this or any expo-
sition of the nature of freedom may be, its reality must
nevertheless be affirmed because of its essential function
in the quest for truth, for morality, for religion, for
man*s control of his world. Even if it is too difficult a
98
concept to be clearly described it is logical, inescapable
and indispensable. One may well have to be content Y/ith the
99
conclusion of Bowne:
Suppose tlriere were a free person with experience
of life's meanings and insight into its values
and obligations. There is nothing in his freedom
98. Cf. Locke, 73; Fraser, LE, I, 568, n; Brightman, Art. (1940),
504.
209-210; cf. Hocking, SBF, 157; Fraser, LE, I, 372, n.

to hinder his acting rationally or to excuse him
for acting irrationally; but how he will act does
not find its sufficient ground in the "antecedent
phenomena" alone, but also in the mystery of self-
determination. And this is some tiling which can-
not be mechanically analyzed or deduced as a nec-
essary resultant--it can only be experienced.
The attempt to analyze it contradicts it. The
attempt to construct it denies it. It can only
be recognized as the central factor of personal-
ity, the condition of responsibility, end the
basis of the moral life. Criticism cannot hope
to construe it; it can only point it out as a
fact, and shov/ that the objections to it rest
only on an imperfect understanding of thought it-
self.
Even if it cannot be described, freedom must be affinned.
B, Locke's Theories of Persons! Freedom,
In the light of this preliminary discussion of freedom,
the views of this British empiricist, who felt that "t37ue
notions concerning the nature and extent of liberty are of
100
so grisat importajice" and whose own views on the subject have
had so wide an influence, may now be more clearly expounded
and criticized.
It must be remarked at the outset that, in this matter
as in things generally, Locke was in utter earnestness; Locke
was deeply concerned about attaining a sound interpretation
of the nature of human freedom. So earnest he v/as about this
particular problem that in subsequent editions (especially
the second in which he made extensive additions and intro-
duced for the first time his confused considerations about
101
deliberation), he freely corrected his former opinions.
100, 74.
101, Of. Praser, LE, I, 529, n,2.

boldly confessing Mmself to be "a lover of truth, and not
102
a v/orshipper of my own doctrines."
Despite all his earnestness and effort, however, his
success in this undertsiving v/as none too great, a fact which
is evident on careful reading and one on v/hich some critics
103
are agreed. Praser calls this chapter on power "perhaps the
104
least satisfactory in the Essay , " In his correspondence,
Locke himself suggests his ov/n perplexities in the reasonings
105
of that chapter. But the causes of Locke's difficulties and
the chapter's inadequacies will be made clearer as discus-
sion proceeds.
One other introductory remark need be made, namely, this,
that Locke's discussion of freedom, or liberty, as he often
calls it, falls into three major parts which are left at the
end disconnected, never clearly and cogently related. It is
with these three views of freedom (freedom as power to per-
form v/hat is willed, determination by uneasiness or desire,
and the experience of deliberation)^ their relations, sud
Locke's specific thesis that one must will v/hat he considers
best for himself, that this chapter will deal. Each of thess
views will be expounded and criticized in order; then Locke's
theory as a whole v/ill be evaluated.
102. 74; in a letter to the Bishop of Worcester he writes a^i:
"My aim (was) purely to follow truth as far as I could
discover it,,/." Cf. Locke, LEW, 3.
103. Hudson, PLBH, 24.
104. Fraser, LE, I, 380.
105. Ibid,, 329, n.2.
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!• Freedom as pov/er to perform what is willed.
a» Exposition,
Locke begins and closes his exposition vzith considera-
tion of the thesis which is suggested by the very title of
his chapter on power, namely, that freedom consists in the
power to perform what a man v/ills. If a man wills to lift
his hand, or to refrain from lifting it, the question is
v/hether he has the physical power to perform what he wills.
Freedom "is not an idea belonging to volition, or preferring;
but to the person having the pov/er of doing or forbearing to
106
do according as the m.ind shall choose or direct." The quite
simple conception of freedom here suggested, freedom from
physical, m.ental, or external hindrance to one's actual exe-
cution of what is v/illed is expressed again thus:
So far as a man has power to thinlc or not to think,
to move or not to move, according to the prefer-
ence or direction of his own mind, so far is a man
free. wOierever any performance or forbearance are
not equally in a man's pov/er; wherever doing or
not doing will not equally follow upon the prefer-
ence of his mind directing it, there he is not
free.... 107
So far as any one can..«.mal^e Ijt to exist or not
exist, so far he is free.108
Freedom (is) our being able to act or not to act,
according as we shall choose or will. 109
y/ere it not that Locke flatly contradicts himself in
his subsequent discussion of liberty as consisting in the
106. 10; cf. 8, 9, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 21, 27, 41, 57, 73.
107. 8.
108. 21.
109. 27.

85
pov/er to deliberate, one would have to conclude that Locke
meant this conception of freedom as pov/er to perform to be
the alpha and omega of his view. As may already have been
suggested, Locke asserts this vlev/ not only at the beginning
and at the end of his exposition, but he boldly states that
freedom consists in this "indifferency" of " the operative
poY/ers of the man " and not "in any other"; "as far as this
110
indifferency reaches, a man is free, and no further," "Our
111
idea of liberty reaches as far as that pov/er and no farther*
"
V/here a man lacks this power to perform, "there he is not at
112
liberty," "liberty consisting in a pov/er to act or to for-
113
bear acting, and in that only," As though to emphasize the
exclusive and complete adequacy of this plain view of freedom,
he asks: "Hov/ can v/e thinly any one freer than to have the
114
pov/er to do v/hat he vd.ll?"
Though no further exposition is required to clarify
Locke's meaning, it may, nevertheless, be profitable to
point out that it is to be understood as the view maintained
by Hobbes:
If a man should talk to me of,,.» a free sub.ject ;
a free v;ill ; or any free , but free from being
hindered by opposition, I should not say he were
in error, but that his v/ords were without mean-
ing, that is to say, absurd,115
110, 75,
111, 10,
112. 8,
113. 24.
114, 21,
115. Lev., 32-33; cf. LN, 247.

This is the viev/ v/hich one of Locke's most approved contem-
poraries attributes to Locke; it is Locke's correspondent,
Anthony Collins, v/ho v/rltes that liberty is
le pouvoir qu'a ^ 'Homme de falre ce qu'il veut, ou
ce qu'll lui plait. .C est I'idee qu'en ont eue
Aristote, Cic§ron, M. Locke, et plusieurs autres
Philosophes anciens et modernes»116
b. Criticism.
In the light of what has already been said of such a
117
viev/ of freedom, no extended criticism is required here.
Let just four comments be made.
(1) Freedom, conceived as the power to execute v/hat one
wills, does not touch the real problem of freedom at all,
namely, whether the spirit of man is free, and, if so, in
v/hat sense it is free. When Locke asserts that freedom con-
sists in this power to perform, he dogmatically insists that
it can consist in nothing else; though later he speaks of
deliberation, right here, by clear implication, he v/holly
excludes any freedom of man% spirit. In so doing, Locke
completely side-steps the only difficult and significant
question of freedom. Not only does he erroneously imply that
morality consists in success or failure in one's perforanlng
one's v/ill (v/hile this is not essentially a matter of moral-
ity at all), but, on this theory of freedom, he excludes the
very heart of morality—the free power of the spirit to
116. Collins, Art, (1717), 857.
117. Cf. I, D, 3.

choose what it v/111 pursue. For It is in this power to
choose for oneself, and the accompanying responsibility for
one's choices (whether one succeeds or fails in executing
them) that morality consists*
ViThen, therefore, Locke asks: "How can we think any one
118
freer, than to have the pov/er to do what he v*fills?" one
must answer that one is freer, is, in fact, truly free, only
when he possesses the pov/er to select freely v;hat he vi^ills
rather than having his will necessitated by something other
-than his own free spirit. As Kant might say, real freedom
and morality consist not so much in the power of one's will
as in one's spiritual capacity for determining v/hether his
will will be good or evil* Were this not true, a man who had
lost his arms in battle would be immoral (though he yearned
with all his heart to save a cliild v/ho was being swept by a
raging current toward a waterfall) simply because it was out-
side his power to save her. Were this not true, Martin
Niemflller, v/hose moral grandeur has stirred the world, v;ould
be a moral failure because he was impotent to defeat Hitler*
If the power to perform is the nature of man's freedom, his
spirit is wholly necessitated; his subjective life is a pro-
cess; his experience of free choice is an illusion; and the
whole structure of real morality is destroyed. In affirming
this as the only freedom man has, then, Locke not only im-
plies the negation of personality and morality, but denies
the reality of spiritual freedom.
118. 21.

(2) But worse than that, sjfter aTfJ-rmlng this as the
119
only freedom of man, Locke, In another place, insists that
man»s liberty consists in something else, namely, the pov/er
of deliberation. Throughout his discourse, Locke seems
neither to attempt to get nor to succeed in getting the two
distinct views coherently related. They stand, rather, as
two independent, disconnected answers to one question.
(5) Related to this view of freedom is Locke's untrue
observation to the effect that "the will. .. .cannot at any
time be moved towards what is Judged at that time unattain-
120
able." This is quite consistent v/ith Locke's inadequate
understanding of ideals. But it is v/holly out of harmony
v/ith the truth about ideals. They are by definition and in
fact always beyond, alv/ays out of reach. As Brov/ning says
so truly, "a mean's reach must exceed his grasp," a man's
ideal will must ever stretch out toward goals that he knov/s
he will never wholly realize, toward goals v/hich grov; in
grandeur and in unattainableness even as one moves toward
them. Not only, then, can one, but it is the nature of life
that one does, will that which is admittedly unattainable.
(4) Yet it is clear beyond any doubt that, while the
pov/er to perform is not a significant account of freedom, it
is a most important factor in humeji experience. However es-
sential freedom of the spirit is, so long as persons are
119. 48.
120. 41.

associated v;ith phsylcal bodies, so long spiritual freedom
v/ill, no matter hov; moral, be ineffective in altering the
v/orld, unless men do possess this power to perform v/hat they
freely will. But in a discussion of freedom it is essential
to see that the important practical pov/er to perfom what is
v/illed does not touch the heart of the problem of the freedom
of a person.
2# Determination "by uneasiness or desire,
a. Exposition,
Having expounded this theory of freedom as power to per-
form v/hat one wills, and even though, at the close of his
chapter, he still affirms it together v/ith a distinctly dif-
ferent conception of freedom, Locke sees clearly that a more
challenging consideration remains, naraely, whether, in addi-
tion to overt acts, volitions themselves are free. This
question he answers at first v;ithout equivocation in the
negative. Volitions are naturally determined by a person's
present, prevailing, uneasiness; and usually the prevailing
one is the strongest ,
Locke's view of voluntary actions is characterized by
ambiguity, evasiveness, and circumlocution. There is, there-
fore, danger in attempting adequately and fairly to interpret
his position. Despite the unclarity of Locke's exposition
and with clear awareness of much that is said which would,
at least on the surface, seem to point to another tendency
toward real freedom (to be discussed in the next section of
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this paper), the thesis to be defended here Is that Locke,
in his chapter on power, essentially and inescapably supports
the theory of natural, necessary, determination of volitions
121
by natural uneasiness or desire of body or mind*
Quite explicitly he asks: "V^t/hat moves the mind in every
particular instance....?" And he ansv/ers: "Tlie motive to
change is always \measiness: nothing setting us uoon the
122
change of state, or upon any nev/ action but some uneasiness."
123
"This uneasiness v/e may call, as it is, desire...," "That
which immediately determines the will... .is the uneasiness
124
of desire." It is clear from this and what follows that (a)
125
volitions are naturally determined by the strongest uneasiness
126
(though modification of this is later attempted), that (b)
uneasiness is most accurately defined (despite Locke's vacil-
lations) as desire, and that (c) desire is essentially
natural (even though it is registered in minds, ranges in
varied persons from lust to the pleasures of the Intellect,
and later is affirmed by Locke to be subject to a Icind of
criticism). Locke's words, but even more compellingly the
necessary implications of his sometimes equivocating exposi-
tion, v/arrant this interpretation— that he holds the activi-
ties of men to be necessitated by inescapable, natural, desire
121. 29, 31, 33, 35, 36, 57, 40, 41, 44, 48.
122. 29.
123. 31.
124 . 33
•
125. 36.
126. 31.

for one's own pleasure or happiness.
(1) Volitions are naturally necessitated, determined, by
(usually the strongest) uneasiness. How explicitly Locke
affirms it: "The present uneasiness that v/e are under does
127
naturally determine the will." Uneasiness "determines the
128
will, successively, in that train of voluntary actions ."
"Uneasiness" determines the v/ill "because that alone is press nt
and it is against the nature of things, that what is absent
129
should operate where It is not." It is not unwarranted to
conclude that, though Locke equivocates a bit, he, as readily
as Hobbes, might have expressed it so: "¥i/hatever is produced
is necessarily. ... and therefore also voluntary actions are
130
necessitated." "There is no such thing as freedom from
131
necessity,
"
(2) T/Vhen Locke v;rites of uneasiness what he means basi-
cally, and, in this sense, exclusively, is desire, desire for
one's ovm happiness , the ever-present inescapable object and
determiner of all one's activity. Locke's must be designated
as psycholoical hedonism. In one place at least, Locke
writes of "some present imeaslness . v;hich is, or at least
132
is always accompanied v/ith that of desire . " Again he speaks
of uneasiness in terms of "aversion, fear, anger, envy, shame"
127. 36.
128. 41.
129. 37.
130. Hobbes, LN, 275.
131. Ibid., 278.
132. 73.

which have "their uneasinesses too, and thereby influence
1.-53
the will." But almost exclusively he speaks of uneasiness
and desire as equivalent; and, what is of greatest import-
ance, he apparently never clearly states that the sense of
obligation, or the demand of duty, or the challenge of a
rationally, objectively, grounded ideal can be the ground
of action unless it, first of all , satisfies desire and is
a means to, and therefore pursued by me for, the satisfac-
tion of my desire for my ovm happiness. It is the "uneasl-
134
ness of desire , " then, that is the "necessity" v/hich "deter-
135
mines to the pursuit of real bliss," that is, real happiness
for me .
(3) Not only is volition naturally necessitated by the
uneasiness of desire , but this uneasiness of desire appears
to be simply present, naturally given; if it is objected
that each specific detailed desire is not, on Locke's theory,
naturally given, surely it cannot be denied that he reiter-
ates tliroughout his chapter that the natural and inexorable
determiner or necessity of life is the grand motivation of
the pursuit of one's own happiness. This is the unequivocal
presupposition, expressed or implied, of Locke's psychology
of the self; it is the principle which, whatever else he
says, reduces his view, necessarily, to mechanism, makes
133. 40.
134. 33; cf. 31.
135. 53.

man (as will be argued subsequently) a part of the natural
order, end deprives him entirely of a partially independent
spiritual nature. It will be readily acknov/ledged that,
desDite his theory, Locke contradicts it in practice, end
156
occasionally in theory contradicts the theory itself;
but it must be maintained that his discussion of the self
and its freedom is most fairly interpreted as asserting that
all men's actions are determined by uneasiness, that that
uneasiness is essentially equivalent to desire, and that
"that desire is naturally given; in short, Locke often ex-
plicitly affirms in detail and necessarily implies in the
large the view that the v/hole activity of the self is mechanis
tically determined by natural desire for one's own happiness *
Let several supporting observations be made. At a later
137
place in his discussion, Locke affirms that men may learn
to desire real goods; this suggests that he meant, till then,
to affirm that desires usually are just naturally present.
(It will later be inferred that Locke's conception of good
malces his discussion of learning to desire a circular and
tautalogical discussion; for the good is, by definition,
that which is apt to give me pleasure.) Again, Locke ex-
plicitly affirms the natural character of desire v/hen he says
that "the removing of pain, as long as we have any left (is)
.138
the first and necessary step towards happiness." To be even
136. Gov., II, 58.
137. 71.
138. 36.
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more emphatic In asserting the natural glvenness of desire,
he writes again: It is not "the greater good in view; but
some (and for the most part the most pressing) uneasiness a
139
man is at present under" that determines volition. The words
pressing and strongest , it is Important to note, and even
"best , are here natural, physical terms, expressing not ob-
jective quality or worth, but natural, subjective feeling,
longing, desire. Even if Locke's conception of good allowed
him to talk of objective, ideal, goods, he v/ould only be
emphasizing that, on his theory, a man is prohibited from
follov/lng the rationally acknowledgedgood (unless it just
happened to coincide with his desire) because of the deter-
mining natural "uneasiness a man Is at present under."
Further, Locke affirms that "pleasure and pain are produced
in us by the operation of certfdn objects, either on our
140
minds or our bodies, and in different degrees...." Here it
seems clearly implied that man is the passive subject of
natural processes and objects and that his volitions, there-
fore, are determined by nature, since nature determines the
desires that determine man's volitions.
This view which, when risduced to a consistent position,
is scarcely distinguishable from Hobbes's hedonistic deter-
141
minlsm is so interpreted by Palmer and so understood by
139. 31.
140. 43.
141. PP, 193.
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Praser who \yrites in a concluding tone:
Naturalism, or the universal applicability of
physical causation, as an adequate account of the
voluntary deterniinations of spiritual agents,
equally v/ith events in the material v/orld, not-
withstanding his vacillations, is Locke's Implied
principle
•
That Locke is, in his theory of power or the self, a mechan-
ist, or naturalistic deterrainist, is the thesis asserted
here—even in the light of the numerous, impressive efforts
of Locke to escape such mechanism and its implications.
After criticism of the view just expounded, these efforts
will he considered under Locke's general notion of delibera-
tion.
b. Criticism.
Several extended criticisms of Locke's naturalistic
determinism are nov/ justified.
(1) It minimizes man's rational and spiritual nature.
Locke's theory adequately explains the largest area of
man's activity; it accurately describes v/hat Christianity
has called the natural man, the man as he lives v/hen he
lives by instinct or habit responding impulsively to the
ceaseless uneasinesses with which nature besets him. But
the theory inadequately comprehends the smaller, distinctive,
qualitative character of man's activity; it inaccurately
describes the whole man because it does not include his
spiritual nature, Man is generally driven by natural
142. LE, I, 372, n.

uneasiness, but In his highest and heroic moments, he moves
on a higher plane by means of his freedom to think and his
freedom to follow what reason, not desire, decrees. For it
is a fact of raan^s spiritual nature that he can, by talcing
thought, direct himself along courses which he v/ould not
have talien if he had surrendered to natural, spontaneous
uneasiness. In the light of reason (to which he can freely
turn usually regardless of the "most pressing" uneasiness),
one can alter somewhat or completely change one*s course as
dictated by desire, one unquestionably experiences the feel-
ing of rejecting the easiest, or "most pressing," motivation
and of following one that requires the greatest exertion of
will; here, then, tmeasiness of desire does not determine;
rather the uneasiness of desire and all its driving pov/er
are overcome by the relentless will to do what ought to be
done. Once upon a time an adolescent boy who had a potent
appetite for chocolates gave up eating chocolates for sev-
eral years, youthfully believing he Could thus perfect him-
self for athletic competition; but even after that reason
for abstaining had vanished, he resisted the temptation
(though the uneasiness for candy v/as literally almost unbear-
able) simply because the experience strengthened his will
and proved to him repeatedly that he could do it. Trivial
though this illustration is, it malces clear the truth that
an idea or an ideal can be rigidly adhered to, not as a con-
sequence of, but in rigorous opposition to the uneasiness of

desire. Again, if only to prove that it can be done, one
can choose any one or six unappealing alternatives aad com-
pletely reject the one which appeals to him most strongly.
Uneasiness accounts for much; but it does not account for
everything, for spiritual freedom alone exhausts man's nature.
(2) Locke's theory excludes freedom of thought and choice.
Locke's theory of determination by uneasiness excludes
freedom of thought and freedom of choice. If it is true
that one can reason only when he is necessitated to it by
the uneasiness of desire, then a scientist cannot carry on
experiments (if he is tired or in a contrary mood) on the
strength of a sense of obligation or duty; then his associ-
ates have to vvait not till the spirit, but till natural
uneasiness, moves him. If nature has not so decreed it, one
cannot reply intelligibly to a sudden question concerning
the sum of twenty-one and seventy- six. If he does not find
satisfaction in it, one cannot surrender his thought to the
laws of logic and find solutions to presented problems. But
most important of all, if even thinking is determined as a
nonspiri tually initiated process, then all proof, including
the proof of Locke's argument, is utterly impossible, all
"conclusions" being equally necessitated effects.
Not only is thinking at the mercy of natural uneasiness;
so, also, is choosing. Whatever one wills is necessarily
v;illed by the quantitative force of \measiness; the good as
such, unless it is at the same time most strongly desired.

cannot possibly be v/llled. Locke, himself, insists on this.
As a result, every man*s every act is wholly necessi-
tated by the force of things beyond his control; he is part
of a necessitated process and is not a person with the spir-
itual povi^er of initiating processes* Three consequences
follow.
(3) Ought and should lose all meaning.
It is, on Locke's theory, utterly meaningless to say of
a man v/ho is about to perform an act or v/ho has just com-
pleted one: "He ought to do this or, he should have done
that." '//hatever was done, whatever will be done, v/as or is
wholly determined by the prevailing uneasiness. Since the
prevailing uneasiness had to prevail, it permitted no free
choice by the person. That which was done had to be done;
and the moral ought , the reproving should have , are alto-
gether empty words.
(4) Moral responsibility and praise and blame dissolve.
Moral responsibility and the ground for praise and
blame completely disappear or go on inconsistently. For when
actions are absolutely determined by natural uneasiness, no
one can be held accountable for them. Responsibility and
praise and blame attach Intelligibly to actions of men only
if those men are free, only if they, not a process, select
this rather than that, deliberately choose the good or the
bad.
(5) God is responsible for both the good and the evil.
If all men's actions are absolutely determined by the

natural iineasiness of desire, and men are deprived of all
responsibility, if they are parts of a process, not persons,
then it is the universe v;hich causes all things, or, if there
is a God, it is God who is responsible for all raen*s charac-
ters, Christ* s and Pilate's, St. Francis's and Hitler's,
Nero's and Nightingale's; it is God v;ho is responsible for
all men's acts, acts of love, good will, honesty, courage,
loyalty, acts of murder, rape, V7ar, lying, choosing, steal-
ing, hatred, blasphemy, laziness, revenge. The Vi/'orks that
men do
—
good and evil—they do not of themselves; God does
the v/orks through them; God commits the Brockton murder; God
kidnaps and crushes the life from a baby; God is solely re-
sponsible for the holacaust of war. The first difficulty
of determinism, then, is that it brutalizes God or makes his
existence utterly inconceivable; and the second is like unto
it, for it makes the universe a madhouse of evil and irony,
evil in that the universe necessitates murder, irony in that
it makes men regret it.
(6) All distinction betv/een good and evil, right and
wrong, vanish.
Because all is determined, all meaning for good and
evil , all distinction betv/een right and wrong, dissolve; men
no longer are moral beings but are, as it were, trees walking
or sheep grazing in the fields.
(7) Locke's viev/ fails to see that desires are often
initiated and directed by ideas.
One may almost by force of habit be perplexing himself
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with a theoretical consideration that as yet has yielded,
and gives promise of yielding, no solution. He may be greatly
\mset and deeply distressed because of this baffling situa-
tion. Then suddenly the idea v/ill occur: "Don't allow your-
self to be distressed by it; simply drop it and forget about
it," If he yields to this suggestion of thought, he cancels,
wipes out, by thought, a desire that was driving him on and
making him uneasy. Nevertheless, he may, if he so chooses,
go on pursuing a solution to his problem. The point of the
illustration is that he is literally free to follow a
process v/hich already is underway, or yield to the leading
of an idea which he entertains in his mind; ideas may stimu-
late desires, or ideas may directly motivate one's will to
the performance of an act; so that desires, alone, do not
determine the will. One may do the obviously most absurd
thing, such as cutting off his finger v/hen he v;ould prefer
to keep his finger; one may do the most importejit thing,
such as going out to die for a cause v/Mch his best think-
ing leads him to believe to be just, though his deep desire
is to live; ideas may not only determine one's actions but
ideas may, as well, initiate desires.
5. Deliberation.
a. Locke's thesis.
Seeing that his theory as just asserted (the theory
that the will is absolutely determined by the strongest or
prevailing uneasiness) makes man a nonresponsible part of

nature's processes, Locke next takes up the task of saving
man's responsibility. And he seeks to do this by affiming
143
(on second thought and in the second edition of the Essay )
that man does possess a power by which, rather than surren-
dering spontaneously to the strongest uneasiness of desire,
he may suspend volition and think about the consequences of
his yielding to any present uneasiness—v/hether or not it
does, in fact, contribute to his long-run satisfaction of
desire For example, he may be dominated by the desire to
reject spinach because he dislikes it; but since he possesses
this pov/er of suspension and deliberation, he suspends the
natural drive of his uneasiness toward willing the rejection
of spinach; and after consideration, realizing that spinach
contributes to physical health which he desires, he eats
144
spinach. Here the important thesis is that the self pos-
145
sesses a pov/er to suspend volition, that, during suspension,
competing desires may be criticized, that, in terms of the
possibilities of each potential act's increasing happiness,
judgments may be made.
For, the mind having.... a pov/er to suspend the
execution and satisfaction of any of its desires;
and so all, one Eifter another; is at liberty to
consider the objects of them, examine them on all
sides, and v/eigh them with others. In this lies
the liberty man has .146
143. Fraser, LE, I, 379.
144. Gf. 57
145. 23, 41, 48, 54, 57.
146. 48.
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(Though Locke had already asserted that man's liberty was
constituted exclusively by his pov/er to perform vjhat is
v/llled.) "Understanding may be free to examine, and reason
147
unbiased give its judgment*" It *ls in the discussion of
this power to deliberate that Locke evinces his awareness
of the need for freedom and that he thinks he has discovered
and proved the true nature of it. He goes so far in other
writings, too, as to imply freedom's reality by objecting to
Hobbes and Spinoza for "resolving all, even the thoughts and
148
will of men, into an irresistible, fatal necessity," and by
149
insisting in his Second Treatise of Government that "God
having given man an understanding to direct his actions has
allowed him a freedom of will and liberty of acting," So
here it is clear that Locke believes not only in the freedom
of the power to execute v/hat is v/illed, but even in freedom
of will . He appears to v/ant to believe in it even in the
Essay ; but he hesitates to affirm it v/lthout equivocation
and, because of his presupposition that all volitions are
determined by the uneasiness of desire, he is unv/arranted in
holding and fails to prove that the self is really free,
b. Criticism.
(1) Locke's thesis fails to allow or establish freedom.
That Locke's attempt to escape from mechanism, v/lthout
147. 54.
148. Locke, Art . ( 1693)^- , 257; unspecifically and Inaccurately
quoted by Hudson, rLBH, 43; unspecifically but accurateHy
quoted by Fraser, LE, I, xlvli.
149. Goji., II, 58.
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repudiating completely (which he never even comes close to
doing) the large explicit part and whole underlying current
of his thought in his chapter on pov/er, fails, that his view
necessarily reduces to naturalistic determinism, in spite of
his struggle to save personal responsibility, is clearly
attested.
(a) Necessary volitions and freedom to think.
He has forcefully and vigorously grounded his thought
in the assertion that men are determined to v/ill that wMch
best satisfies their present uneasiness; volition is always
so determined; tliis, men cannot escape. But in the light of
this, Locke goes on to say that, even so, if a man v/ills
wrongly, he is responsible for his error--because he did not
stop and think. If Locke really meant, as he seemed to mean,
that volitions are always determined by the prevailing un-
easiness, then it is clear that whatever a man willed sjid
150
did had to be willed and done. The prevailing uneasiness,
whether it was strongest or not (since Locke admits that
occasionally it is not the strongest), absolutely determined
his volition; the fact that he acted as he did proves that
he was compelled by his uneasiness to move in that direction;
so Locke's theory requires. In the following sentence, Locke
says it most plainly; here he, at one time, affirms necessity
and dresses necessity in such alluring clothes as to make
150, Cf. Fraser, LE, I, 352, n. 5.

thinking alv/ays present when needed:
Whatever necessity determines to the pursuit of
real bliss, the sanie necessity, v/ith the same
force, establishes suspense, deliberation, and
scrutiny of each successive desire, v/hether the
satisfaction of it does not interfere with our
true happiness, and mislead us from it ,151
But in saying this, he not only rededicates himself to the
necessity of satisfying desire for one's own happiness and
to subsequently necessitated volitions, but again undermines
152
any v;arrant for saying someone "should have thought For,
by his ovm words, it is not a matter of should or should
not, could or could not; it is simply a necessitated matter
of did and had to do so. How clearly he says it in another
place: "V/hat moves the mind in every particular instance.,
153
is always imeasiness. " If one did not think , he did not
think because imder the existing conditions of uneasiness,
he Y/as not free to think ; he could do no other than as he
didl So, at the outset, Locke's attempt to escape from his
basic principle and its implications is frustrated; freedom
to think, like freedom to will oveit acts, just does not
exist. On Locke's theory of necessitation of all volitions
by vmeasiness, then, if a man does not think, he cannot
sensibly he held responsible. For the fact of his failure
to think is identical with the fact that the naturally
151. 53.
152. Of. 48.
153. 29.
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prevailing uneasiness prevented him from thinking. This
point Locke fails to consider at all.
One of Locke's views may help to explain this failure,
namely, that Locke thought of thinking and v/illing as two
different powers of a substantial self; he may have believed
that thinking v/as something to which the substantial self could
turn v/ithout reference to the will; he apparently (consider
his views on substance) had no idea that the entire self,
person, spirit, was one conscious unity. But it must be
pointed out, first of all, that this viev/, v/hether or not
Locke stood by it, is unsound. The self, it appears, is con-
sciousness v;hich recognizes itself as belonging together as
a whole. It is a unity of conscious activity, which is
characterized by a mysterious minimum complex unity of feel-
ing, V7illing and thought, abstractly mentionable but actually
inseparable. Each continually involves the other; each, at
least on a minimal plane, simultaneously functions with the
other. Without specific and persistent volition, thinking
on any but the minimal level of humsJi consciousness, tliinking
which is directed and concentrated on any problem, is abso-
lutely impossible. So it must be asserted that, even if
Locke believed thinking to be independent of volition, and
thus assumed man's pov/er to think independently of volition,
his assumption is untenable. And secondly, if Locke made
this assumption in his argument for freedom to deliberate,
his exposition is to be challenged because he never took the
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pains to acknoY/ledge it as his presupposition, even though,
v/ere it allowed as valid, it v/ould be thoroughly indispens-
able to his sxgument for man's freedom to think.
The essential thesis here, defended, hov/ever, is simply
this, that Locke's assertion that man is free to think
(though, admittedly, he may engage in thinking if he happens
to be necessitated to it), and the responsibility he would
thereby place on man, are utterly indefensible on his basic
presupposition that all volitions are necessitated by uneasi-
154
ness, desire for happiness. If a man did not think, it is
clear, on Locke's thesis, that he could not; on Locke's
thesis it is clear that there is no freedom to think at all.
In clear language, though he misconstrues the real nature
of freedom, he, nevertheless, plainly states, near the end
155
of his exposition of power, that such freedom to think as
that v/hich real freedom requires is impossible, when he
holds that
to place liberty in an indifferency, antecedent
to the thought and judgment of the understanding,
seems to m^e to place liberty in a state of dark-
ness, wherein we can neither see nor say anything
of it; at least it places it in a subject incap-
able of it, no agent being allov/ed capable ,of
liberty, but in consequence of thought and judgment.
(b) Locke does not primarily and -unequivocally assert
man's spiritual nature.
One other consideration which undermines Locke's assert-
154. Praser, LE, I, 364, n. 3
155. 73.
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Ing freedom is that he does not unequivocally assert man»s
spiritual nature* His consciousness is a pov/er of a so-
called spiritual substance; this substance is the fundamen-
tal reality of a self, of a spiritual being, for, on Locke's
theory, without it there would be no agency for the separate
poY/ers of thinking and willing, Locke is somev/hat evasive
in declaring what the real nature of this substance is; it
is, in fact, a " .je ne sais quoi "; it is that in wlriich the
pov;ers of thinking and willing exist; he even speaks of fin-
156
ite spirits (substances) as having place , spatial location;
he asserts that material substance may have the power to
157
think. Now in spite of Locke's affirmation that God is
immaterial and that, though it cannot be proved, it is "in
the highest degree probable, that the thinking substance in
158
us is immaterial," the fact remains that Locke does not une-
quivocally assert the distinctly, primarily, spiritual (as
opposed to material), self-conscious vmlty and fundamental
reality of a man in his nature as a person. He leans in that
direction; yet he is not bold to affirm it v/ithout qualifica-
tions and other intimations.
Ijeberweg cites at least tv^o historical consequences of
Locke's vacillations in this matter. For one thing, he
points out that the materialists of the school of Kobbes
156. Essay . II, xxvii, 2.
157. Ibid., IV, iii, 6.
158. Locke, LBW, 33; this is cited unspeclfically by Praser,
LE, II, 193, n.

were encoursiged. in their theory during the eighteenth century
"by the fact that Locke had asserted the possibility that
159
matter might think. For another, Voltaire, Locke's disciple
in many ways, was encouraged, "by this supposition of Locke,
in his belief that there could be no unextended spirit in
160
man. The point of these observations is simply this, that
Locke's equivocation about the nature of spiritual substance
and his assertion that even matter may possibly think, not
only offered support to historical materialists, but left
unclear just what his view about the nature of man as a
person v/as. All that can be said with assurance of his view
is that it did not unequivocably and primarily assert man's
spiritual nature.
For his view of freedom this is of fundamental import-
ance; for if freedom exists at all, it exists only because
men, as spiritual beings ^ are, at least in measure, indepen-
dent of the material and necessitated realms of the world.
If men, themselves, are material things, they are engulfed
in the stream of necessity v/hich basically characterizes the
natural world; and freedom is swallov/ed up with them.
As Locke's viev; of the nature of man stands in the
Essay , his efforts to establish any kind of freedom are
doomed to defeat in advance; his theory of man's nature is
not explicitly adequate to bear the load of freedom. If,
159. Porter, Art. (1874), 37I4 cf. Lowell, EFR, 66.
160. Ueberweg, HP, II, 125; cf. Voltaire, LA, 48, DP, II, 23
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without hesitation, he had affirmed the clear, empirical
insight that selves are complex, imified, agents, conscious
spirits , and that spirit is the fundamental reality, all
else being subordinated to it, he might, ?/ith greater confi-
dence, clarity, and cog^ency, have asserted, and been justi-
fied in asserting, a theory of real personal freedom. For
the question of freedom can be intelligibly argued only in
the light of a clear conception of self-consciousness, the
ultimate reality which, in man, is not the product of the
unconscious but is, rather, the reproduction of an eternal
161
consciousness.
If, in spite of these, his presupposition of naturally
determining, given, uneasiness and his materialistic or ag-
nostic viev/ of the self (which does not sufficiently distin-
guish it from physical nature or matter) he believes in
freedom, he believes in a reality which is wholly excluded
by and impossible on his own theory. If, in spite of these,
he believes in freedom, he should have modified his theory
of natural uneasiness as determining each volition, or should
161, Of, Locke, Art, (1696) 19 in v/iiich he stresses his
point in the Essay (II, xxiii, 4) to the effect that
substances are essential to the subsistence of "simple
ideas of sensible qualities," In like manner, Locke
fears that personal self-consciousness is not the ulti-
mate reality but requires an unknown substance in v/hich
it may inhere: "The idea of thinking is inconsistent
with the idea of self-subsistence, and therefore has a
necessary connection with a support or subject of inhe-
sion." (Art. (1696)1, 33.
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have shown how the two, determining uneasiness and free voli-
tions, could stand together (which appears impossible)* He
should have clearly stated that spirit is absolutely differ-
ent in kind from matter and operates on a distinctive law of
its own. He should have frankly acknowledged necessity to
be incorrect or incomplete and have affirmed freedom as a
reality even though he had to confess that he could not
define it or clearly relate it to his viev/s of the self as
a whole. Because he did none of these, because at one point
he maintained (and in subsequent revisions did not alter it)
that freedom to execute what is v/illed is the only freedom
man has, because he basically affirmed and repeatedly re-
verted to the thesis that uneasiness of desire absolutely
determines each volition (which would have to include con-
sciously directed thinking, since that is a volition), because
he allov/ed the possibility of materialism, or at least agnos-
ticism and unclarity in his view of the self's essential
nature, because of these things, it must be argued that
Locke's view explicitly is, or necessarily reduces to, natur-
alistic, mechanistic, determinism. His viev/, therefore,
wholly excludes the possibility of real freedom and it shares
with acknowledged determinism the criticisms virhich have pre-
viously been made of it»
(2) Suppose a real power of deliberation.
But suppose, for the sake of argument, that, in spite
of his presupposition of a deterraining, natural, agnostic.

or equivocating view of the self's essence, Locke's power
to suspend volition is a free power (admittedly, it could
occur as a necessary consequence of an uneasiness which deter-
mined a man to suspend further volition; but this v/ould not
be freedom and a man could not be charged with responsibil-
ity if, in any instance, he failed to suspend and deliber-
ate). Nevertheless, supposing Locke's power to suspend and
deliberate were a free power, what kind of freedom
—
after
the volition were freely made to suspend and deliberate--
what kind of freedom would this amount to anyway? An answer
will now be given to this question.
(a) Locke's theory of good and evil.
Because of the nature of good and evil in Locke's
theory, even if men v/ere free to think, it would be illegl-
162
timate for Locke to speak of the "proper" object of desire
or to say that someone is responsible for his wrong choice
because he "imposed on himself wrong measures of good and
163
evil," For again, in spite of Locke's confusing equivoca-
164
tion, it must be concluded that his theory is that good and
evil are purely relative to one's own taste and desire, some
desiring intellectual, some desiring sensual satisfactions—
apparently naturally. This thesis underlies all that Locke
says in his chapter on power.
162. 44.
163. 57.
164. 70, 57.

The relativity and subjectivity of good is the imderly-
ing and implied thesis of his whole discussion of desire,
volition, happiness, good. It is unmistakahly affirmed in
his bold and vivid illustration of the doctor who gave the
right answer when he told his patient who had sore eyes:
"If you have more pleasure in the taste of vilne than in the
use of your sight, v/ine is good for you; but if the pleasure
of seeing be greater to you than that of drinking, wine is
165
nought." It is perfectly summarized in his own words when
he writes:
The mind has a different relish, as well as
the palate; and you v/111 as fruitlessly endeavour
to delight all men v/ith riches or glory (which yet
some men place their happiness in) as you v/ould to
satisfy all men's hunger with cheese or lobsters;
which, though very agreeable and delicious fare to
some, are to others extremely nauseous and offen-
sive: and many persons would with reason prefer
the griping of an h\mgry belly to those dishes
which are a feast to others. Hence it was, I
think, that the philosophers of old did in vain
inquire, whether summum bonum consisted in riches,
or bodily delights, or virtue, or contemplation:
and they might have as reasonably disputed, whether
the best relish were to be found in apples, plums,
or nuts, and have divided themselves into sects
upon it. For, as pleasant tastes depend not on the
things themselves, but on their agreeableness to
this or that particular joalate, wherein there is
great variety; so the greatest happiness consists
in the having those things v/hich produce the
greatest pleasure, and in the absence of those
which cause any disturbance, any pain. Now these,
to different men, are very different things. If,
therefore, men in this life only have hope; if in
this life only they can enjoy, it is not strange
nor unreasonable, that they should seek their
happiness by avoiding all things that disease them
165. 55.

here, and by pursuing all that delight them;
wherein It v/ill be no wonder to find variety and
difference. For if there be no prospect beyond
the grave, the inference is certainly right
—
*Let us eat and drink, » let us enjoy what v;e de-
light in, »for tomorrov/ we shall die.* This, I
think, rnay serve to show us the reason, who,
though all men's desires tend to happiness, yet
they are not moved by the satne object. Men may
choose different things, and yet all choose right;
supposing them only like a company of poor in-
sects; whereof some are bees, delighted v/ith
flov/ers and their sweetness; others beetles, de-
lighted with other kinds of viands, vdiich having
enjoyed for a season, they would cease to be, and
exist no more for ever,166
1. Yet he goes on to speak of acknowledged greater
167
goods which are not desired and therefore not willed. Here
is a plain confusion and contradiction. It is impossible
to make the idea of acknowledged greater goods intelligible
or consistent v/ith his other fundamental dogma that the
168
last, best, judgment necessitates volition; yet he clings
to the latter tenaciously. It is by no means clear how, on
Locke's theory, one recognizes a greater good to be good for
him if his own desire for happiness necessitates his pursu-
ing something else v/hich, by that very act, so Locke insists ,
he uncompromisingly acknowledges to be best for him . Pre-
sumably, Locke would try to clarify this by saying that
spinach is an acknowledged greater good because it gives
health v/hile liquor is acknowledged to be less good yet pur-
166. 56.
167. 70, 55.
168. cf. 48.
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sued. But on Locke's own premises, whatever is judged, best
169
for him Is willed ; surely, then, it cannot be escaped that
what Is willed is, in his judgment, best for him on that
occasion v/hether or not, on other occasions he sees that
spinach is best. Strangely enough, (and here Locke's circu-
larity is especially manifest), he says as much himself:
"If he prefers it in his present thoughts before any other,
170
it is plain he thirJcs better of it," So it appears that,
on Locke's theory, it is really misleading, confusing, and
unwarranted, to speak of acknowledged greater goods that
are not desired; since, of necessity, men must and do desire
and v/ill v/hat is best for themselves * Locke's attempt to
introduce extraneous, idealistic, strains into the confused
sounds of this shaky symphony are unwarranted by his relativ-
istic theory of good and evil. So that, in this instance,
even though it be conceded, for the sake of argument, that
Locke's man is free to deliberate, he can deliberate only in
terms of best satisfying his own subjective preferences.
He cannot judge choices by any "proper" or "right" measures.
He can judge them only by his own desires, and this reduces
again to determination by desire.
ii. Locke contradictorily presupposes another view which
is doubtless sound in itself and offers a way of escape from
subjective, natural, determination by desire, but which is
169. 49.
170. 49; Italics inserted by the writer of this dissertation.
1t
again logically excluded by his theory or relativisitc, sub-
jective, good and evil. That presupposition is "the eternal
171
law and nature of things," the real distinction between
good and evil, before the bars of which all other tastes
and desires must be judged. But clearly, this is out of
harmony v/ith any theory which holds that the good is that
which Is apt to give pleasure to each of us as separate in-
dividuals (in this connection, compare the doctor's admoni-
tion to the drimkard and the discussion of the simimum boni^a
which was set forth above). If, as Locke's extended theory
expresses and implies, good is altogether subjective and
relative, then how can it be said that there is an eternal
and real distinction betv/een good and evil, that there are
"proper" and "v/rong" measures of judgment; who is to say
which and what these "proper" standards are? So again Locke
fails in his attempt to escape the vicious circle involved
in the subjective nature of goods in the light of v/hich
one's goods must be chosen. And he comes quite close, per-
haps reduces exactly, to that view of Hobbes which frankly
confesses that "deliberation is nothing else but alternate
Imagination of the ^ood and evil sequels of an action, or,
which is the same thing, alternate hope and fear , or alter-
nate appetite " In deliberation, one simply considers
171. 57.

"whether It be better for himseir to do it or not to do
172
it."
Hi. Another confusing expression which Locke uses is
173
"good in general" or "all good." This too, ?/ould suggest
that all persons recognize the same all-inclusive large body
of "good" as good, that it has a universal objective reality,
and that, therefore, men might, in their pursuit of good,
attain objectivity and freedom from the chain of natural
desire and the circle of subjective good by judging their
subjective desires in the light of real, objective ideals.
But again, these v/ords of Locke must be discounted, and his
escape to freedom, frustrated, in the light of his theory
of the relativistic, subjectivistic nature of good. All
that this confusing reference to "all good" or "good in
general" can be allowed to mean is simply the recognition
that taken together, people do like a vast variety of things,
but talcen separately (as Locke's relativism exclusively
takes them) men like vastly different things; and though
one may acknov/ledge that your good is good for you and his
is good for him, it by no means follov/s that his good is
good for you, or yours for him. V/hat it reduces to again
is the clear fact that, for Locke, there can be no "proper"
or "wrong" measures of good. He says himself that the
172. Hobes, LN, 273; italics inserted by the writer of this
dissertation.
173. 44.
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"variety of pursuits shows that every one does not place
his happiness in the same thing,. or choose the same way to
it."''"'^'^ Your measures are your only measures ; and mine are
my only and necessary ones . So that Locke is accurately
interpreted when his words are clarified to read unequivo-
cally that, while one recognizes the broad range of goods
that people as a whole enjoy, that, only, is good for him
"as is considered and taken to make a necessary part of
his happiness. "-''^^
The conclusion of this discussion of Locke *s relativ-
istic, suhjectivistic theory of good and evil and its rela-
tion to the self's freedom is this, that even if and after
the self suspends volition and gives itself to deliberation,
it is still the slave of desire, and is not really free.
For the self must circularly judge its desires by what is
desired. It has no objective standards or ideals by which
it can examine the various desires or alternatives in
general which present themselves; the good is what the self
does desire, vi/hat deliberation does for Locke, at best,
then, is this: it may reveal to him the most effective means
for realizing something that is desired; but it cannot lift
him out of the general circle of desires for his own happiness
or enable him to will something that ought to be done even
though it endangers or destroys his own hapx)iness. Grounds
of the highest ethical ought are not contained in Locke's theory.
174. 55.
175. 44; cf. 43.
1
i
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Impulse may no longer be completely blind; it may
be criticized in thought j'JJeven the "thinking" is determined
by the single purpose of the impulse; namely, the best
possible satisfying of one»s natural, subjective, inescap-
able desire for his ovm happiness. "Our desires look beyond
our present enjoyments and carry the mind out to absent
176 177
good , " to remote goods, only "according to the necessity
v/hich v/e think there is of it, to the making or increase of
178
our happiness." Even if while thinking is under way, one
may "freely'' discriminate between desires and choose one
which, had he not thought, he would not have chosen blindly,
he, nevertheless, in all his thinking and judging, is com-
pletely determined by desire, desire for his own happiness.
So on Locke's basis, freedom at best is no more or less '
than careful calculation about the best means of satisfying
one's natural (even though each means be not desired in it-
self and even if it be conceded that, on Locke's theory,
179
"learning to desire" is admissible) desire for one's ovm
greatest happiness. The shallov/, hedonistic, nonmoral, non-
spiritual, essentially nonrational character of this freedom
is readily apparent.
(b) Mercenary, or selfish, morality and religion.
For one thing, even if it is allov/ed that Locke estab-
176. 61.
177. 57.
178. 61.
179. 71.

lishes freedom, not only does his theory of good and evil
minimize its significance; so does his theory that man Is
absolutely necessitated to seek his own happiness. If
morality is conceived as devotion to that which is right
—
"because it is right rather than because it makes me happy;
if morality is conceived as loyalty to objectively valid
ideals or to the service of men who are ends in themselves
rather than (no matter how well I treat them) means to ^
happiness; if morality is conceived as implying altrulsm--
but not for what it will give me in return; if morality is
related to obedience to God's lav/ not for the sake of secur-
ing the rev/ard of eternal happiness for myself but for
his
God's own sake and for the furthering of^ purposes; if moral-
ity is more than the single pursuit of my own selfish happi-
ness (and it surely is more than that, whatever it is),
then, supposing that Locke's hedonistic determinism grounds
any freedom at all, that freedom, at best, excludes real
moral experience. For on Locke's theory, concern, thought,
volitions are necessarily, inevitably for, and only for,
the prime and necessarily exclusive purpose of satisfying
myself
. My happiness is the alpha and omega, the beginning
and end, of all my living; everything else, the wealth of
the earth, inanimate and animate ideals—If any, , "sacrifi-
cial" service, martydom, all other persons, even God himself,
are subordinated by me to my welLHDeing, are mere means to
my ends.

By the nature of ray hedonistically determined, self, it
cannot be otherwise. I may serve God, I may live a good
(that is, a self-satisfied) life, I may serve my fellovimen,
I may sacrifice my life for a "good" cause; but if I do, I
do it first of all and necessarily because it makes me happy.
By the nature of my hedonistically determined self my moti-
vation cannot be basically , essentially , that of service to
God for God's sake, service to others for their sake,
loyalty to ideals because they are right regardless of the
cost to me, service to Christ "for Christ's salce." Honesty,
180
at best can be but a policy. If tliis seems overdrawn, one
may read again the chapter on power, one may note espec-
ially the remark on whether the drinking man's v/ine or eye-
sight is best for him (no consideration at all for the
effects of drunkenness on his associates), especially one
may note Locke's grounds for men's obeying God—that men may
have for themselves eternal happiness through the reward of
181
immortality. If men are free, at all, on Locke's theory
they are free to pursue only a mercenary morality, only a
mercenary religion* Such freedom is less than that v/hich
high morality and high religion require. One advance of
Kant over Locke is just at this point, namely, that, though
he sees en important connection between morality and
180, Cf. Windelbsnd, GP, I, 276-280, (HP, 514-517), v/here a
similar interpretation is made.
181. 56, cf. 72.

happiness, he Insists on the basic truth thet one acts
essentially morally when one acts from obligation, not from
182
desire for rev^ard.
(c) Locke's view subordinates reason to desire.
Such freedom is less, too, than that which purs\iit of
truth requires. On Locke's theory , there can be no pursuit
of truth for truth's sake; one can will only that which he
believes will increase his happiness; one can pursue truth
only so long as its pursuit or truth's content is a means
to his happiness. Reason cannot "unbiased" carry jn; reason
can face the facts so long as they please, but when the
truth leads into unpleasant paths, reason csji no longer
follov/, unless the self v/hich reasons .just happens naturally
to find happiness in truth no matter how much it hurts him
by puncturing the balloons of his delight. On Locke's hedon-
istic theory, therefore, one v/ho does not like the thought
of freedom, for example, simply cannot persist in thinking
of it, let alone accepting it as true. On Locke's theory,
men can use science, study philosophy, pursue truth, only
as the Nazis do, only so long as it serves their own ends;
truth as truth is ostracized from the realms of rational
inquiry.
(d) Locke's theory contradicts experience.
Not ohly does Locke's deliberation in the service of
hedonism logically exclude the high morality of obligation.
182. KpV, A210-212, A212-215.
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duty, altruism, and ideals, and disinterested sacrificial
pursuit of truth, but, in so doing, it runs counter to the
testimony of experience, namely, that such high morality
does characterize men's actions and that truth can be pur-
sued when there is no need for it or even v/hen it leads to
one's own detriment— as, for example, v;hen Socrates affirms
the validity of lav/s that require his own death, or as v/hen
Galileo discovers and publishes new truths, at the risk of
his own life. Locke's life itself seems to be partial testi-
mony to the way in which men can be loyal to ideas and ideals
even though that loyalty rims counter to the first law of
nature, one's own preservation (even though he must flee
his homeland to insure his safety). Yet, Locke, of course,
should knov; best whether he wanted to teach the things he
taught merely for the sake of his own happiness, or, first
of all, and in spite of the cost to himself, because he be-
lieved them to be true , of benefit to all manlcind, and
exemplary of the nature and will of God.
1/Vhen John Hus boldly proclaimed the independence of men
before God, thereby seeking their freedom and v/ell-being,
he v/as doubtless aware that he was endangering his life.
He may, at the same time, have believed he would be rev/arded
in heaven. Yet the clear fact remains that the inspiration
and motivation of his actions and his words were not his
own happiness, his ovm rev/ard, but, precisely, his nonhedonr
istic, altruistic, concern for the well-being of others
.
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the triumph of truth and .justice , no matter that it meant
he v/ould hum at a stalce in 1415.
No doubt Martin NeiraBller, with all his suffering, . finds
a kind of peace (though it is doubtful v»rhether one can call
it happiness) in his loyalty to his ideal social and relig-
ious purpose of ridding Germany of Hitler's irreligious
scourge; but how shabby, by contrast, would his heroism seem
if he were maintaining his costly stand, first of all, basi-
cally, because it made him at peace with his soul or gave
him happlnessl It is only because he is free to yield to
Hitler, yet freely sacrifices his happiness, even life it-
self if need be, for something beyond and greater than him-
self and his personal gain or loss, that Martin Niemfiller
has his moral grandeur. It is instances such as these that
dramatically clarify the truth that men as free spirits, by
free heroic dedication to things beyond and independent of
themselves, or by free, hedonistic, pursuit of their own
happiness, enter, in either choice, into moral experience
and make themselves morally admirable or morally desijised.
4. The necessity of v/illiiif'; what one considers to be
best for himself .
a. Exposition:
Even if it v/ere allov/ed that Locke's theory warrants
freedom to deliberate, one thesis would stand as an insur-
mountable obstacle to real moral freedom. And it is the
clearest and most emphatic of all Locke's thesis (in spite
!
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of his equivocation v/hen he implies that v/hich on his theory
185
is unwarranted, namely, a "greater good" than the one most
desired and therefore necessarily willed). The thesis is
this, that every volition is necessarily determined hy that
v/hich one considers to be best for himself . The judgment
may be spontaneous, equivalent v/lth uneasiness of desire,
or, if deliberation occurs, may be the conclusion of thought.
In every instance, however, this is unalterably necessary,
that whatever is judged best be willed. Now in this respect,
as in others already noted, Locke's view is much like
Hobbes's, for, though Locke uses softer, less repugnant lan-
guage, his view reduces to the one defined in the more di-
rect words of Hobbes: "Of all voluntary acts, the object
184
is to every man his ov/n good." On Locke's theory, that
which is willed is identical with what the self judges to
be best for itself; it cannot be otherwise. There can be
185
no "indifferency" between the judgment and the volition.
Nov/ this would be sound (though thoroughly tautologous) if
Locke meant merely , as he sometimes says, the last judgment.
But he e3q)licitly says: "In all particular actions that he
wills, he does, and necessarily does, v/ill that v/liich he
186
then judges to be good." "Every man is put under a neces-
sity, by his constitution as an intelligent being, to be
183. 55, cf. 47.
184. Lev, 138; cf. 49, 120; also LN, 275.
185. 75.
186. 57.
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deterrained in willing by his own thought and judgment what
187
is best for him to do." As Locke's whole theory of good
asserts, "best for him" means nothing other than his own
personal pleasure or happiness. Not only man, but God, also,
is absolutely thus determined to will that v/hich is best for
188
himself.
b. Criticism:
This point of view requires extended criticism.
(1) It destroys moral responsibility.
For one thing, it must be acknov/ledged that Locke's
interpretation of the significance of this necessity of
v/illing what is judged best is readily understandable. In
one sense it would be not a fault but "a perfection of our
nature, to desire, will, and act (of necessity) according
189
to the last result of a fair examination." It would keep
us from committing moral failures. But then, too, (and
Locke fails to see it) it would deprive us of moral respon-
sibility and of moral freedom. And, empirically, responsi-
bility is experienced, v/hile theoretically, it is indispen-
sable to morality. So in reply to Locke's question, the
ansv/er^ here, must De stated: It is "worth the natne of freedom
to be at liberty to play the fool, and draw shame and misery
190
upon oneself." For only if one is free to do this is he
187. 49; italics inserted by the writer of this dissertation.
188. 50.
189. 48.
190. 51.

praiseworthy for refraining from doing it and for follow-
ing, instead, the nonnecessitated choice of the good. In-
telligence and loyalty to it are necessary to the noble use
of freedom, but if one is necessitated to follow his best
judgment always, one is not free at all. Freedom is then
not fact but fiction.
Locke goes so far as to affirm that even God is com-
191
pelled to v/ill what he judges to be best. This is true.
But it is not true in Locke's sense or for Locke's reason.
It is not that God's acts are rigidly necessitated; for then
he ¥/ould be a process, not a person. It is, rather, that
God is freely devoted to the creation, realization, and pre-
servation of all possible value. This eternal spirit could
do v/rong, could will contrary to his best judgment, but if
he did, he would be, or become, a devil, not God. As Locke
says, God can do no wrong; he must will the best. But as
Locke does not say, he must will the best in order to remain
God, for God is, by definition, a benevolent spirit v/hatever
else he is; he does not will the best simply because he. is
rigidly necessitated to do so. For if God were not free
to do the wrong, when he judged and did the right, his ac-
tivity would be more like that of a nonmoral process than
like that of a moral person. He would appear to be doing
good only because he could not do evil. But the grandeur
191, 50.

of high morality essentially consists in a person's doing
good even though he might have freely done evil.
(2) Its analysis of hmnan motivation is inadequate.
Locke's theory rests on an inadequate analysis of human
motivation. He holds, here, that the only motivation is
the pursuit of one's own happiness, that, therefore, one's
Judgment of what is best for himself is necessarily v/illed.
192
Now as Karl Groos has observed, psychological hedonism is
untenable because men caJi and do will things other than
those which they know would increase their own happiness.
(a) One can, for example, deliberately will what he
unquestionably know
s
to be wrong—even in the sense of v^ork-
ing for his own ill. A young man and yoxmg v/oman, outside
of marriage, despite their high ideals and full knowledge-
even in the moment of the act— that they are surrendering
something that can never be recaptured, that they v/ill
regret it deeply through long years following, may neverthe-
less yield to the temptation of marital relations. It is
groundless to say they did not knov/ better; they indubitably
knew what v/as best, but they moved in the opposite direction.
(b) Any one of, say, four acknowledged goods (relatively
good by degrees) can be selected and willed. One may ac-
knowledge the v/elfare of mankind to be of greatest worth,
the writing of a great book to be next in value, the building
192. Art. (1940), 167
•

of a cathedral to be next, and yet (supposing oneself able
to contribute to or create any one of them) deliberately
choose to loaf along the seashore. Contrary to this view
of Locke, a man's judgment as to what really is best is not
of necessity Y/illed. It is because of this freedom to do
less than the best possible and because men use it that
immorality exists. V/ithout this freedom to do right or
v;rong, neither immorality nor morality could be part of
human life. Only necessary processes would go on.
(c) Most clearly, one can act in the interest of others
and this can be the primary motivation; any happiness or
consciousness of happiness following from the act can be
v/holly incidental. Surely Socrates did not consent to die,
rather, than flee, because he found happiness in it; rather,
the basic motivation of his act was the well-being of the
youth of Athens and the recognition of the importance, for
mankind , of obedience to the lav/s. One may argue, if he
v/ill, that Socrates found happiness in so doing and that
that was the necessary cause of his doing it; and it will
be admitted that he doubtless found satisfaction inciden-
tally. But the thing that gave and gives his action moral
grandeur in men's eyes is nothing other than the recognition
that his deed was not primarily motivated by his desire for
hJLs own happiness, but by the possible welfare of society,
no matter if it cost his very life. Farther still, one can
seek the sell-being of others rather than his ov/n (even
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though, in a particular Instance, he despises doing it)
simply because of his clear consciousness that he ought to
do it. Both because he is concerned about his own ssSetj
and because he despises the man who is now endangered by a
flaming forest, one may v/ant exceedingly to let him burn;
yet, because of his clear conviction that he ought to save
any human being, he v/111 even risk his life to save this
man's*
(d) So, also, one can respond to a moral ideal which
he recognizes as having authority over him, even though it
is clear to him that, if he is true to it, he will suffer
the most horrifying pain and anguish, "Father, if thou be
willing, remove this cup from me: nevertheless not my will ,
but thine, be done." Is it possible that any one will
seriously interpret this tremendous volition as the v/111
basically to satisfy one's own desire for his ov/n happiness?
All these are but a few of the kinds and illustrations
of volitions which prove that man need not and often does
not will that v/hich he Judges best for his ovm personal v/ell-
being. Though attempts are made to interpret all these in
terms of hedonistic determinism, it is clear that the only
v/ay in v/hich such a theory can be acknov/ledged to include
them is for its advocates dogmatically to insist on what
their theory as sume
s
even though psychological analysis de-
fies it, namely, that willing is identical, in its aim, with
wanting selfish satisfaction. The fact is that willing may
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have many different objects only one of which is the ful-
fillment of one's own yearning for happiness.
(3) Other implications of Locke's thesis for morality,
(a) For one thing, if one must will what he judges to
be best and the action turns out to be a wrong one, the
failure is not a moral failure. It is only an unavoidable
error of judgment. This, as such, is good ethics; but Locke
is to be criticized because, though he sees that men are
not condemned by God for not knowing what they could not
know, he still seems to hold that, on his view, men's acts
can be morally wrong. But, in fact, on his theory, the
only possible error is error in thought, not morality,
(b) Because one is necessitated to do the thing he
judges to be best for himself, he can do no wrong. He sim-
ply acts as necessitated. And moral distinctions in actions
vanish.
(c) On a sounder theory of good than that which Locke
asserts, on the theory that there is a real distinction
between good and evil and that, for example, whether one
likes it or not, honesty is an ideal which demands the alle-
giance of all persons; on this theory, according to Locke's
argument that one must v/ill what he thinks best for himself,
if one does not desire to be honest in a certain instance,
if he thinks honesty will work against his ovm best inter-
ests and happiness, he simply cannot be honest. Unless he
is made happy by doing v/hat is right, in each instance, he
i
cannot, in those Instances, do right.
193
(d) As Professor Wayland Vaughan clearly Implies, it
is only in the belief that one can act contrary to one's
best judgment that regret becomes intelligible.
(e) If one insists, as one must finally insist, that
on Locke's presuppositions, one is not really free to delib
erate but either is or is not, in each instance, naturally
necessitated to it, then it is clear (since, in addition,
what appears best for oneself must be willed) that man's
total activity is completely necessitated and moral exper-
ience is utterly destroyed. Man's total activity is the on
going process, the chain of necessary desires and satisfac-
tions, the unswerving pursuit of his own selfish happiness.
Man is reduced to a mechanism or a process and has no essen
tially moral nature or experience at all.
5. Criticism of the theory as a whole.
Thus far in the course of this discussion of Locke's
theories of personal freedom, criticism has been associated
explicitly with specific parts of his exposition—freedom
as pov/er to perform v/hat is willed, determination by the
uneasiness of desire, the pov/er of deliberation, the neces-
sity of willing what is considered best for one's self; at
the same time, criticism has been essentially of a negative
nature. Locke's theory of personal freedom is nov/ to be
193. GP, 642; cf. James, WB, 175 and A, 3, b, (E) of this
chapter.
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criticized as a v;hole, first, in negative and then in
positive terms.
a. Negative criticism of. Locke's theory as a v/hole,
(1) Locke's theory is incoherent and his theory and
his life are inconsistent.
Though Locke must here be interpreted as a detemilnist,
he is, in fact, not a thoroughgoing determinist, or a thor-
oughgoing hedonist, or even a thoroughly consistent etliical
relativist. This point must, in itself, be emphasized; and
it must be stressed, too, that this is both a favorable and
unfavorable fact for Locke. It is favorable, as will be
noted in the section devoted to positive criticism, in the
sense that it shows Locke's basic intuition of the necessity
and reality of freedom, an affirmation implied not only by
his occasional words but also by his life of religious, in-
tellectual, moral, and social Inquiry and activity. But it
is unfavorable in the sense that it vividly reveals Locke's
uncertainty, unclarity, inconsistency, and incoherence in
his viev/ as a whole, .
The point of the following criticisms is not, therefore,
that Locke, in fact, was a thoroughgoing determinist or
hedonist or relativist, in life or even in certain affirma-
tions; it is, rather, that in his Essay , v;here he dealt most
extensively and most earnestly with, and repeatedly revised,
his viev/ of the self's nature and activity, he never clearly,
cogently, and consistently got beyond the limits of mechanism.

133
hedonism, and relativism; that even here he had intuitions
of and sought grounds for freedom but that the often explicit
and always implicit princiiDle of natural, hedonistic, deter-
minism stood in the way of his success. It is, therefore,
neither Locke's life nor the practical, and occasionally
theoretical, presuppositions of that life that are chal-
lenged here; it is, rather, Locke's extended theory of the
self as set forth In the Essay
,
particularly, in the chapter
on pov;er. It is agreed, at the outset, that it is, in part,
surprising that a man of such great social concern should,
in his explicit theory of the nature of man, limit himself
to determinism and hedonism. It is no doubt now time to
clarify and justify again this deterministic, hedonistic
interpretation of Locke.
(2) Locke must be interpreted as a determinist,
Locke's qualifications and attempts to establish freedom
are not to be lightly passed over; yet, for reasons, it must
be maintained that Locke's view is essentially deterministic.
The intimations of freedom v/hich accompany his exposi-
tion are out of harmony with the dominant theme and underly-
ing current of his entire chapter. That theme is crystal-
lized in his assertion that no volition is made (not even
the volition to think) except as it is necessitated by a
prevailing, naturally present, and dominant, uneasiness.
If he meant to affirm freedom or if he v/ished to warrant
such an affirmation, he should boldly have affirmed that
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this uneasiness may be spiritually initiated (not, presum-
ably, only necessarily and naturally begun) and that, even
so, it need not be yielded to by the v/ill; he should, at the
barest minimum, have at least coherently related this nec-
essitatlon of each volition by natural and strong uneasiness
with his affirmation of the liberty to think. This he did
not succeed in doing not only because he did not attempt
it, but also because it cannot be done. On Locke's theory,
thinlcing is possible only if necessitated by the uneasiness
of desire or the pursuit of happiness; such necessitation,
however clothed, is not spiritual freedom.
If Locke meant to affirm forthrightly the reality of
freedom, he never should have made (and in repeated revi-
sions left unchanged) the unequivocal statement that man's
freedom consists in the pov/er to execute what is v/illed (for
this does not touch the problem of the self's freedom at
all, much less establish it); further, he never should have
affirmed that the same necessity which drives men to the
pursuit of happiness and necessitates their deliberating
constitutes the only freedom men have. Further than this,
he never should have maintained that a man must v/ill what
he judges to be best; for, on the presupposition of the rel-
ativity of good, this allov/s no response to moral obligation
or response to duty or service to God for their sal^e and,
thus affords no escape from the basic and natural necessl-
tation toward the pursuit of one's own happiness; and, on
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the presupposition of an objectively real distinction be-
tween right and v/rong or good and evil, and the psycholog-
ical and spiritual distinction between desire and duty or
wish and ought, it allows no moral freedom to do right
because it ought to be done. Naturally necessitated free-
dom to deliberate and lack of any freedom to will the wrong
destroy the distinction (in conjunction with the theory
of relative good and evil) between real right and wrong, in
theory, and in practice. Such freedom is neither rational
freedom nor moral freedom but is, rather, from its presup-
position upward, natural necessitation. It must be added,
further, that if Locke meant to establish spiritual freedom,
he should not have denied its possibility both before the
judgment of thought and between the judgment and the voli-
tion. If freedom (whether "indifferency" or not) cannot
manifest itself at either place, how can it manifest itself
at all?
If Locke really Intended to establish freedom, he
should have made his conception of personality clearly and
unmistakably spiritual as distinct from natural; he should
have abandoned substances, especially as unknov/n or as
possibly mat.erlal in essence; he should have recognized the
essential nature of all thought and consciousness as spirit-
ual activity. For materiality logically requires thorough-
going necessity and excludes spiritual freedom, while skep-
ticism about substances or faith in them gives no positive
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warrant whatsoever for affirming anything about the nature
and activity of a self which is dependent on it. And pas-
sivity of thought in perception tends in the direction of
the mind's subordination to the activity of nature.
One must not forbear adding that Locke's unclarity,
inconsistency, and disconnectedness cannot be excused on
the ground of the brevity of his discourse or the lack of
time and attention devoted to it (for it was a much-disputed,
oft-revised, and lengthy section of the Essay ) One must
conclude, rather, that if he meant to assert real spiritual
freedom and if he had succeeded in justifying it, it would
have been readily evident on one's careful and repeated
reading of his discourse. It is not insignificant to note,
finally, that Locke's viev/ of the self's activity is inter-
preted as deterministic even by those who expound the same
view more clearly and cogently. Several of these thinkers
194
are Anthony Collins, Jonathan Edwards, and David Hume, And
it has been similarly interpreted by Locke's critics who
believe in freedom, such as Eraser, Palmer, and Hudson,
(3) Locke's theory is unclear and inconsistent.
It must be stressed, too, that one of Locke's greatest
weaknesses in His chapter on power is his ambiguity, tau-
tology, and circularity of exposition and terminology, Con-
195
sider several instances of these failings,
194, Collins, Art. (1717), 366.
195. Cf. A, 4, b,.(3) ana (4).
!

(a) Locke says the stronp;est motive ordinarily deter-
mines volition. But what has he said? Since there is no
way of measuring the strength of motives, and no v/ay of
proving or disproving such a hypothesis, Locke's case rests
in good degree on an untouchable assumption. Since it adds
196
nothing to Imov/ledge, it is mere tautology. It is, as
well, a circular argument; and it goes like this: what a
man v/ills is the unquestionable sign of the man's more press-
ing uneasiness; and, the most pressing uneasiness necessarily
determines the will. But all this profits nothing—unless
it can be proved; and it cannot be touched.
(b) Locke spealcs of desire and its necessitation in a
sometimes confusing manner. It usually means present uneasi-
ness of desire for happiness and its necessary determination
of volition—even the necessitation of deliberation in the
pursuit of happiness. But then, in the light of this clear
principle of necessitation of every volition by desire,
Locke says that men, in certain instances, should have done
otherv/lse than as they did, Nov/ if he means necessity, all
talk of should have is utterly meaningless. If he means by
should have that they could have done otherwise, then he
cannot mean that they were necessitated,
(c) Related to this is Locke's assertion that v/hatever
is v/llled is wanted . But he adds darkness rather than light
196, Cf. Palmer, PP, 88.
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by this observation because he fails to see that his asser-
tion is true only if want is interpreted in a far broader
sense than his hedonistic theory allows. Clearly, one can-
not will v;hat he does not choose to will; but equally
clearly, one can v/ill acts which are motivated by other wants
or wishes than those which aim only at the exclusive pursuit
of one's own happiness. There are wants and wishes and
volitions imitated them which are themselves spiritually,
rather than naturally, initiated and v/hich aim not at the
satisfaction of one's desire for happiness but at obedience
to moral precepts because they ought to be obeyed, at serv-
ice to others for their own sakes , at devotion to the laws
of God and his purposes for his sake , rather than for one's
197
own. If, therefore, Locke, or any other determinist, as-
serts that one cannot v;ill what he does not wish, he is not
only unclear, but unfair, unless he emphatically drav/s this
distinction between natural and spiritual, processional and
personal, imitations and aims. For it is only in the non-
Lockean, nonhedonistic sense that Locke's assertion of the
determination of volitions by wants, wishes, and desires can
be held to be true. Yet, Locke never clearly notes this
fundamental and illuminating distinction at all.
(d) Again Locke contributes confusion rather than clar-
ity v/hen, on the one hand, he speaks of acknov/ledged greater
197. Of. Palmer, PP, 193.
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goods which are not desired and, on the other, affirms that
"if he prefers it in his present thought before any other,
198
it is plain he thinks better of it," So, on the one hand
stands the fuzzy reference to goods that are acknowledged
to be greater, yet not desired, sjid, on the other, the state-
ment that the good v/hich is most strongly desired and willed
is at the same time the one which is plainly judged to be
best.
Such tautologies, ambiguities, and circularities make
interpretation and criticism difficult and detract greatly
from the cogency and persuasiveness of Locke's exposition
on the nature of the self.
(4) Lookers basic theories are disconnected.
Another major v^eakness of Locke's discourse on power
is its failure coherently to relate the independent and, as
such, contradictory, yet fundamental, assertions (1) that
the power to execute what one wills is all the freedom a man
has; (2) that volitions, including thinking, are always nec-
essitated by specific, or prevailing, uneasinesses, at best
by a natural and inescapable desire for one's own happiness;
and (3) that in the power of deliberation (though absolutely
199
necessitated) "lies the liberty man has." These are Locke's
basic principles; and, even if they v/ere not quite contradic-
tory in themselves, it v^^ould scarcely be possible strictly
198. 49.
199. 48.
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to deduce real spiritual freedom from them.
(5) Locke's necessity is only a postulate, not certain
knowledge.
Locke's theory implicitly, v/hen not explicitly, pre-
supposes a natural necessity v/hich Locke, nevertheless, admits
is not an object of certain knowledge ; he says precisely
that there is no "certain knov/ledge of universal truths con-
cerning natural bodies." It is only probable knov/ledge; it
is, therefore, only a postulate. So Locke proceeds with his
deterministic theory of the self even though he acknov/ledges
that his presupposition of necessity in natural law is un-
200
proved and, as he believes, improvable. Thus, as for all
determinists, so for Locke I The a priori argument for
determinism is by no means conclusive. Neither, hov/ever,
is Hudson's criticism that Locke is excluded from holding a
theory of freedom because absence of necessity in natural
law "reveals the knower as subject to it and not the eternal
201
and sovereign legislator of that lav/." For, as has been
noted before, v/hat freedom requires is not rigid necessity
in natural lav/ or anywhere but, simply, a degree of uni-
formity which makes reasonable prediction possible, Locke
is excluded from real spiritual freedom, but not on the
grounds suggested by Hudson. And his argument for determinism
200. Essay IV, iii, 25; cited by Hudson, PLBH, 38. cf. Essay ,
IV, ii, 26, v/here he says: "Certainty and demons tratjp n
are things v/e must not, in these matters, pretend to."
201. PLBH, 39.
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Is inconclusive on his own theory of the uncertain nature
of the knowledge of necessity.
(6) Locke's psychological hedonism and common sense.
Locke's hedonism is erroneous psychology and poor com-
mon sense, and at the same time excludes moral freedom.
Hedonism maintains that man's only motivation to thought or
action is the pursuit of his ov/n happiness. But psycholog-
ical examination makes it clear that the conscious motives
of men v/hich m.ove them to action unquestionably (and there
is no reason to believe that one's subconscious activity
necessarily opposes it) Include such ends as the service of
others, of God, of ideals—for their own sakes. These may
be v/illed by men without any consciousness on their part
that they v/ant to do so for their o\vn happiness. They may
be dominated, rather, by the clear consciousness only that
they ought to do so or that they want to do so for the v/ell-
being of others or the advancement of God's purposes. There
is a marked distinction between mere selfish desire, on the
one hand, and the clear moral ought or the sacrifice of self
for others, on the other. How clear the difference is be-
tv/een even enlightened .self-interest (the best Locke's theory
gives), v/hich operates on the assumption that "the very end
of our freedom" is "that v/e may attain the (personalis^ sub-
202jectively, satisfying) end we choose" and selfless, heroic.
202. 49.
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devotion to objectively authoritative ideals and sacrificial
service of God and other persons on the presupposition that
the end of our freedom is not, the attainment of what we
naturally desire for ourselves, hut the realization of ,
ideals which lift men above nature and, whatever the cost^
enable them to develop the kind of characters vi/hi oh spiritual
persons ought to achieve, Hov/ clear it is that the only
freedom (if any) that Locke allov/s is the freedom to pursue
one's own selfish ends and that he never establishes that
kind of freedom which is essential to the morslity v/hich
roots in the power to distinguish between objective good and
evil and the power to choose either good or evil.
(7) In a comprehensive negative criticism of Locke's
theory of the self's activity or personal freedom, it is
perhaps not unv/arranted to cite an explicit instance which
proves the inadequacy of his viev/ to establish any moral
freedom and, thus, mors-l responsibility.
By coimtless persons, including empiricistic determin-
Ists related to Locke, former Prime Minister Chamberlain of
England has been severely criticized for his failure to
oppose and defeat Hitler before the latter had attained to
such tremendous pov;er as to engulf the v/hole v/orld in devas-
tating war. Now such criticism may be well warranted; but,
on Locke's theory it cannot be justified at all. The prime
minister, on Locke's theory, can be condemned neither for
his failure to gather adequate information, nor to think
1
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more understandingly about It, For, because of his given,
prevailing uneasiness, he was necessitated to think when he
did and as he did; he could think no more often or no less,
and no more adequately; his mind was prohibited from doing
differently. And, Just as his uneasinesses necessarily
determined v/hen and how he did and did not think, so also
his uneasinesses necessitated his doing, in overt acts,
exactly v;hat he did. It is Locke, not his critic, who is
insisting that every volition, even that of thinking, is
necessitated by one's Inescapable desire for, and inevit-
able pursuit of, one's ov/n happiness. But it is the critic
who is stressing the actual implication of Locke's asser-
tion and, by this Illustration, shov/ing the logical absur-
dity of Locke's saying of the prime minister, or of anyone
at any time, that he should have done differently, that he
should have stopped to think, that he should have kept him-
self better informed, that he should have acted differently,
that he should have declared war on Germany long before he
did. For on Locke's theory he could have done no otherwise;
every volition is absolutely necessitated by the prevailing
uneasiness, and that's the whole of the matter; v/hat v/as
done v/as done because it had to be done. So v/hen Locke
places responsibility for actions on persons or says they
should have done differently, he is either boldly rejecting
his basic presupposition of determination by uneasiness,
and assuming freedom v/ithout warranting it, or he is utterly
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unaware of a crucial and devastating contradiction in his
discourse. In either event, his exposition is distinctly
inadequate.
(8) Locke's narrow empiricism is inadequate.
One of Locke's basic difficulties rests on his em-
piricism which is concerned so much with what men can knov/
that he fails sufficiently to consider how men can know.
203
As Bowne would point out, he stresses that area of experi-
ence which comes from sensations and reflections and fails
to consider that area of experience which is the thinking
person himself. In fact, as has been noted before, he be-
lieves that original ideas are simple and passively received'
on this level, at least, explicitly excluding the activity
of the thinking self.
One serious consequence of this way of thinking is
that, in his concern for v/hat men can knov^f and his lack of
concern for how men can know (which, later, was Kant's con-
tribution to philosophy), the thinkei^s intellectual eyes
are pressed so closely to the ground that, though they see
certain disconnected parts clearly, they do not see the
widely scattered and equally relevant data and fail espe- -
cially to see the far-reaching decisive implications, for the
whole, of even those parts v/hich they do see clearly. So
204
Locke, by his exclusive purpose and selected data, is led
203. Met., 4, 5 ff.; Hudson, PLBH, stresses tliis.
204. Locke, Essay
,
Intro., 2.
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to a kind of mechanism or natural determinism v/hich he
might well never have maintained if he had included in his
considerations the implications of his one-sided conclusion
—
the implications that thought presupposes a thinker, that
knowledge presupposes a knov/er. Had he looked more in the
direction of the self itself, he might have seen that moral-
ity, conceived as the pursuit of "the true intrinsic good
205
or ill that is in things," presupposes a free self, that
religion requires it too, that the spiritual significance
and dignity of man is inseparable from it, and that man's
possibilities of controlling his v/orld and his society under
an ideal purpose also presuppose it. Locke was so obsessed
with concerns and presuppositions v/hich, of themselves,
exclude freedom that he did not sufficiently consider the
data v/hich alone can ground freedom, can make- possible the
proving of any claim or justify the moral life. Had he
looked more in the di'rection of the knov/er as well as the
known, he would have perceived the truth that, though his
selected, limited, data clearly exclude freedom, a compre-
hensive viev/ of experience points to freedom and reveals it
as indispensable to a coherent interpretation of life as a
206
Vifhole. He would have seen that all postulates or principles,
such as necessity itself, are categories of minds first of
205. 54.
206. Compare Locke's ov/n recognition of the significance of
one's data for his conclusions; in CU, 209.
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all and, therefore, subordinate to minds, not masters of
them. As Hudson so ardently affirms and as Bov/ne clearly
shows, it is intelligence that explains the categories and
not the categories, intelligence. Intelligence, which re-
quires freedom, is, therefore, logically and metaphysically
prior to the category of necessity which v/ould exclude it.
This fundamental fact Locke fails to consider sufficiently.
(9) Locke's determinism and the infinite regress.
Locke's determinism defeats itself in its infinite
207
regress. Both an uncaused cause and an eternal cause ere
inconsistent with it; yet hov/ can both be escaped? If one
does admit, as both Plobbes and Locke who were Christian be-
lievers would admit, that the eternal God ordered everything
that is, including necessary causation in certain realms at
least, then he adtnlts, first, that God, as the ordainer of
the principle, is superior to it, second, that he is there-
fore as free from its control as he chooses to be, and,
third, that spirit is then essentially superior and indepen-
dent of the world of nature. Admitting that God could order
the world on the principle of causal necessity, which is not
the essence of God's own nature, one would have difficulty
arguing that he could not order persons as free spirits when
free spirituality is the very essence of God's ov/n being.
Interestingly enough, though Locke does not intimate it in
207. Cf. Praser, LE, I, 367, n.

his chapter on power, he does adinit this very possibility
when he resolves "that if it be possible for God. to make
a free agent, then man is free, though I see not the way of
208
it." If there be any meaning v/hatsoever in the historic
statement that man is created in the image of God and if
God be a free, uncaused, eternal spirit, certainly it must
mean that man is created a free spirit. Nor is the precise
means whereby God could Institute a principle of necessity
in certain areas any more readily comprehensible than the
precise procedure v^hereby God could create free spirits*
(10) Negative criticism in summary.
In conclusion of this negative criticism, of Locke's
theory as a whole, then, it may be said that whether or not
Locke intends to establish real spiritual freedom, freedom
from determination by the natural uneasiness of desire or
any other sequential necessity, he does not succeed in es-
tablishing it. For, most exactingly interpreted, and des-
pite his equivocation, Locke's theory reduces to determinism
Even when most freedomistically interpreted, Locke's "free-
dom" (if "freedom" may properly be used to desi'gnate it)
does not consist in that freedom which is essential to dis-
interested inquiry after truth, high moral
,
e:xperience and
responsibility, a tenable conception of God or a nonmercen-
ary religion, or a conception of man which makes all men
208. Locke, Art. (1695) 2, 305; cited by Fraser, LE, I, 316,
n. 2.
I
clearly ends in themselves, both willing and able to create,
and to dv/ell together in, a society which altruistically
seeks the well-being of alio
b. Locke's positive contributions to a theory of freeds m*
In spite of all that has been said by way of negative
criticism of Locke's conception of the self's activity, it
must be recalled that Locke is not v/ithout serious equivoca-
tion and ambiguity and that, therefore, he introduces into
his discourse, in the Essay and elsewhere, clear statements
and less clear intimations that point to his awareness of
and, sometimes, belief in, factors v/hich contribute to or
are wholly intelligible only on a theory of freedom. It is
these positive insights of Locke that are to be noted nov/«
(1) Locke's admission of a distinction betv/een real
good and evil.
Locke's mention of an eternal distinction between right
and v/rong and his reference to "the true intrinsic good or
209
ill that is in things," though reduced in significance by
his extended affirmation of the relativity of good and evil,
nevertheless indicate that Locke believes in a level of life
and reality v/hich is distinct from nature and v/hich provides
man with spiritual insights and motivations. And this is
essential to real spiritual freedom.
209. 64,

149
(2) Locke's assertion of moral responsibility.
Though it is doubtful that it can be held on the basis
of Locke's general theory, Locke nevertheless asserts that
men are responsible for their moral actions. He says, for
example, that they should, in instances, have thought or
done otherwise. He asserts that men can learn to desire
what they do not spontaneously desire but which clearly
leads to their happiness, that, even when not desired in it-
self, an object or an act may be willed because it is ac-
knowledged as a means to happiness. Though all these abili-
ties are limited by the chain of necessitating desire for
one's ovm happiness (and, in this sense, reducible to a pro-
cess of necessity or determination), they are, nevertheless,
capacities v/hich ere relevant to freedom, abilities which
come most completely to expression and are interpreted in
their full significance in conjunction with the principle
of freedom. For on this basis one is free to do v;hat he
ought to do, whether it, first of all, brings him happiness
or not.
(3) Locke's emphasis on man's responsibility for thinking.
Locke is especially interested in proving man's respon-
sibility for deliberating, for thinlcing before acting. This
power to think is at the very heart of spiritual freedom;
it alone enables man to realize his freedom and to employ it
either well or poorly. It is essential that Locke's view be
sufficiently commended. His assertion is to be criticized
i

not in itself but because it seems impossible on Lookers
deterministic view which subordinates it to nature. For
this subordination malces reason the enslaved servant of
natural desire or the necessary pursuit of one's own happi-
ness • On Locke's theory, it fails to establish responsi-
bility in the human self and lets it rest back on the natural
process. Spiritual freedom requires that the pov/er to think
be a free power which the self possesses in itself and for
itself, to which the processes of nature are subordinated
and by which the processes of nature are employed. This
places responsibility on persons and not on the process.
Though Locke is far from adequately understanding and inter-
preting this power of deliberation, this power of thinking,
he is nevertheless to be credited v/ith recognizing that
freedom, to be significant, requires rationality and think-
ing. He comes most explicitly to this freedomistic insight
when he Vifrites: "Without liberty, the understanding v/ould
be to no purpose: and without understanding, liberty (if it
210
could be) would signify nothing,"
(4) Locke's necessitated freedom.
Even on Locke's theory that the same necessity v/hich
drives to the pursuit of happiness drives men to delibera-
tion, deliberation is to be seen as a constructive rather
than a negative insight. For it does, in many instances.
210, 69.
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provide (though not for escape from the necessary pursuit
of one's own happiness) for a more enlightened pursuit which
may supplant man's otherwise completely blind surrender to
spontaneous desire.
(5) Locke's assertion of man's responsibility for
avoidable Ignorance and inadvertency.
Locke makes assertions about ignorance and inadvertency
which presuppose or imply freedom and which are reasonable
on the basis of freedom. For it is a fact that a free per-
son may be held morally responsible (and Locke affirms that
men are) for acts v/hich he commits on the basis of ignorance
which he might have overcome or after overlooking "even that
211
which he does knov^f," Locke is to be commended, then, on
seeing that men are free to overcome their ignorance in
measure and to determine for themselves the degree of care
with which they will think about their decisions. But he is
to be criticized on the grounds that this freedom could
scarcely exist If men v/ere determined naturally, in all
volitions--including thinking, by the prevailing uneasiness
of desire. For, on that basis, whatever a man does, when it
is done, must be seen as having been completely determined
by the process v/hich necessitates determination by imeasi-
ness and to which all persons are subordinated.
211. 69
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(6) Miscellaneous contributions to a theory of freedom.
Five other statements, at least, reveal In Locke his
intuition and presupposition of spiritual freedom—even
though his basic exposition v/ould seem to exclude it.
(a) One of these is his observation that the executive's
pov/er of prerogative is often rightfully accompanied by the
people's confidence In the executive, even if his actions
prove to be to the discomfort of the people— so long as the
executive's intentions are good and his mistakes not too
212
disastrous. Nov/ intentions have real moral significance
only where responsibility for intentions is real. Since only
a free spirit possesses this responsibility and, thus, can
have morally meaningful intentions, in judging a man's in-
tentions to be good, one implies that he is free and respon-
sible. One Implies, too, that that freedom is more than a
mere power to perform; it is a freedom of the spirit v/hich
is real even though loerformance prove to be unsuccessful.
So Locke here tacitly affirms man's freedom, even though
his theory of deliberation fails to establish it and his
determinism quite excludes it.
(b) A second statement is Locke's bold assertion that
"God having given man an understanding to direct his actions,
213
has allov/ed him a freedom of will..,,"
(c) A third Intimation of freedom consists of his
212. Gov., II, 165.
213. 58,
j
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resolving that "if it be possible for God to males a free
agent, then man is free, though I see not the way of it."
He even goes so far as to say: "I cannot have a clearer
214
perception of any thing than that I am free."
(d) A fourth intimation of freedom is the insight that
the more one is loyal to a grand purpose, the more he is
freed from detailed distractions and spontaneous, unguided,
215
surrender to natural impulses. Unfortunately, Locke refers
only to the grand purpose of pursuing one's own happiness.
But the fact is that his view is sound also for such pur-
poses as basically seek other ends, such as moral ends, duty,
fulfillment of obligation, service to God and otheisfor their
own sakes. So Locke's insight, limited as it is, is, never-
theless, significant for freedom.
(e) A fifth suggestion of freedom consists of his criti-
cism of Hobbes and Spinoza for "resolving all, even the
thoughts and will of men, into an Irresistible, fatal nec-
216
essity."
All these statements and inferences from Locke's writ-
ings corroborate the suggestion, made earlier in this paper,
that Locke belongs to that group of thinlcers who recognize
the need for spiritual freedom in man, who even go so far in
214. Locke, Art. (1693) 2, 305; cf. Praser, LE, I, 316, n.2.
v/here he cites the first Quotation.
215. 52.
216. Locke, Art. (1693)1, 257; cf. Hudson, PLBH, 43 and
Praser, LE, I, xlvii.
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certain instances as to presuppose it, yet are so obsessed
with the persuasive idea of necessity that, in the main,
their conceptions of the self's activity are dominated by
it, are fundamentally deterministic.
C« Historical Influence of Locke's Theory.
It would be of considerable interest to trace the wide-
spread influence of Locke's thought concerning the freedom
of the self. So v/ldespread, in fact, v/as that influence
that it might prove to be impossible to trace it completely.
For, as Praser has noted, so much v/as written on the basis
of the stimulus of Locke's chapter "that the literature- of
'free will,' in last century England (the eighteenth century),
217
might form a small library." If a thorough investigation
were made, it would possibly turn out that Locke's chapter
not only touched off a heated discussion in his own day,
involving men like Anthony Collins, Samuel Clarke, Bishop
Stillingfleet, and Leibnitz, but exerted significant influ-
ence, negative or positive, on Berkeley, Butler, Hume, J. S*
Mill, Jonathan Edwards, Kant, Voltaire, Cousin, Hamilton,
Fraser, T# H. Green, Palmer, and V/hitehead; and these are
but a f ev/ of all that might be mentioned.
But it is not v/ithin the limits of this dissertation
to malce this extended study. Attention v/ill now, therefore,
be turned back to the main concern of the paper, to Locke's
217. Praser, LE, I, 372, n.

conception of freedom. That conception having been examined
and criticized in relation to the self, it v;ill now be ex-
pounded and evaluated in its social context, in its meaning
for religion, politics, and economics. Thereafter, certain
important lines of the influence of Locke's conception of
social freedom will be briefly traced.

CHAPTER III
LOCKE'S CONCEPTION OF SOCIAL FREEDOM
The last chapter dealt with Locke's view of the free-
dom of the self. It is the purpose of this chapter to
exaraine Locke's conception of social freedom, political,
economic, religious, and to trace certain lines of its
influence in subsequent thought and history* First, then,
to a consideration of the former.
A. Locke's Theory of Social Freedom Expounded,
Compared, and Criticized.
1. Locke's theory of social freedom and his conception
of man.
Because one's conception of man is "basic to and in-
separable from his social theory, if it is sound, it is
imperative that, at the outset of this inquiry, the relation
of Locke's social theory to his view of man be considered.
Locke's social theory must later be expounded and criti-
cized in detail. But it is necessary now that that theory be
outlined briefly in order that its relation to his view of
man may be considered.
a, Locke's social theory.
Locke's theory of social organization could stand on
the exclusive principle of self-interest, freedom for me .
And in a sense, this is Locke's primary concern. Yet Locke's
theory, as a matter of fact, goes beyond mere self-interest
to concern for others, not merely as means to one's own

freedom, but as ends in themselves. In brief, his view,
in addition to his conception of man, consists of these
theses: that government exists only on the free consent,
the common contact, of the people; that representative
government is founded on majority rule; that there sho^old
be a large measure of religious tolerance and that the
church and state should be independent of each other; that
tyranny must be absolutely discountenanced, and, under cer-
tain conditions, overthrown by violence; that, when neces-
sary to freedom, persons or governments may properly use
force; that slavery is essentially to be despised and for-
bidden; that all men should have a part of the wealth of
the earth sufficient to meet their needs and that private
property should be protected by government. Through it all
runs the principle that government exists for one purpose,
the public good, this public good being the means to my
freedom, my concern for the public good being a condition
of my imiflortal bliss, but aiming at the same time at the
well-being of all mankind on the altruistic impulse v/hlch
roots in the belief that all persons are of greatest worth
and, therefore, ends in themselves.
b. Locke's view of man and his social theory.
V/hereas . for Hobbes, government, in fact if not in
basic theory, exists as the expression of the will of the
person in power and thus is quite compatible v/ith the hedon-
istic determinism which necessites the exclusive pursuit
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of one»s self-interest (exemplied in the tyrant), and whereas
Rousseau's theory of the natural feeling of good will among
all persons is compatible with a highly democratic theory
of government in which each menber seeks the well-being of
1
all, Locke's view, which mingles self-interest
. and interest in
others as ends in themselves, is not adequately grounded in
the deterministic, hedonistic view of man which he holds
in the Essay While in fact complicating this theoretical
difficulty, he transcends it, in his political theory,
simply by assuming in the nature of man that which the Essay
never established. Now let this thesis be expounded in
detail*
(1) The man of the Essay »
In the Essay
,
though even there Locke introduced ex-
traneous elements of freedom and altruism of a kind (to be
rewarded in heaven), his essential view of man was that he
was naturally determined in all his volitions by the necess-
ary pursuit of his own happiness* Now if it is insisted
that, on this view, Locke's man would never be ffee to think
but could think only when natural desire necessitated it,
it is quite difficult to see hov/ he (or they, that is, num-
bers of man) could cominit himself to any complicated ideal
of government, such as democracy, how he could, in fact be
a controller of mechanisms rather than a mechanism himself.
1. Windelband, HP, 519.
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If, on the other hand, it be allowed that Locke's man is
free to think about v;ays of achieving his greatest happi-
ness (and even this is a concession to Locke) it is clear
that, if he chooses democracy as his best means to his happi-
ness, not only the ideal but the persons with whom he is
associated can be looked on not as ends in themselves but
only as means to his own well-being. Democracy would be
compatible with this view of man, but it would not raise
men to the level of being treated as more than mere means.
This theory of man would be compatible, in fact, even with
this-worldly altruism if the Christian morality and Christ-
ian religion were accepted. This suggests other data of
Locke's view which significantly bear on the nature of man
and his fitness for democratic society, for the achievement
of -^he -greatest possible freedom for all in social rela-
tions,
(2) Man in the light of Christian revelation.
That Locke's view of man is significantly influenced
by Christian revelation, that it adds, to man, attributes
which Locke's purely psychological or philosophical inquiry
could never have touched," is clearly evident. The basic
insight that is pertinent here is that Christian morality
—
which admonishes altruism, charity, good will, cooperation,
tolerance, and the like, all of v/hich are contrary to
narrow hedonism—is, without doubt, in Locke's mind, the
only complete, adequate, and true morality. But as has
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been suggested, this charitable morality, to which man is
called and virhich he is able to acknowledge and pursue, is
not grounded in the natural nature of man. It is imposed
"from above. 7 It is the fruit of Christian revelation.
Nevertheless, Locke insists, it is approved by reason
—
though reason had not discovered it before Christ and might
not have discovered it for centuries to come. Yet this
morality of altruism in this life (which is compatible with
Locke's liberal, humanitarian viev/ of social organization)
is compatible, too, rith Locke's view or man as hedonisti-
cally determined.
The reason is this: that Christian morality is accom-
panied by the assurance of the Christian faith as a v/hole
that he who heeds the Christian ethics will be rewarded by
eternal bliss I So again it is emphasized that Locke's demo-
cratic government could exist if men v/ere free at least to
think but were otherwise wholly determined to pursue their
own happiness. For through cooperation with, and concern
for, others here, they v/Duld not only satisfy self-interest
here (if they deemed cooperation to t heir best interests
here ) but they would be guarantee r'.ng their eternal happiness ,
Locke has explicitely said that one of the great values of
the Christian revelation is that it gave men an inducement
to be good. And this inducement, coupled with psychologi-
cal hedonism, enables men to see beyond their selfish in-
terests in this world , for the sake of a selfish interest

which reaches into and throughout the next. It is the
thesis of this paper that the altruistic element in Locke's
theory of government is mode compatible with his theory of
man not essentially on his philosophical argument, as such,
but onliie revelation of a morality which rewards this-worldly
altruism with other-v;orldly hedonistic bliss, a revelation
which Christ brought and which Locke insists would have been
most slowly, if ever, achieved by the labors of reason. It
is the thesis of this paper, further, that certain purely
nonhedonistic , nondeterministic insights concerning the na-
ture of man and social organization were held by Locke not
basically as the discoveries of 3?eason but as revelations
of the Christian faith.
2
When one, therefore, says, as does Borgeaud that Locke
approached the theory of social contact "completely free
from all thought of religion" , he is in danger of serious
misinterpretation. Clearly Locke argues from his view of
the nature of man, fron natural law ; but equally truly,
thought not so readily discernible (unless one examines
Locke's thought in varioiis of his works) the conception
of man from which Locke argues is a conception which his
reason alone never established, a conception of man which,
in its most significant aspects, was the fruit, basically.
2. HMD, 81.
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of Christian revelation and Locke »s persuasion of its truth,
though reason might never have discovered it alone. The
fact that reason approves it is Locko^s way of emphasizing
that reason must judge of revelation, but it is at the sam.e
time an emphasis on a breach in Locke's thought, for revela-
tion brings insights which reason's analysis in the Essay
failed to discern. Reason argued psychological hedonism;
the Christian revelation stirred up in Locke convictions
as to the nature of man which transcend both the hedonism
and the determinism of the Essay as well as the tendency
to hold human spirits on the level of nature.
Consider, for a moment, several of these nonnatural-
istic, nonhedonistic , nondeterministic elements which were
not the basic fruit of reason or nature, as such, but the
insights inspired by Christian revelation. And as they
are considered, remember that it is these religious in-,
sights that transcend Locke's reasoned conception of man
and enable his social theory to be more than a theory of
exclusive self-interest, make.it, as well, to throb with
the impulse of altruism and concern for others as ends in
themselves, even, at times apart from any' consideration
of the glories of heaven.
(a) One of these elements in Locke's conception of
3
man is his belief in the freedom of the v/ill. At one time
3. Gov
. ,
II, 56.
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he says he cannot see how it is possible that the will can
be f2^e , but that if God can make it so, it is free. In
asserting this, then, Locke is at once admitting (as his
chapter on pov/er enables one to understand) that he cannot
believe in the freedom of the will on the basis of reason,
and that he does, nevertheless, believe in it on the basis
of God»3 mysterious power. In another context, too, Locke
suggests that the self is free to forget self-interest and
seek only the truth and (it seems implied) the well-being
that truth brings to others, notably, in this particular
instance, the untolerated dissenters of religion. Thus -he
writei^:
,
Disputes, especially of religion, should be
waged purely for the sake of truth , and not for
our own self : self should have nothing to do in
them . 4
Still earlier, he had written his first letter on tolerance
so that all men might come to enjoy "the same rights that
5
are granted to others". Again he had said:
I shall not be so unreasonable as to expect,
whatever you promise, that you should lay by
your learning to embrace truth and own what
will not perhaps suit very well with your cir-
cumstances and interest, 6
Here he implies that the will is free to direct thinking
toward truth regardless of personal consequences. Further
implying the reality of the disinterested freedom of tbe
4, T, rv, 550; itf»lics inserted by the writer of this
dissertation.
5, 'r, 1, 51; c:^. T, I, 6.
6, T, III, 545.

will, he insisted that he xma defending tolerance for
a party that has so few preferments to bestow;
so few benefices to reward the endeavours of
any one v/ho appears for it; that I conclude I
shall easily be believed when I say, that nei-
ther hopes of preferment, nor a design to reo-
ommend myself to those I live amongst, has bi-
assed my understanding, or mislead me in my
undertaking. 7
He even speaks of "men who have souls large enough to pre-
8
far the true interest of the public , before that of party",
and of "rational creatures" who, if they will not live up to
9
the rule of their reason "cannot be excused for it.!* So
the freedom Locke is asserting here, contrary to the Essay «
not only denies determinism but also cancels hedonism and
admits objectivity and altruism.
(b) Not only does this freedom of the will seem to be
the fruit of Lockers Christian conviction rather than the
conclusion of reason; so, too, does his basic principle of
10
the law of reason which "obliges everyone" and teaches
all mankind, who will consult it, that being all
equal and independent, no one ought to harm an-
other in his life, health, liberty or possessions
In Locke's analysis of the self's motivation, all that the
drunkard was to consider was his own happiness, whether he
7. T, III, 544.
8. T, I, 4; italics inserted by the writer of this
dissertation.
9. RC, 11.
10. Oov.
,
II, 11, 57.
11. Gov.
,
II, 6.

preferred liquor or sight; no consideration whatsoever for
others was implied; simply complete determination to seek
one's own personal pleasure. But here Locke maintains,
and in a spirit of sincere, altruistic concern for others
as ends in themselves, that the law of reason commands that
everyone should be concerned about the well-being of others
as ends ; in saying it, he seems as concerned about them as
about himself, and wholly unconcerned about his reward in
heaven for saj^-ing it I It is not Locke's hedonistically
deterministic analysis of the self; it is, rather, the
Christian revelation of the worth of man permeating Locke's
mind and coloring his v/hole system of thought, that consti-
tutes really the essential content of Locke's so-called
law of nature, which is his law of reason. Locke's law of
reason, as grounded in nature, not only differs from Burke's
theory that rights are grounded in tradition and vested in-
12
terests, but differs also in that its content is not dis-
covered in nature or reason but is provided, basically, by
Christianity*
(c) Likewise, Locke's conviction—which gives him his
soundest grounds in man's nature for the altruistic elements
of his social thought—that "our (not m^r) souls are of more
13
worth than all the v/orld" and that, as rational beings, we
12. D. S. Miller, at the Boston University Philosophical
Club, Dec. 2, 1942.
13. RG, 11*^ r italics inserted by the v/riter of this dis-
sertation. Locke gives man's possession of reason
as nis ground for man's worth, not his freedom; but
both are essential to it.
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14
are "almost equal to the angels, I' surely transcends any
naturalistic viev/ of the self or any hedonistic principle
which implied that other persons are but means to m^^ ends.
Here, again, not the analysis of reason, primarily, but the
revelation of religion, supplies Locke v/ith the insight
that men, as free, rational
,
spirits, are "of more worth than
all the world"—to which they stand opposed
. As such, they
are ends, not means and (as the so-called law of reason re-
quires) ought to be treated so.
(d) One other datum in the nature of man, which seems
to have the aura of religion alout it more strongly than it
has the mood of the Essay and its reasoned viev; of the self
is the insight (most significant in theories of social
thought) that "obedience is due in the first place to God
15
and afterwards to the laws.'i Hedonism may well require
one's self-centeredness in the pursuit of happiness; but
it is something more than selfishness that requires a man
to be true to his moral conscience even in opposition to
society which may punish or persecute him, especially if
a man has no thought of his eternal compensation for it.
That something more is a supernatural, spiritual, concep-
tion of men and morality; and that came to Locke, too, not
from rational empiricism, but from religious revelation.
14. Gov., I, 58; cf. RC, 133.
15. TTlf 43.
i

When one dwells on Locke's view of man and society,
though one notes that self-interest is often and, per-
haps, usually dominant, a recognition of man's spiritual
worth and a spirit of altruism are also there, a recogni-
tion and a spirit which would be incompatible with Locke's
conception of man were it limited to the insights of his
rational analysis of the Essay ; a recognition and a spirit
which are initiated by religion, and which constitute
for Locke, in content and not in coherence, an adequate
conception of man and make the altruistic elements of
his social thought consistent with his view of man. There
-
if
fore,^it is asserted that Locke's theory of government had
no roots in religion, or if his law of nature or law of
reason is interpreted as being literally a law of nature
or of reason , an all-important factor in Locke's social
thought is entirely overlooked. The fact is that Locke's
law of nature and of reason, his social contract, his
theory of government, his c nception of man, are by no
means grounded exclusively in nature or in reason, as such,
but are mightily influenced by Christian revelation and
Locke's persuasion of its truth—seemingly -as an extran-
eous appendage, rather than as a coherently related part,
of a coherent whole view of man, the appendage in many
respects, and especially for the altruistic elements of
Locke's social thought^ being the most significant part of
his conception of man.
c
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Hudson is, therefore, right Tflfhen he notes that "Locke »s
empiricism never sees that which makes the social regard
16
fundamentally possible and eternally imperative," but that,
nevertheless
,
whether he could rationally justify it or not,
Locke believed in a religion in the very center
of whose doctrine is the message of the eternal
worth of the spiritual self.... .which is free
through the truth, and whose supreme duty is to
recognize other selves as equally eternal and
free. 17
The point of these remarks then is this: that Locke's
social theory and the view of man he presupposes in it both
transcend the rationally argued conception of man in the
Essay and complete that conception and that theory by per-
meating them with essential Christian insights, Locke's
failing, then, does not consist in his having inadequate
convictions and intuitions on the nature of man* The man
he presupposes is adequate to the altruistic elements in
his social theory; but the argument which ought to support
his theory of man is not consistently or coherently v/orked
out.
It is the further thesis of this paper that Locke's
theory, grounded as it is in self-interest .as well as al-
truism, is essentially sound in principle . For democracy
is a bi-polar concept, a two-sided concern. In some situa-
tions, one seeks to further the causes of freedom and
16. PLBH, 44.
17. PLBH, 45.

democracy, to increase the public good, because it is a
means to his own greatest well-being* In other situations,
one may sacrifice everything he has, even life itself {with
no necessary belief in or hope of eternal bliss), for the
sake of freedom and democracy, as noble ideals in themselves,
or as insuring the well-being of others , of millions of men
and women whose voices he has never heard, whose names he
never knew, or who are, themselves, as yet unborn. As a
matter of fact, is it not true that, the more earnestly one
longs and strives for the achievement of high democracy, the
more concerned he usually is for others and the less con-
cerned about himself? And the more narrowly selfish one
is the more one will either prefer jungle-like anarchy, or
tyranny, or exploitation, on the one hand, or, on the other,
throw up a curtain of talk abour. the glories of democracy
while v/orking behind it for his ovm selfish ends. In demo-
cratic government, the end is, as Locke says, the good of
each; it is m^;^ private good, but also your private good and
yours and yours . So that the end of democracy is two-starred
it is equally private good and public good; it is, at the
same time, self-interest and altruism, Locke is to be com-
mended, then, in that his social principles carry the nec-
essary overtones of both, even if, at times, in differing
contexts, his stress on one seems almost to exclude the
other.
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2. The religious roots of Lookers theory of social
freedom.
Thus far it has been suggested that, in numerous re-
spects, Locke's conception of man v/as made compatible with
his social theory as a whole, especially its altruistic
elements, because of the influence of Christianity on it;
it is now, brieflTj asserted in addition, and in the bold-
est contradiction of any view which denies or minimizes
the influence of religion in i"^ that Locke's theory of
government, according to his own interpretation, is insep-
arable from religion. Religion is its indispensable foun-
dation. It is not that governments exist by divine right;
on the contrary, this view Locke ardently denies. It is,
rather, that "promises, covenants, and oaths, v/hich are
the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an
18
atheist ." JMo state can exist unless its citizens fear God;
and no person is to be tolerated who denies the being of
God. How now can one any longer say that Locke's theory
of social contract or his argument in general had little
or nothing to do v/ith religionl According to his own in-
sistent v/ords, government is impossible apart from the
basic presupposition of religion.
18. T, I, 41; italics inserted by the v/riter of this
dissertation; cf. Laski who is, in a sense, right but
who, nevertheless, is in danger of overlooking the sig-
nificance of Locke's deep religious conviction
wiien hQ says: "Locke is, in fact, the first of English
t:hinkers the basis of whose argument is mainly secular."
(PTE, 58.)
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Locke, then, believes religion irdispensable to govern-
ment. The essential criticisra to be made of that belief
at this time (it will be treated again iinder the discussion
of tolerance and minorities), roots in the fact that it
presupposes his mercenary morality and religion, that men
could have no moral dependability unless, in their moral
failures, they feared the punishment of God, This presupposi-
tion of mercenary iiiorality, as has been argued in this paper,
not only fails to exhaust the nature of morality, but it
fails to account for the truly free and altruistic elements
of Locke's social thought,
3, Social freedom and social contract,
a. Exposition
In Locke's scattered thoughts, which express his broad
but none -too-coherent conception of man, there are two vividly
apparent but somewhat estranged principles. One of them would
tend to leave man, while under the law oi' nature, that is,
without government, on the level on which Hobbes*s theory
placed him-, in the condition of ceaseless v;ar, in the realm
of the jungle, to v;-hich Hobbes refers when he v/rites:
That miserable condition of v;ar is necess-
arily consequent to the natural passions of
m.en, v/h'n there is no visible pov/er to keep them
in awe " 19
19, Hobbes , Lev . , 153.
I
That principle is the principle of selfishness, expressed
by Locke in the imequivocal assertion that men "had rather
injuriously prey .upon the fruits of other men's labours
20
than take pains to provide for themselves," The other
principle, which transcends Hobbes and narrow selfishness,
is the principle -of the law of nature as the law of reason
which obliges everyone to seek the preservatioini and well-
being of all mankind . Now the clear proof that, despite
his hedonism and his theory of man's selfishness, Locke,
in his social thought, makes the law of reason the domi-
nant principle in man is that it is this principle on which
he grounds his socially basic theory of social contract.
But the principle of selfishness is nevertheless real.
So from his conception of man as a selfish being who,
nevertheless, possesses reason, "the common rule and mea-
21
sure God hath given to mankind," and whose natural state,
even, seems, at times, to be to "live together according
to reason," Locke develops his theory of social contract.
It presupposes that the state of nature is a state in
which men, in large measure, heed the admonition to seek
the preservation of all men, but in which they thus stand
unprotected against the selfish attacks of those persons
who live by the law of the jungle ratlier than the law of
reason.
20. T, I, 42.
21. Gov.
,
II, 11.
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The only compact that puts an end to the state of nature
and unites persons under a form of government is "this one
of agreeing together mutually to enter into one community,
and make one body politic; other promises and compacts men
may make one with another, and yet still be in the state of
22
nature," Agreeing together, consenting together, freely,
voluntarily, in the interest of the well-being of all=
—
that is the heart of the matter for Locke » Contract always
and only between free persons on free consent to give up
certain personal rights which they possess under the law
of nature in order to enjoy the rights of nature more fully,
under group protection from the threats to their rights
23
made by lawless and powerful groups or individuals. Because
this contract rests exclusively on consent, it cannot be
enforced, for example, from one generation to another, ex-
cept in the light of the expressed or implied consent of
each individual of each succeeding generation. But more
important than that, the social contract is binding on the
people only so long as ths government which was instituted
24
to represent the people's will remains true to its trust.
Members of a society owe "no obedience but to the Dublic
25
will of the society," In every commonwealth there still
remains "*in the people a supreme power to remove or alter
22, Gov., II, 14,
23, Gov , , II, 99,
24, Gov,, II, 116,
25, Gov,
.
II, 151,
i
ti
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the legislative* when they find the legislative act contrary
26
to the trust reposed in tnem,'* Such contract is to safeguard
27
and enlarge freedom; hut it destroys anarchy. Locke denounces
Robert Filmore's thesis that freedom is the right to do what
one pleases, and insists that "freedom of men under government
is, to have a standing rule to live by, common to everyone of
that society, and made by the legislative power erected in it;
28
" But he emphasizes equally that such contract also im-
plies and safeguards "a liberty to follow my ovm will in all
things, v;here the rule prescribes not; and not to be subject
to the inconstant, uncertain, unknovm, arbitrary will of another
28
man " This statement not only recalls Locke's remarks in
the Esj^ay on freedom as the power to perform what one wills,
but also suggests that, despite his hedonistic emphasis, he
does not really excuse or approve the selfish domination of
one man to the injury of others.
u. Criticism. .
(1) V/hat marked similarity there is between Rousseau and
Locke on this matter of social contract; what sharp differences
between Locke and Hobbes. Not to speak of Machiavellil Locke
and Rousseau are the spokesmen of liberty, defying Hobbes and
Hitler, Machiavelli and Mussolini, Rousseau agrees that con-
tract roots in consent and that the sovereign power is the will
26, gov. > II, 149.
27, Gov>
.
II, 57,
28, Gov.
.
II, 22.
I
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of the people always. But Hobbes holds that contract, v/hether
betweon persons v/ho would protect themselves from each other
or between persons and their conqueror, roots in fear. So
for Hobbes, if one subnits to a ruler no matter under what
conditions, he is bound by that chain forever. Worse than
that, bound forever also are his children and his children's
children through all generations. Though Hobbes holds pre-
cisely that contract is entered into for the highest well-
being of men, his developed theory of government certainly
belies this affirmation. Once consent is given, no matter
under what conditions, no matter hov/ horrible the circum-
stances of life under the government become, obedience is ov/ed
to that government forever.
(2) Locke's theory of consent, obviously, is superior to
Hobbes*
s
, and that for several reasons. First, it recognizes
throughout that with which it began, namely, the presupposi-
tion that all men, princes and people, are equal by the de-
cree of nature; Hobbes began with this, but forgot it. Second,
it is consistent with its basic law of nature, namely, that
all men's preservation and well-being, above all else, are the
things to be sought after; Hobbes had said this, too, but
had forgotton it. Third, it is consistent with the oily in-
telligible meaning of the term contract . For contract in any
form means and must mean, if it means anything, not what Hobbes
claims, but what Locke affirms. Contract implies basically
that the agreement is equally binding on both parties to it
—
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on the people, to be sure, but no less on the person or per-
sons in whom they embody their trust. Whether the prince be-
trays the people's trust in him, whether people defy the laws
of a truly representative govern. ^ent which the majority vdll
supports, it makes little difference; in either case the con-
tract is broken by those acts against the letter and spirit
of the common contract,
(3) But what of the idea of social contract, itself? Is
it an adequate description of the rise of government? Is it
an adequate conception of the grounds of goveminent?
It must be admitted, first of all, that it is scarcely
29
an accurate description of how governraents cotYie into existence.
As a historical account of the nature of government, then,
Locke's theory is inadequate. It is difficult to find even
insignificant illustrations of peoples freely compacting to-
gether in government (though the foundings of the United States
somev/hat approaches it). It is probable that there never was
a so-called actual state of nature. Governments existed , and
exist even now, as the consequence of at least three quite
widely recognized causes, which are far more basic and empir-
ically evident than that of many people freely entering, from
a state of nature, into a social compact.
For one thing, the very nature of life appears to be,
not atomistic, but organic. Men are bom into families;
29, Stephens, E'HEC
,
II, 140 ff; cf. Gooch, EDI, 344,
i
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families aru associated together by ties of kinship; peoples
are bound together by interests and cultures which permeate
them before they are old enough to choose from among others;
as a child of a people, of a clan or a larger group, as a
part of a cultural pattern, as united by bonds of kinship and
love, men do not live as atomistic units; they are bom as
members of society . And this is prior to any fact or theory
of social contract.
For another thing, men are held together by the bonds of
utility. To say that a man is free to leave his group if he
prefers is not to speak an untruth. Sometimes men are free
to leave , and do leave , because they do not consent to the
government which rules over them. But more often, the members
of society, no matter how disagreeable the government over them
may be, because of the organic relations v;hich for them are in-
destructible, because of the limitations of financial means
without which they could not transport themselves to another
area, but, above all, because they would , in most instances,
naturally choose to live under any government, however mean,
rather than give up the conveniences of their society and
undergo the pains of transition, most human beings have re-
mained and, no doubt, will continue to remain under the juris-
diction of organized govemuaent in the land of their birth.
Because of the organic nature of human life, then, and be-
cause of the conveniences of men's remaining with the group
into v/hich they are bom, organic ism and utility turn out to
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be the more basic factors v/hich account for the existence of
govemnient.
And a third basic cause of the existence of peoples iinder
governments, v/hich is prior to consent or compact, is the
wide-spread unreflectiveness or mental lethargy v/hich has
all too long characterized the masses of men. If one v/ere to
ask any one of countless ordinary citizens v;hy he was a citi-
zen of the United States rather than of Germany, or of Eng-
land rather than France, he would scarcely imagine that he
had any choice v/hatsoever. He is a citizen of his own land,
he would say, because he was born there. It would scarcely
occur to him that such a concept as that of social contract
had ever even entered into the mind of man.
Yet to say that Lookers theoiy of social contract is an
inadequate description of the grounds for the historical ex-
istence of governments is not to say that his theory of
social contract is not a basic principle on which governments
of civilized men should be grounded. In their zest for criticis-
ing Locke's inadequate theory of history, critics have been all
too prone to overlook the ethical truth permeating^ \inderlying
his view. Though governments have not come Into existence
through the medium of an actual social contract, it must be
affirmed that, among enlightened peoples, governi:ient is ade-
quate to the nature of human personality only when it is
grounded in the consent of the people. This may not hold

for primitive peoples; but it is indispensable to self-
conscious, rational, morally disciplined peoples. It is the
distinctive mark of respect for personality.
The fact is that, in the main, people are not free to
consent or to refuse to consent, in the sense that they may
simply leave a society of v/hich they do not approve. In ex-
treme instances, they may and they do—as in the flight of
the early Puritans to America, of Locke to Europe, of the
modem Germans from Germany, But in the main, men are, in
no real sense, free to move to another society or to seek
anarchist bliss on lonely isles (for even the isles are
largely governed now). Nevertheless, they possess the ethi-
cal right to contain the power of sovereignty in themselves;
they possess the right of self-government; they possess the
right of free criticism; they possess the ethical right of
revolution when rulers rule to their ovm interests and to
the injury of the members of the state. Though they are, in
the main, bound to the land by organic, utilitarian, and in-
tellectual circumstances, they nevertheless possess the ethi-
cal right to caisent or to refuse to consent. On the moral
plane and within these limits, then, Locke's theory of social
contract is not only sound but fundamentally indispensable to
the govermiients of civilized persons.
Yet that principle is limited still further by the prac-
tical impossibility of pleasing all men in all things and the
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practical necessity of majority rule, at least so long as no
more adequate principle can be discovered. The theory of
social contract, then, ethically" and practically, is an ever-
lastingly valid principle, in this sense, that within the
limits of organicism, utility, intellectual conditions, and
the practical principle of majority x-ule, civilized, rational,
disciplined peoples should govern themselves and submit to
no other. So long as the poweis of the government come from
the oeople, so long as the rule is by majority will, so long
it is meaningful to say that the people are free, that they
consent to their government, that they have a social contract;
but when that is absent, when sovereignty does not rest in the
people, v/hen freedom of expression is prohibited, when the
majority does not rule and an oligarchy or tyrant rules in-
stead, then the people cannot be said to consent, then rather
than contract there is compulsion, then men are not free but
enslaved. And, in order to recapture the freedom to v/hich
they are entitled and to be ruled by a govemiient to which
they consent, they possess the natural right (since their or-
ganic relations and the conveniences of staying in their home-
land almost exclude their voluntary exile) to rise in revolu-
tion and to throw off the tyrant's yoke.
Seen in such a light, though it be admitted that his
tiieory is an inadequate interpretation of the histoirv of govern
ment, it must also be affirmed that Locke »s theory of social

contract is by no means to be speedily discounted but is,
rather, to be recognized as the basic ethical principle of
all govemnents in v/hich men are sufficiently civilized to
be conscious of their ovm ivorth and the wrth of every human
soul. The great and eternal truth pemeeting Locke's theory
of social contract and the ideal which flamed in his spirit
were the truth and the ideal of government of the people
,
by
the people, and for the people, government to which the people
(frankly recognizing and accepting the limitations within
which social relations must be carried on and desiring not
perfection by only the best possible ) could consent.
4. The ends and neans (or forra of organization) of
government
.
a. The ends of government.
As has already been suggested, government exists, accord-
ing to Locke , for the benefit of each and the benefit of all.
But the narrow self-interest of the tyrant or which leads to
rzrs
any other injustice is despised. ^ To secure the largest
possible social freedom, through voluntary cooperation, is
the thing for which governments exist.
_! am not the only end;
all rien are equally important ends in themselves.
So throughout Locke's literature there runs a two-fold
emphasis, truly tv/o-fold, because, though the good of
all is often conceived as the means to the good of each,
30 . Gov. , I , 42
.

the good of others as ends in themselves^ is often the
dynamic inspiration of enthusiastic democrats—as is il-
lustrated by Locke *s ovm defense, and justification of his
defense, of dissenters, in a nonse If-interested attitude.
Sometimes Locke's concern seems to be dominantly one of
self-interest.
The commonwealth seems to me to be a society
of men constituted only for the procuring, pre- 31
serving, and advancing their ov/n civil interests.
The political society is instituted for no
other end, but only to secure every man's pos-
session of the things of this life. '52
But even at this most selfish pitch, Locke's implied thesis
is that the well-being of men in society is inseparable
from good will and cooperation. And at its best, Locke's
view is expressed in terms which imply a concern "for others"
as the end, almost as though, at times, and in accord with
the Christian admonition, Locke had forgotten his own self-
interest, as such. Here, for example, is the altruistic
33
note: "The end of government is the good of mankind."
"The public good (not special, private, privilege) is the
34
rule and measure of all law-making." Peace and tranquil-
lity (not tyrannical self-aggrandizement, not the conflict
of selfish exploitation by persons of special privilege.
31. T, I, 9.
32. T, I, 43; cf, Locke's statement to the effect that:
"Men enter societies for the defense of their
temporal goods." (T, I, 42.)
33. Gov,, II, 229.
34. T, I, 30.

not the struggle for personal or party pride and pov/er, not
the jingle- jangle of the jungle) but "peace and tranquil-
lity is the business of government and the end of hu-
35
man society," Locke labors for the well-being of self, but
not for selfishness. Locke seeks the well-being of self,
but not of a few dominating selves of special privilege.
He seeks the well-being of all the selves of earth, the
good of all mankind.
By that good is meant all the "things of this life."
Thus he writes:
Civil interests I call life, liberty, health
and indolency of body; and the possession of
outward things, such as money, lands, houses,
furniture, and the like. 36
These, then, are the ends v/hich Locke thinks, in prin-
ciple, governments exist to achieve. That Locke's bi-polar-
self-interested and altruistic—theory is deemed adequate
in this paper, and why it is deemed so, has already been
suggested under the discussion of Locke »s concept ico of man
and its relation to his social thought,
b. The means, or form of organization, of governraent.
The best form of government is, in general, that form
which has basic concern "for the end why people entered in-
to society," naiaely, "to preserve one entire, free, inde-
37
pendent society, to be governed by its own laws "
35. Gov.
,
I, 106.
36. T;"I, 10.
37. Gov., II, 217, cf. 222.
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Locke conceives the "political power" which belongs to good
govern) lents to include
the right of making laws with penalties of
death, and consequently of less penalties,
for the regulating and preserving of property,
and of employing the force of the community,
in the execution of such laws, and in the de-
fense of the commonwealth from foreign injury
and all this only for the public good ,
The best form of government, according to Locke, consists
of two essential branches (though he frequently alludes
specifically to a third great responsibility of government,
namely, courts and judges); these branches are the legis-
lative and the executive.
The legislative is brought into power by the vote of
the majority and the vote of the majority decides the ac-
tions of that legislative, Locke would have understood
readily the folly of the demand for unanimity in the legal
actions of the League of Nations, for he saw the impossi-
bility of unanimity in any sensible government; strikingly
he expressed it when he said that any demand for universal
agreement v/ould leave society somewhat as it once found Cato
39
who went into the theatre, "only to go out again," No
society, on that basis, could maintain its existence,
Jaajority rule is the best possible, the fairest and most stable,
basis for carrying on government.
38, Gov,, II, 3; italics inserted by the vrriter of this
dissertation,
39, Gov.
,
II, 98,
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The chief function of the legislative , which is the
40
soul of the comraonwealth, is to make laws which express
41
the majority will of the people. These laws must be
"founded on the law of nature, by which they are to be
4£
regulated and interpreted." The DOwer to make laws can-
43
not be transferred to any other hands. Under this theory,
then, laws, not persons, are the true embodiment of the
will of the people and the sovereignty of a state.
Nevertheless, there must be persons or a person rep-
resenting the people's will to enforce the laws which
their will creates; this person is the executive. In
Locke's view, not only internal matters, but interna-
tional matters, too, should come unc.ier the charge of this
44
executive. In each case, his task is to defend the com-
munity and execute its laws. He therefore possesses the
power of meting out punishment for crimes, a pov/er of
punishing which has a two-fold purpose ; one is to repair
any loss sustained by specific parties as a consequence of
crimes and the other is to safeguard the comiiunity from
repetitions of such crimes, Locke expresses the view that
if by some crime no loss is sustained by any person and no
actual hurt is done to the comrriunity in the present or
40. Gov.
,
II, 212.
41. Gov, II, 217
42, Gov, II, 12.
43, Gov. II, 141.
44, Gov. II, 147
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future, no punishment whatsoever should be meted out
—
for the fundamental purpose of government, more funda-
mental than specific laws and punishments, is its insur-
ing and enlarging of the well-being of "all mankind," even
45
offenders against the laws. Another distinctive power of
the executive is the power of prerogative, the power given
the executive to act in emergencies in the interest of the
com^i'unity when laws governing certain actions do not exist
and cannot be made in time to cover situations that
iBcessitate immediate action, power even to act contrary to
the laws established if in certain unforeseen circumstances
the act is clearly in the interest of the community, Locke
might have ap-^roved, for example, President Roosevelt's
recent threat to act on prices if Congress failed to do
so; he v/ould approve of an executive's exercising his power
of prerogative, even thoup^h occasionally his judgment proved
to be wrong, if in the main it v/ere clear that his inten-
tions and his actions were directed toward the well-being
46
of the co. i lUnity, One other matter should be emphasized
in connection with the executive's pov/er; it is a power
rightly undergirded by the use of force, both internally
applied and externally administered w.ien the cause is just.
Now what shall be said by vmy of comparison and criti-
cism of this theory of government? First of all it should
45, Gov.
,
II, 159.
46, Gov.
.
II, 165.
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be pointed out that in placing sovereignty in the people
and the laws, Locke is the companion of Rousseau while, at times
Plato, and MachiaveHi and Hobbesiwalk down other lanes. Locke
and Rousseau place sovereignty in the people and their
laws; Plato, tochiavelli , and Hobbes place it in the per-
son or persons of those in power or in the laws which they
decree. Though this cannot be said of Plato, .for the
latter two, whoever rules is right J By way of criticism,
this much must be said of Locke »s view of govemriient, its
functions and its powers: That though it stands opposed
to the views of great philosophers who have expounded theo-
ries as to where sovereignty should rest, he, not they,
stanas in tne rignt. If government is for the well-being
of men (snd this is, for all v/ho believe in the Christian
insight that persons ar the seat of value and of greater
worth than the v/hole world, the basic presupposition of
govemment
)
, then it must follow that the sovereign pov/er
must rest in them, that is, in their lav/s , end by no means
in the persons of those v/ho represent i:nem. It is the laws
that are sacred, not the prince's person; it is the lav/s
that are to be obeyed, not the prince's v;ill. For it is
in allegiance to taeir oi,vn freely formulated lav/s that
man's freedom is secured. On these terms the executive
is controlled hy the laws and in turn all persons are com-
pelled by the executive to obey the laws. Only by the
obedience of all is th freedom of all secured. To express

it differently, to be ruled b3'- the wavering v/ill of the
majority may be less efficient, but it is free; to be
ruled by the will of a man or a ^roup of men may be more
efficient, but the people who are ruled are always in
theory, and too often in fact, subjected as slaves, no
longer free and independent pers ns; and the wisdom of the
group is sacrificed to the dogmatic will of an elite,
5, The place of force in Lockers theory of social
freedom,
a. First of all, let his viev/ be expounded in detail.
In two different directions but to.^ard the same end,
accordinc5 to Locke, force of arms my, yea, must, be em-
ployed for the sirgle end of the preservation of the great
est possible freedom for all. The govermaent must, on the
one hand, use force to protect the society against attack
from without and against law-breakers v/ithin; but it can
never be justly employed to sustain tyrannical rule or
for other than the oublic good. On the other hand it is
natural, necessary, right, and approved of God that, un-
der certain c jiditions, the people resort ta violence to
preserve or secure their freedom against tyrannical rule
and the preservation of their natural rlgljts.
(1) Locke gives not the slightest suggestion that
he ever dreamed of a day, of which some have had visions,
when the state would vdther away or when moral force alone
would be sufficient to govern the world. For Locke, force

is indispensable to the execution of civil laws and the
maintenance of civil government. This he holds, first of
all, because "laws are of no force at all without penal-
47
ties" which, in turn, cannot be applied without the use
of force. It is tie Id, in the second place, because free
and independent governments cannot endure as such unless,
with force, they defend themselves against foreign invaders
(2) On the ot-her hand, by Locke, tyranny (which in-
volves the threat or use of force for the subjugation of
persons naturally bom free and deserving freedom) is ut-
48
terly discountenanced and, in the defense or pursuit of
his freedom, man is held to possess the right of revolu-
tion by violence. But this is warranted only when no other
alternative remains, when no appeal is possible to an honor
able court or when the tyrant cannot be dissuaded from his
49
policy. Otherwise, "any attempt upon the government,...,
is certainly the greatest crime men can be guilty of, one
50
towards another," The right to use force to maintain or
secure freedom is affirmed, somewhat on the authority of
51
Scriptual revelation, to have the sanction even of God
52
and to be legitimate even for Christians,
47 T I 12
48! gov. ! II* 13, 176, 186, 198.
49. Gov, , II, 207,
50. Gov,, II, 218.
51» Gov.
,
II, 196, 222.
52. Gov. , 11,192.

b. Let a few coirmients be made on Locke's viev/ of the
place of force in man's struggle for political freedom,
(1) For one thing Locke's thouf^ht stands in clear re-
lief against the background of the views of the social
philosophers of history. In his insistence on the neces-
sity of force to sustain governments, he stands in the
long line of thinkers who have asserted it, V/hat Hobbes
says, so Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Hegel, Fichte,
and Locke would say: "Covenants, without the sword, are
53
but words and of no strength to secure a man at all,"
They would also stand together in asserting that states
must defend themselves, by force, against invaders from
without.
With respect to the right of the use of force, by
subjects, against a government exercising power over them,
Locke stands at odds with Hobbes and in strong accord with
Rousseau, Hobbes api^roves revolution under no circumstances;
whoever rules is right and citizens must accept him. But
in opposition to this, Locke holds with Rousseau that re-
volution is sometimes indispensable, since, under certain
circumstances, it is the only sufficient alternative, and
since "renoncer a sa liberte, c'est renoncer a sa qualite d'hcrame."
53, Lev_j_, 154; cf. Locke, T, I, 12,
54, SS, 64S.

(2) It is in examining Locke's views on the place of
force in man's securing and maintaining his social freedom
that one sees most clearly what Locke believes to be the
only just ground for the existence of governments and what
he means by the end of government, by the well-being of
mankind. For in his discussion of the place of force,
Locke's hierarchy of values becomes evident. In order of
decreasing importance to man, he deems life's values to
run something like this: truth, freedom, equality, justice,
peace.
As has been suggested, it is not that Locke treats
not see
revolution lightly or that he does^the horrifying cost of
war; for he says;
This I am sure, whoever, either ruler or sub-
ject, by force goes about to invade the rights
of either prince or people, and lays the founda-
tions for overturning the constitution and form
of any just government , is highly guilty of the
greatest crime, I think, a man is capable of;
being to answer for all/those mischiefs of blood,
rapine,, and desolation, which the breaking to
pieces of government brings on a country. And
he who does it, is justly to be esteemed the com-
mon enemy and pest of mankind, and is to be
treated accordingly,^^
It is rather that he sees even more vividly the tragedy of
peace which deprives man of his freedom and believes that,
under certain circumstances, freedom can be secured only
by the resort to violence. So he writes:
55, Gov.
,
II, 230; italics inserted by the writer of this
dissertation.
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If the innocent honest man must quietly quit
all he has, for peace sake, to him who will
lay violent hands upon it, I desire it may be
considered, what a kind of peace there will
be in the world, which consists only in vio-
lence and rapine; and which is to be main-
tained only for the benefit of robbers and
oppressors. Who would not think it an admir-
able peace betwixt the mighty and the mean,
when the lamb, without rr^sistance, yielded
his throat to be torn by the imperious wolf?
Poljrphemus's den gives us a perfect pattern
of such a peace, and such a goveriuaent, wherein
Ulysses and his companions had nothing to do,
but quietly to suffer themselves to be de-
voured. And no doubt Ulysses, who was a pru-
dent man, preached up passive obedience, and
exhorted them to a quiet submission, by repre-
senting to them of what concernment peace was
to mankind; and by shov/ing the inconveniencies
might happen, if they should offer to resist-
Polyphemus, who had now the power over them.
Because Locke prefers freedom to peace, and because he be-
lieves governments should exist for no more important end
of
than that Afreedom, Locke would agree with Brand Blanshard
that absolute pacifism is positively immoral.
(3) Now what shall be said by way of criticism of
Locke's views of force?
(a) Locke stands in accord with the realities of
human nature, human history, and human aspiration, when he
emphasizes the fact t .at the real cause of revolutions is
not, as is so easily assumed by some, the greediness and
thirst for power on the part of common men, but is the
56. Gov.
,
II, 228.
!t
I
ultimately unbearable inconsiderateness
,
domination, ex-
ploitation of the people by their rulers. In this sound
affirmation, Locke stands with mixed company, with Machia-
57
velli, v/ith Marx and Engels, and with Tocqueville.
(b) It is indisputably clear that government can sus-
tain itself, in internal relations only by the use of
force for the execution of its laws; Locke is unquestion-
ably sound
(c) It seems equally clear that, under certain poli-
tical circumstances, peoples dominated by tyrants can se-
cure their freedom either by waiting for the tyrant and
his influences to die a natural death or by throwing off
his yoke, if possible, by resort to violence. It is quite
possible , that the nonviolent, none oope ration of Gandhi and
his follov/ers may prove effective, in relation to the Bri-
tish imperialists, in throwing off their yoke; but there
appears no adequate reason for believing that the peoples
of Europe will find freedom in that fashion, first, be-
cause the people themselves are untutored in, and unper-
suaded of the possibilities of the success o^ the tech-
nique of aonviolent noncooperation, and, second, because
abundant evidence points to the fact that the Nazis are
insufficiently impressed with spiritual power to be readily
ousted from control by any such techniques.
57, Locke, Gov.
.
II, 228; T, I, 49-50, o3; Tocqueville, SSF,
250-257,

(d) So far as the world at large and the persistence
of warfare in the earth are ooncemed, this may be said,
Locke's trieory of the necessity of the use of force was
sound in his day and is still sound because, under the his-
torical circumstances of his day and this day—when numer-
ous nations have existed as absolute, self-interested,
sovereigns in one world, nov/ exceedingly organic in its
fundamental cultural and economic structure—warfare is
inevitable
•
So long as there are numerous absolute sovereigns
when there logically is room for but one, so long as un-
cooperative, jungle-like, capitalistic, competition in the
economic realm characterizes the life of tne sovereign na-
tions, so long as the conceDt of numerous absolute sover-
eignties engenders the spirf.t of nationalism and the thirst
for power, so long as such raging currents flow, war seems
inescapable. Such currents as these, if not themselves
altered by the cooperative intelligence and enterprise of
men, v/ill lead again and again to the same end* St, Paul
was right; "Whatsoever a man (a nation, or a world) soweth
that shall he also reap," This is by no means fatalism.
It is simply a defense of the view that under such circum-
stances, the use of force between nations is inevitable.
For the desire for self-preservation and for freedom being
deep-rooted in man's nature, when the fate of one's nation
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and the people's freedom are "brought into danger—as a con-
sequence of the conflict brought on by those who foster the
currents that lead to war, freedom-loving peoples will
agaiQ return to arms. War cannot be evaded at the last day;
it can be removed from the earth only if the causes are
removed before they gather that degree of power which drives
the nations, necessarily, inevitably, into the chaos of war.
War cannot be evaded either by wishing or resolute v/illing
alone; it, and the natural use of force for freedom, can be
outlawed only through intelligent planning .
It is, therefore, the thesis of this study, in accord
with Locke, that war will remain inevitable, and that, so
long as men cherish freedom, in certain political situa-
tions, resort to violence will be necessary and warranted
in attempts to preserve it, unless and until the causes of
war are destroyed through a v/orld organization which is,
itself, sovereign, which establishes a system of economic
cooperation, which interprets the democratic and eternal
yeamin{_; for freedom not in terms of the limits of a nation,
but in terms of the whole world, Locke, therefore, is to
be commended for proclaiming that government should seek
the well-being of all mankind (for this is an implicit pro-
phecy of a world order); his capitalistic economy (as will
be argued later) is no longer to be endured, since it is
one oaltise of war; yet, so long as the world continues in
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its war-culminating pathways, his point must be conceded
that the struggle for freedom against tyranny will natur-
ally, inevitably, and rightly bring sone peoples to arms
in defense of their freedom. In fact, as Dickinson S,
58
Miller has asserted in connection with his criticism of
the late Prime Minister Chamberlain's policy, to refrain
from the use of force in certain historical situations is
one of the most grievous errors governments can make. That
which can cancel the argiiment of Locke, therefore, is noth-
ing short of intelligent planning and co-operation under a
common sovereign, which makes impossible numerous contra-
dictory and conflicting sovereigns in a v/orld that is es-
sentially one, which thereby diminishes narrow national
spirit and narrow, national self-interest, and which grounds
the economic life of the world in a fundamental principle
of rational cooperation and good will. It is by no means
the thesis of this paper that this great sovereign organi-
zation will necessarily soon come into existence and func-
tion successfully; it is, simply, that, until it or its
equivalent does come to birth, Locke »s thesis' of the natural
and v/arranted recourse to force will co- tinue to hold,
6. Tolerance, minorities, and social freedom.
a. Exposition.
Lookers specific theory of religious tolerance.
58. Boston University Philosophical Club banquet, April 15,
1942

indicative of his general attitude tov;ard tolerance, is
suggested by the unequivocating words: "Absolute liberty^
just and true liberty^ equal and impartial liberty, is the
59
thing that we stand in need of." Tolerance among churches
is indispensalbe , for it is "the chief characteristical
60
mark of the true church." Tolerance of the church by the
state is natural and right since Christ
instituted no commonwealth, he prescribed unto
his followers no new and peculiar form of gov-
ernment; nor put he the sword into any magistrate's
hand with commission to make use of it in forc-
ing men to forsake their former religion, and
receive his.
More precisely stated, Locke's theory of religious
tolerance rests on the follov/ing thesis: (1) All persons
in a commonwealth should be free to join themselves to
any religious society they choose—since religious socie-
68
ties exist only for the saving of souls and for worship
and since each person, not the state, is responsible for
his own soul's salvation. (2) Each society should, there-
fore, since it conc^^ms not civil affairs, be free to
govern itself so long as it does not disobey what has been
63
decreed by civil law. (3) Neither the state, then, nor any
64
church, should seek to coerce persons, by force, by
59. T, I, 4.
60. T, I, 5.
61. T, I, 38| cf. Locke, Art. (1669), 194.
62. Cf. T, I, 30, 33, 54, 55.
63. T, I, 33, 34.
64. T, III, 435.
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oonfiscation, or by threat to any other civil liberty; into
a religious fellowship which he does not freely choose
—
66
for his salvation can never be secured by force but only
67
by the persuasion of love and his free choice, and since
the use of force, in religious matters, is wholly contrary
68
to the New Testament; (4) Since the civil government is
of and for all of the people, no priesthood should be per-
69
mitted to assume power in civil affairs, (5} If a Chris-
tiah*s conscience conflicts with the civil law, he should
disobey the government, "Obedience is due in the first
70
place to G-od and ffter./ards to the laws," One should care
71
for his own soul first and next for the public peace;
but, even so, the civil law raust be enforced and the dis-
obedient person must be punished, 'Tor the private judgment
of any person concerning e law enacted in political matters,
for the public good, does not take away the obligation of
72
that law, nor deserve a dispensation," (6) "Those that
will not ov;n and teach the duty of tolerating all men in
matters of mere religion" are, themselves, not to be
tolerated.
65, T, I, 35.
66, T, II, 68.
67, T, I, 7-9.
68. T, I, 15-16.
69. T, I, 46; cf. 21.
70. T, I, 43.
71 T I 44.
72! t| i| 43; neither overt acts, then, nor even opinions
contrarv to government are to be tolerated (cf. T, I,
45; cited by Graham, EPF, 79).
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For v/hat do all these and the like doctrines
signify, hut that they may, and are ready upon
any occasion to seize the government, and pos- •
sess themaelves of the estates and fortunes of
their fellow-subjects; and that they only ask
leave to be tolerated by the magistrates so
long, until they find themselves strong enough
to effect it,'73
The law of toleration (should be) that all
churches lay down toleration as the foun-
dation of their ovm liberty, and teach that
liberty of conscience is every man's natural
right, equally belonging to dissenters as to
themselves; and that nobody ought to be com-
pelled in matters of religion either by law
or force. "^^
(7) Again,
those are not at all to be tolerated who deny
the being of God. Promises, covenants, and
oaths, which are the bonds of human society,
can have no hold upon an atheist. '''5
b. Criticism.
Locke's thesis in his discussion of religious toler-
ance (and, presumably, it suggests the principles of his
theory of tolerance in general) is simply this, that no
person and no persons of a society should be mede to suffer
the loss of any of their civil rights and privileges because
of religious opinions and practices, and no person or per-
sons should be compelled by law or force to adhere to any
religion but should be left absolutely free to choose any
one or more—so long, at least, as he believes in God,
espouses tolerance of others, and does not conflict, in
73. T, I, 46.
74. T, I, 47.
75. T, I, 41.

overt act or expressed opinion, with the laws of the state.
(1) The first comraent to be made of this view, then,
is this, that Locke's arguiient for refusing to tolerate
atheists is in fact, unwarranted and untenable. Though men
do take civil oaths in the name of God, it is not his name,
it is rather civil law and its force (as Locke himself
asserts in other contexts, especially in his theory con-
cerning force) that compels him to conply with the pledges
he liiakes as a citizen of a state, Man's fear of God's wrath
is not essential to the preserving of the bonds that hold
a state together* V/ere there no God at all, men's moral
consciousness alone right enforce such oaths. And where
this fails, the force of the state itself would compel men
to fulfill their civil pledges. Though a v/ise belief in
God would be a reasonable, desirable, and beneficial mark
of mankind, contrary to Locke's theory, the state itself
is not grounded upon it; so that the stability of civil
life is not fundamentally affected by what individuals be-
lieve about the ultimate nature of things, ana the question
is not seriously related to matters of tolerance in general,
(2) In the context of his thought and the conceptions
of his day, Locke's view concerning sovereignty of churches
and states was sound and adequate, Locke affimed that the
church had to do vrith the saving of souls for eternity while
the state h-d to do with the temporal affairs of men. Almost
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entirely, then, conflict should be avoidable, if only each
group stayed within its realm. So Locke argued rightly
that the sovereignty of a church belonged to the members
who freely joined it; no external povv^er should seek to in-
fluence it in any way; for its affairs were entirely its
own. Likewise, no church, as a church, should seek to
control civil affairs, for civil sovereignty belonged no
more to tne cnurcn organization than church sovereignty
belonged to the civil society; civil sovereignty belonged,
rather', to all members of the state no matter what their
church affiliation, or lack of it, might be. It therefore
follov/ed that churches should be tolerated so long as they
did not op-oose the civil government. If a church or a per-
son, for conscience's sake felt constrained to op ose the
state, according to Locke, he should by all means do it,
since G-od is to be served before the civil laws; but he
should do it v/ith the consciousness that the state must
justly punish him, since the laws of the state are to be
cancelled by the private v;ill of no man.
Now so long as Locke favored the intolerance of athe-
ists and so long as the separate jurisdictions of the church
and state were clear, Locke's theory presented^ for today,
no great difficulties. Clearly, and contrary to Locke,
atheists are to be tolerated as much as any persons. Clearly,
the church and the state should exercise sovereignty in
their own distinct areas.
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(3) The question of tolerance becomes contemporaneously
critical,; however, and, in democratic societies, crucial,
only when the churches or any other persons or societies
seek to make their weight felt against existing condition,
that is, seek to press forward theories and practices which
are in conflict with the laws of the state which embody the
majority v/ill. Such contrary purposes may express themselves
in thought and v/ords or in overt acts.
Locke's ovm writings on social affairs make it clear
that he believed in freedom of expression, with limitations.
But he believed that such tolerance and freedom v;ere merited
only by the tolerant. It is not difficult to comprehend the
reason for such a position. After all, tolerance, in one
sense, is a right which has its collateral duty ; on this basis,
only he who fulfills his obligations to tolerate others fully
merits the privilege of being tolerated in his thoughts and
vDrds and all those of his acts which are not contrary to
democratically established law.
(a) Yet the problem of tolerance goes deeper than the
question of rights merited through acceptance of equivalent
obligations. It involves the sanctity of man's reason and
conscience, the independence of a man's soul, the impossi-
bility of h\jman authority determining absolute truth, and
the danger to the possibility of progress on any principle
of any intolerance. For one decisive reason in particular
which undergirds democracy itself, then, and contrary

to Locke, even the intolerant must be tolerated—so long
as their intolerance takes expression in thought and word,
but not in overt acts . That reason is this, that the
principle of intolerance of the intolerant obviously de-
feats itself. If intolerance of intolerance were a basic
democratic principle, then tolerance, itself, v/ould vanish
from democracy, and democracy would disappear. The para-
dox of democracy is that to sustain itself, it must per-
mit all opinions to be expressed—even to opinion of in-
tolerance, which, should it triumph, v/ould destroy democ-
racy. For if the sanctity of conscience is despoiled,
even the consciences of the intolerant—since even intoler-
ant persons may be intolerant on rational and conscientious
grounds, democracy is destroyed. It is destroyed, not only
because conscientious persons v/ho believe in intolerance
are prohibited free speech, but because the so-called demo-
crats, themselves, actually practice intolerance. So, con-
trary to Locke, even the intolerant mur^t be tolerated in
thought and word and influence , but not in overt act
.
But the objection is reiterated: If even the intol-
erant are tolerated, then, again, tolerance itself is en-
dangered, for, in time, intolerance may come to dominant
power. It must, therefore, not be tolerated. Locke holds
this view. To this the answer must be; Intolerance, on
democratic terms , should come to dominate if it is desired
by a sufficiently large (a majority) number of citizens;
and it cannot have this democratic opportunity for success

204
unless it is tolerated. Yet, comtrary to Locke, it cannot
come to power on the v/ings of force unless it acquires over-
whelming support (doubtless far more than majority support);
for governments in power rightfully and naturally squelch
all signs of unlawful force so long as they are able—which
means, so long as the opposing force has not taken on over-
whelming proportions. When it has attained the sux^port of
the vast mass of citizens, intolerance should dominate
anyway on the principle of majority rule,
(b) But while the only adequate democratic principle
is toleration of all forms of criticism of established gov-
ernment as well as those who advocate intolerance of laws
or groups or persons, or even advocate the use of force to
establish what they believe to be a much needed reform or
replacement of an inadequate government (with exceptional
restrictions during wartime and responsibility for libel
and the like)
,
it must not tolerate any ove I't acts against
the laws whic'i have been decreed by the democratic expression
of the majority will.
But again it is objected: To pemit propaganda for
a cause contrary to the established government is to en-
courage its overthrow. Why not, then, for example, per-
mit the use of force, if it is permissible to advocate it?
And the answer is this: Free speech is the foundation of
democracy; but so is the principle of rule by ballots

rather than bullets. If, by the exercise of free speech,
a majority of persons can be persuaded to desire the in-
tolerance of a group or the change of government by vio-
lent overthrow, then, unfortunately, but necessarily, in-
tolerance of that group actually becomes lawful in obedi-
ence to the principle of majority rule. If the desire for
change by force is necessary, is fostered to the extent
that it actually threatens the existent government, then,
on democratic terms (since that force must be tremendous
to threaten a government which has pemitted only freedom
of speech , not overt acts), force should not be necessaiy;
the majority will, which such a threat of force would im-
ply, would, on democratic terms, warrant a change of gov-
ernment. And, if, v/hen warranted, that change were not
made, then violence would be justified anyway* (It is of
striking significance that the freedom of speech and writ-
ing practiced by the French in the eighteenth century, by
its philosophers, pamphleteers and politicians, was an im-
portant factor in bringing about the attack on France
injustices.) So it becomes clearer that tolerance for all
ideas and expressions of speech and pen are essential to
democracy whereas ove rt disobedience of established laws
cannot be permitted.
For, in a democracy, the enforcement of the laws is
the backbone and basis of its continued existence, the
only safeguard against tyranny and anarchy. It is at this

point that Locke gets directly and soundly at the heart
of the matter. Moral conscience may demand overt disobedi-
ence to civil law; then conscience must, by all means, be
obeyed, since conscience is prior to law
. Yet at the sauB
time, conscientious disobeyers of civil law must be punished
for their disobedience, for the private opinion of no man
(though, contrary to Locke, it must for all persons be per-
mitted unmolested expression and propogation) must never
be permitted to cancel the laws which root in the majority
will. The conscientious objector, if he i£ a believer in
democracy, should see that a society which permits him to
propogate his views short of overt disobedience to the laws
is equally justified in, and has, in fact, the unswering
responsibility, as Locke wisely mentions, when the v/elfare
of society is at stake , of prosecuting all breakers of the
law, though they break them for conscience's sake,
(c) These two principles of absolute tolerance of
thought and speech and of the enforcemsnt of laws for the
protection and well-being of a democratic society are clari-
fied by the recent court decisions concerning Jehovah's
Witnesses, According to the view proposed here, the court
was undermining democracy when it prohibited the sale of
Witness literature; it was, in principle, upholding demo-
cracy when it insisted that all citizens, under the law of
the state , must salute the flag or take the consequences.
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(d) But if a democracy is to attain its high possi-
bilities, then even deeper than these two collateral prin-
ciples of free government must lie an attitude which per-
vades the state »s citizens almost in entirety. As Pro-
76
fessor L. Harold De Wolf recently said, with reference to
Rousseau, this attitude is that of common good willaad co-
operation toward the greatest well-being of all ; it is the
will to see beyond private and party interest to the wel-
fare of the v\rhole and all its parts. Though Locke seeks
just this, his theory of majority rule is not characterized
by this consideration. Yet this is the root principle of
democracy, that the majority govern, but that, in enacting
legislation, the majority have an eye to the desires of
the minorities and that theynot only safeguard the basic
structure of government, which exiles anarchy and tyranny
and provides order, but enact every law with the greatest
possible consideration for minority interests. An excellent
example of this spirit in action (and an illustration of
the attitude that has stabilized democracy in the United
States) is the contemporary, federal, provision that con-
scientious objectors to war on religious groimds be re-
lieved of the otherwise, and otherwise necessarily, uni-
veral obligation to defend the state in time of war. In
76. In a conversation at Boston University School of
Theology, Feb. 17,1943.
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this practical situation, it might have "been feasible for
the majority will to concede even more to the interests
of conscience; then, again, it might not. But the supreme
task and dominant characteristic of democratic peoples is
their seeking and their finding, in a spirit of imagination,
sympathy, and mutual respect for persons and for conscience,
the best poSvSible solution to the dilemma caused by man's
enigma of being a creature of two worlds, the world of his
self and that of his society,
(e) This task, this attitude, this will to see beyond
majority and minority interests to the greatest possible
well-being and liberty of all in spite of conflicts in
opinion and desire, this, the indispensable of ideal govern-
ment, rests on indispensables in the natures of the men who
constitute that government. Those indispensables are a
good measure of reason and disciplined wills; reason v/hich
enables men to understand the true, organic, necessarily
cooperative, nature of democratic life, and wills disciplined
to submerge narrow self-interest to the well-being of the
whole
.
It is relevant to note here (though theses matte i-s have
already been dealt with in detail) that Locke, the apostle
of democracy, though he failed to characterize the principle
of majority rule with the possession of any eye for minority
concerns, presupposed, for one thing, reason in man, and,

209
for another, the Christian morality, the morality of self-
sacrifice and discipline. It is also relevant to acknow-
ledge the probably valid suggestion of Professor De V/olf
,
substantiating half of this thesis, namely, that the success
of democracy in England and Ar.ierica may partly be explained
by this very fact, that the soil from which it sprang was
rich with a rigorous religious traditicoa which fostered
the development of moral self-discipline,
Locke's view of tolerance, then, though commendable
in the main, is to be criticized, because it contains with-
in itself the seed of intolerance and the partial cancella-
tion of democracy, since it excludes the toleration of the
intolerant and atheists. He is further to be criticized
because of the fact that, tliough his theory of man includes
what man requires for the democratic handling of majority
—
minority relations in the interest of the greatest well-
being of all, that is, though he presupposes in man both
the possibilities of reason and a morality of self-disci-
pline, he fails to ccmsider the will of the majority in
its all-important and essentially democratic aspect of
giving all possible (that is, that which is compatible v/ith
the security of the foundations and structures of democra-
tic government) consideration to the peculiar desires and
special concerns of minority goups.
i

(4) One other remark which grov/s out of Locke's dis-
cussion of tolerance remains to he made. It is this, that
Locke discerned, among other important marks, an indespen-
sable principle of democracy when he discerned the impor-
tance of the complete separation of church and state. But
they should be separate for a reason wliich Locke does not
sufficiently recognize. He argues that they should be
separate because they deal with different areas of man*s
concern—one temporal, the other spiritual. He argues that
they should be separate because each is freely joined or
consented to by its members; therefore, in each area,
governLient should be administered only by those who are
members of the society. But he does not see sufficiently,
if at all (and perhaps it was due to the temper of his time
and the contemporary emphasis of religion on personal sal-
vation being conceived essentially in terms of eternal
bliss beyond this world ) , that the church must be separate
from the state in order that, in its now generally recog-
nised temporal mission and role, it may, v/ithout financial
or political hindrance or control, hold aloft the standards
of Christ in their temporal and social , as well as eternal
and individual, significance, and freely criticize the
society, of which it is a part, even the civil government
of the time and place in which it exists.

? Social freedom and the institution of slavery.
a. Exposition.
Though, essential3-y, Locke ardently denies the in-
stitution of human slavery ("Slavery is so vile and mis-
erable an estate of man that it is hardly to be con-
ceived, that an 'Englishman , » much less a *gentlemen,»
77
should pLead for it."), he, nevertheless, conditionally
condones it. If, for example, a man or a group of men
are taken captive in a just war (that is, a war in which
a people is unjustly attacked ) by those who are unjustly
attacked, the captives, "by the right of nature," may be
"subjected to the absolute dominion and arbitrary power
78
of their masters." Since they might have been put to
death at the first, they may justly be enslaved ever
•afterwards, "it being clear that that is less than death,
and death being available at any time if he refuses the
79
will of his master."
b. Criticism.
(1) Man's conscience has, in general, advanced so
far by now that, though man may not alv/ays heed his con-
science, almost every normal civilized person will be
able to understand and, if he is honest and objective,
will acknowledge, that it is no longer necessary even to
77. Gov.
,
I, 1,
78. Gov. « II, 85.
79. Gov. . II

argue the imnaturalness
,
inhumanity, utter injustice of
slavery. Conscience and reason plainly testify to that
fact. Yet it is not unprofitable to note how Lookers
view of slavery stands in relation to the history of
social thought, and how his ovm approval of slavery, condi-
tional though it is, is to be explained,
(2) In clear relation to Locke »s view is Plato's,
which accepts slavery as p natural thing; Aristotle's,
which holds that slvaery is not only right but expedient
on the grounds that, since rationality is the mark of
personality and some human beings do not possess ration-
ality to a degree much above the animals, they are not
persons but, like animals, property--yes
,
says Aristotle,
as southerners argued of old, it is by the grace and
goodness of rational men that the nonrational are given
80
the saving blessing of slavery; Hobbes*s view, which dis-
aporoves slavery; Rousseau's, which bluntly affirms that
81
slavery is never right; and Hegel's, which, hinting of
Aristotle's, holds that sone men are not full persons,
yet are valuable, and that therefore, though one can
scarcely say that slavery is right, he may condone it,
(3) In criticism of Locke's partial surrender to
slavery as a right under the condition -f just conquert,
this must be said. Two fundamental principles acknowl-edged
80. Pol. , 1254a
81, SC, 13,

by Locke come into conflict. The more basic one is that
of the equality and v/orth as ends in themselves of all man-
kind ; the less basic, and yet the one which Locke chooses
to count most important here, is man's right by nature to
oppose and punish, to the degree proportionate to the crime
,
those who encroach on the rights of others , Locke's view
of slavery, therefore, must be judged consistent v/ith the
principle from which he choosers to infer his conclusion,
the principle of punishment; but as nevertheless unsound,
and inconsistent with his o\m truest thought, his most
fundamental principle, wh^ch roots, above all else, in the
dignity and equality of men as free and rational persons,
Locke's slip in thought here is further emphasized by the
fact that at another place he expresses a principle which
might definitely have encouraged him to let go the prin-
ciple of punishment and hold fast the principle of the
equality of men; for in anoth r context he says that when
men's crimes do not injure individuals or society, even
the guilty are not to be punished. He might reasonably
have gone further and acknowledged the fact that, though
men's crimes or intentions are at one tijne destructive
to individual and social welfare (insurrection or conquest)^
when restrained and reflected on, and repented of, they
may cease to be destructive. He might reasonably have
concluded, that the time night come, not through charity
merely, but rightly, when the captives should be set
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entirely free again, Locke's view of slavery is internally
inconsistent with his ov/n deepest insight and externally
inconsistent with its equivalent, the high, Christian,
democratic conception of man,
8, Social freedom and Locke's economic theory,
a. Exposition,
By definition, when Locke uses the term property, he
82
means "lives, liberties, and estates," 'By property I must
be understood to mean that property which men have in their
83
persons as well as goods," Yet in his discourse on property,
what he is referring to, essentially, is the material poss-
essions which are commonly called property today. His gen-
eral theory may be understood in teims of God, labor, capa-
city for use, and imperishable possessions, Locke begins
by acknowledging that both natural reason and revelation
84
show that God has given the earth "to mankind in common."
But immediately he adds that, in the light of this and in
spite of this, what 3ian "hath mixed his labour with" is his
35
ovm. It is, in fact, this mixing of v/hat is his ovm, v/ith
what God freely gives to all, that gives man ownership of
that which is altered and increased by the work of his
35
hands. Really, says Locke, there is scarcely any other
82, Gov.
,
83, Gov.
,
84, Gov.
,
85, Gov.
,
II, 123,
II, 173.
II, 25,
II, 27.
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ground on which a man can claim to own any material thing,
"It, is labour. ... .which r)uts the greatest part of the value
upon lanrl , without which it wouln scarcely be worth any
86
thing," "It is labour indeerl that put the difference of
value on everv thing," "Nine -tenths" "of the products of
the earth useful to the life of man" "are the effects of
labour: nay, in most of them ninety-nine hundredths
87
are wholly to be put in the account of labour," Therefoi^,
what a man works on is his ovm, so long as no one, on the
same grounds has claimed it before him.
Yet, according to nature, all men must have enough and
no man may own more than he can use; if he permits anything
to perish, he coimiits a crime against society, and, if he
88
permits any man to perish in need, he commits a sin. But,
on the consent of society, men may nevertheless be v;orth
a great deal, as worth is measured in terms of universally
accepted, but not originally natural, standards of money,
gold, jewels. If he can exchange perishable for durable
89
goods, there seems to be no limit to what he may rightfully
possess. So unlimited possessions are legitimate; but they
90
are legitimate not by nature but by consent of the people.
The essence of Locke's economic theory, then, seems
86. Gov.
,
II, 43.
87. Gov.
,
II, 40,
88. Gov.
,
II, 31 and Gov,
.
I, 42,
89. Of. Locke, Gov. , II, 46-50.
90. Gov.
,
II, 36; cf. 32,

to be this, that the wealth of the earth, by nature , be-
longs to mankind in common^ that all men, therefore, must
have at least an adequate share of the necessities of life,
but that by labor, which is the v/arrant of possession, by
exchange of perishable for durable goods, including land,
and under government, by the consent of society, men may
come rightly to own unlimited private property,
b. Criticism,
(1) The possible adequacy of Lookers theory for his
day.
Nov/, despite the supBort of communism by the Puritans
91
in Locke's day, it is clear that Locke believed that, under
contemporary economic conditions, his essentially capital-
istic theory of economic life was the most adequate one.
In fact, it is not improbable, as Bastide suggests, that,
in his "vigoureuse defense de la propriete, ... .Locke se
rappelait les theories comnunistes des puritains extremes
et croignait encore caDrice et la convoitise des querel-
91
leurs et des disputeurs . «"
Not only did Locke believe the system of unlimited pri
92
vate property, its protection by government, and free busi-
ness enterprise {He spoke innocently of an "overplus, gold
and silver, v/hich may be hoarded up without injury to any
91, Bastide, JLTP, 231;
92. Gf . Gov.
,
II, 36.
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93
ond»; but little did he realize the injurious power of
wealth in the organic society of today, ) to "be the eco- -
nanic system which best safeguarded man»s natural rights and
freedom, but, in his day, he may have been right. That
system may well have contributed to the enrichment of
mankind more than any other system could have. With the
riches of vast untapped reservoirs to be developed, with
world commerce just beginning to recognize its possibilities,
with modern industry just coming to birth, v/ith the need
that there was, therefore, for the complete dedication, of
the capable few, to the task of developing these great possi-
bilities, it is not improbable that, for all mankind, it
was well for capitalism to have that day. It is not,
therefore, difficult to understand why Locke counted that
system the one which best served the cause of freedom; it
allowed, from a private point of view, a maximum of indi-
vidual freedom which, from a social point of viev/, may not
have been significantly endangered or diminished by the
economic forces which in subsequent centuries have gathered
tremendous power and have come to be concentrated (as a re-
sult of that freedom of enterprise) in the hands of a few
and have enabled them to control and exploit the masses
for the benefit of the few. Locke, therefore, is not to
be hastily condeinned for his judgraent favoring the capitalistic
93. Gov., II, 50; cf. Locke, IM, 5, "wAiere he supports
unlimited interest on loans as encouraging free trade
and even working in favor of the comparatively poor people.
i

system, so far as his contemporary situation enabled him
to judge, as the most effective in maintairiing the freedom,
and enriching the life of, man,
(2) The clear inadequacy of his specific economic
theory for today.
It must be affirmed at the outset, that Locke's eco-
nomic theory, especially his theory of property, is not
wholly inadequate or useless today. It is the thesis of
this study that the limited ownership of private property,
even of land, for private use, not for production, for
comiaerce, is indispensable to the fullest development of
personality and the richest consciousness of social freedom,
(a) But it must be insisted, without reservation, that
unlimited private ownership for private use and commercial
production and exchange is now no longer compatible with
the essential principles of democracy. For unrestrained
enterprise has come, in this day, and under the organic
economic and industrial conditions of modem society, which
are controlled by a few, to spell slavery for the masses,
not freedom, even though men possessing economic power do
not necessarily desire exploitation. As Laski notes:
Because of technological changes, specialization, concen-
tration, interdependence, "the principle of individual free-
dom in the economic realm" has come to operate in such a
fashion as "to deny to the masi^es the benefits democracy
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was supposed to secure," And it has become clear that,
though Locke did not see it, "property, whichAsa type of
95 ^
power, may or may not be liberating," Adequately shared,
it is liberating; controlled by a few, it is enslaving.
For their control of the means of production, which follows
from their control of property, gives them control over
millions of people whom they have never even known; and that
power they are sometimes unwilling, sorrfitimes unable, to
96
use for the public good,
(b) It is with this insight in mind that Henry George
defends the thesis, in his Progress and Poverty , that land,
as the source of all wealth, should not be privately o^med.
Explicitly he states it:
Political liberty, when the equal right to
land is denied, becomes, as population in-
creases and invention goes on, merely the
liberty to compete for employment at starva-
tion wages and poverty ensJaves men whom
we boost are political sovereigns 97
Herbert Spencer holds a similar view; a view v;hlch
sharply opposes, and soundly opposes, Lookers approval
of vast private ownership in land. Now, let it be re-
iterated, this study sustains the thesis that limited land
ownership for use is desirable for democracies; but the
94. Laski, SF, 124,
95. Schneider, Art. (1940), 661,
96, Carl Becker, iviD, 55-56; quoted by Laski, SF, 125.
97, George, PP, II, 542.

essential thesis of George and Spencer is sound, namely,
that private ownership of vast land areas and of the nat-
ural resources of the earth is one of the gravest injus-
tices man has been guilty of, since it involves grossly
unfair distribution and fosters exploitation and economic
slavery. It is as George says:
In allowing one man to ov/n the land on which
and from which other men must live, we have
made them his bondsmen in a degree which in-
creases as material progress goes on ex-
tracting from the masses in every civilized
country the fruits of their weary toil; that
is instituting a harder and more hopeless
slaveiry in place of that which has been
destroyed. . . • .98
Because land is "the source of all wealth and the field of
99
all labor," this paper maintains not that all land must
be owned in common, but that private ownership must be
limited to that which can be reasonably used in private
life , and that all land productive on a large scale and
all significant natural resources must be owned in common
if the real freedom of man is to be secured.
(c) As has already been suggested in the discussion
of the place of force in the maintenance of social free-
dom, Locke's capitalistic economic theory is inadequate
because in this modem world, so organically constituted
and inseparably related in the major parts of its economic.
98. George, PP,jr545-546.
99. George, PP, II, 326 ff.

as well as other, activities, free enterprize, cut-throat
competition between the capitalistic interests of the vari-
ous nations, is one of the most potent factors contributing
to the recurrence of wars* Not only, then, does capitalism
lead to the loss of freedom through the exploitation of the
masses within nations; it also leads to the loss of free-
dom through the subjugation of whole nations to other na-
tions • selfish pursuit of wealth; and, in the conflict be-
tween self-seeking, capitalistic nations of comparable
military power, it leads to long, devastating wars, in
which millions of the lives of the masses are lost while
capitalistic interests increase their v/ealth,
(3) The type of social organization now necessary if
real social freedom is to be secured.
It is nov/ quite clear that capitalism as a form of
economic organization, even though existing in conjunction
with political democracy, does not secure, in the modem
world, the ends that democracy seeks. As circiamstances
have changed, the need of a new form of organization to
100
secure the ideals of democracy has become apparent. The
end of freedom, no longer secure under capitalism, must be
sought in a different way. In place of industrial dictator-
ship, ruthless competition, subjugation of the masses, must
100. Of. Bastide, JLTP, and Ulich, Leo. at Boston
University Philosophical Club, 2/5/43^ cf. also Glapp,
Art. (1943)
,
89, n. 10.
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come industrial democracy, cooperatior] for the well-being
of all, the participation of the masses in assuring the
sane and cooperative distribtuion of the wealth of the
earth. It is not the purpose of this study to give a de-
tailed exposition of the precise form that that new organi-
zation of national and international economic life must
take; it is simply asserted that, in it, greed must be
supplanted by good will, and ruthless individualism must
be succeeded by cooperative planning,
• Now this is a difficult and dangerous task. It is so
because the organization of a planned economic system re-
quires persons who plan and requires safeguards against
the planners' usurpation of power and betrayal of their
trust. For under a planned economic society, if those in
positions of responsibility and power betray their trust,
they have at their disposal all the forces of economic life
with v/hlch to subjugate the masses to a new slavery, not
only economic, but cultural, too.
The new organization, then, must not only provide for
a planned economic order , but, also, for democratic means
of controlling that order. With a planned economy, must
be coordinated a free cultural society. Such a socialistic
order of life requires, as Mulford Sibley has said, "a well
thought-out scheme for the extension of the machinery of
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101
democratic control to all areas." This is an exceedingly
difficult task; but it is essential^ in this period of his-
tory, to the preservation of the social freedom and, security
of man.
(4) Permanent elements of freedom in Locke's political-
economic theory.
One may, if he v/ill, insist that Locke's fundamental
purpose in his social theorizing v/as to defend the capital-
istic system for the v/elfare of the strong, that his expo-
sitions were not inquiries concerning truth and justice
but, rather, attempts to justify special privilege under
the cloak of the name of freedom, that the eternal protec -
tion of unlimited private property , not the greatest possi-
ble freedom for all men , was the primary mrpose of his
political theory.
But according to his writings, this seems to be the
soundest interpretation: Locke earnestly desired the rec-
ognition of roan's dignity as a person and the preservation
of man's freedom, and believed, much as Hegel later did,
that that personality was symbolized and that freedon!. .real
in social relations. as one's possessions, were protected
102
from tyrannical confiscation or threat by his neighbors.
Therefore^ for Locke, that government which existed to maintain
101. Sibley, Art. (1942), 4.
102. Gov.
.
II, 222, 91.

man's freedom and safeguard his natural rights existed nec-
103
essarily to protect his property. If Locke really meant,
then, what his writings say, and was not merely seeking to
justify the selfish accumulation of wealth by the few re-
gardless of its detrimental consequences to the many and
the destruction of their natural rights and freedom, Locke's
principles of government are to be seen as more fundamental
than the specific economic system in which he believed, in
his day, they found their best expression
.
Nov/ if this is the soundest interpretation of Locke's
purpose and writings, then his political theory, though; it,
in one sense (its defense of unlimited private property),
is a document of only temporary validity, is, in another
sense (its defense of freedom and justice), a document of
(v/hat, by contrast, might be termed) enduring validity.
In the light of this interpretation of Locke's theory of
political and economic freedom (though this interpretation
has not yet been widely comprehended ) , it will nov7 be sug-
gested in more detail, what the elements in Locke's theory
are which transcend any particular type of economic system
and make it, in its fundamental princ iples , applicable to
the changing needs of a changing world and' compatible with any
economic s^'-stem which, in any generation or century, is
103. Gov«
.
I, 92; Gov.
.
II, 85.
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actually best able to establish and maintain taan's social
freedom and the preservation of his natural rights as a
man. Several of these enduring principles of Locke, which
transcend any ©ixclusive system of economic life and make
his basic theory of social freedom able to transcend capi-
talism and compatible even v/ith socialism, are the follow-
ing:
(a) Cxod gave the earth to mankind in common
(b) In bold statements, already quoted in the exposi -
tion of Locke »s economic views, Locke makes it xinmistakably
clear that almost all of the value of anything (nine -tenths
to ninety-nine hundredths) is to be credited to the account
104
of labor* Here Locke not only implies the possibility of
his lending logical support to socialism; he is actually
stating a socialistic principle even before the days of
105
its greatest prophets. It is, in truth, as Gooch andGorwin
see, that:
Here in ovo is the labor theory of value of
modem Socialism, In short, though it has
always been regarded as the gospel par ex-
cellence of individualism, and indeed of pro-
prietarian individualism, the Second Treatise
on G-overnment contains many of the ingredients
of a very different interpretation of the doc-
trine of Natural Law. 106
104. Gov.
.
II, 40.
105. Gooob. EDI, 358.
106. Corwin , Art. (1940), 96-97.

226
(c) Democratic socialism is further compatible with
principles of Locke. For he holds that private ov/nership
of property is justified, in nature, only by one's mixing
of his labor with it. And that same law of nature which
supports ownership on the basis of labor (thus, together
v/ith Locke's theory of value, implying that the laborer
should receive almost in entirety the fruits of his labors)
also clearly indicates that one should own only that v/hich
he can use; to allow anything to perish or to refuse to
share with one in need is a crime. By the law of nat\ire,
then (and according to Locke, government must alwayc re-
spect it), private possession and ownership of property are
rigorously limited. It is only by consent
,
by expression
of the majority will , that unlimited private property can
rightly be possessed and owned. Even if, then, by the law
of nature , it were not just for property to be rigorously
limited (though as a matter of fact this is more fundamen-
tal than the principle of consent ) , then, if the majority
willed it
. if the majority consented to it, private pro-
perty could rightly be limited or even abolished. So on
Locke's principles . nature not only moires tov/ard socialism
but t ie prirni^le of consent always implies i1s possibility.
(d) The public good is always^ for Locke, a more funda-
mental principle even than the protection of private property

107
as the end of government • In fact^ government exists for the
public good; and private property is protected because it
is deemed an essential means to that end. But more consis-
tent today with such an end, as suggested by the thesis
of the socialists, is, at least, the limitation, perhaps
the abolition of private ownership of property which leads
to the enslavement of men. Despite the fact, then, that
Locke persistently argues that government exists to pro-
tect unlimited ownership of private property (though he,
himself, affirms that "natural reason tells us that
men, being once bom, have a right to their preservation
and consequently meat and drink, and such other things as
108
nature affords for their substance
, )j he might, as a logical
inference from his most basic principle of the public good,
have argued, if he lived in such a historical situation as
today's, for the limitation or abolition of private property
in the interest of the v/ell-being of all mankind. And he
would have found grounds for that argument not only in that
principle but in his theories of the law of nature, consent,
and majority rule. Despite his ovm practical application
of his principles in favor of a capitalistic economy, then,
and despite the potent manner in which his theory helped to
shape history in that direction, Locke is not exclusively
107. Gov.
,
II, 37.
108. Gov.
,
II, 25; cf. Gov. , II, 36.
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or necessarily the eternal father of capitalism but is, as
judged by his fundamental principles « equally (and in today*
s
historical circumstances more fundamentally) a prophet of a
kind of socialism or whatever form of political-economic or-
ganization actually safeguards human freedom, in fact, and
most effectively serves the public good.
If this thesis cannot be maintained, then it must be
conceded that, in the organically constituted v/brld society
of today, Locke »s economic theory is essentially undemocratic
and, as such, is destructive of the ends Locke claimed to
seek, the real social freedom and the realized dignity of man,
109
For, as Henry George has said:
It is not enough that men should vote, it is not
enough that they should be theoretically equal be-
fore the law. They must have liberty to avail
themselves of the opportunities and means of life;
they must stand on equal terms v/ith reference to
the bounties of nature. Either this, or Liberty
withdraws her light,
9, S\immary of Lockers theory of social freedom.
This, then, in summaiy, is Locke's conception of social
freedom. Because man is free by nature, by birth, as a
possessor of reason and free will, as created in the image
of God, and as of greater worth than the whole v/orld, man
freely consents, commonly contracts, to membership in a freely
organized society which is governed by the free will of the
majority in the interest of the greatest possible well-being
109, George, PP, II, 545,

of all. Because men are free persons, society must exist
only to enlarge and secure that freedom against the unlaw-
ful and tyrannical domination of those who heed not the law
of reason, the law which admonishes the preservation of all
mankind. This freedom preserving society must, therefore,
be constituted by members who seek not only self-interest
but the interest of all, who believe in God, whose consent
and oath, therefore, are trustworthy, and who freely tol-
erate others. That society must be ruled by the will of
the majority, and that majority and its laws must be the
seat of sovereignty. Its government must consist of at
least two strong branches, legislative and executive, the
latter possessing pov/er of prerogative and the use of force
to execute laws and defend the state against invasion; but,
under certain circumstances, subjects may exercise force,
too, to defend their freedom against the injustices of rul-
ers. Among the freedoms of society must stand freedom of
religions so long as that freedom does not include the be-
liever »s disobeying of the established civil laws. Slavery
is essentially to be despised and prohibited; but society
is to protect the private ovmership of unlimited property
against fellow citizens, against rulers, and against for-
eign invasion.
Summarily stated, these conclusions were reached:
Locke's conception of man and of social ends and means
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actually transcends the Essay^s deterministic, hedonistic
view of man, the transcending elements apparently being de-
rived fron Locke's Christian faith and conviction; for his
inconsistency he is to be censored but for his broadening
of his conception of man and society he is to be corajnended.
He is wrong in holding that belief in God is essential to
citizen's oaths but right in affirming the indispensability
of force for the maintenance of governments, Locke's theory
of consent, explicit and tacit, is ethically sound and
groijnded in the laws of reason or nature, the content of
which is essentially Christian, His balanced governmental
organization, consisting of legislative and executive
branches, rests on an indispensable insight; but, as thus
far has been only intimated, that insight was not completely
developed by Locke, To the executive and legislative
branches was to be added, in the political theories of
110
Montesquieu and in the government of the United States, the
equally authoritative judiciary. It was further maintained
that Locke's theory of the place of force in the defense
of freedom and security is essentially sound. But his view
of tolerance was criticized in spite of its great liberat-
ing influence and its recognition of the necessity of en-
forcing civil laws for the good of all, because it did not
110, Cf. Fletcher, ^.JIP, 136.
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approve toleration for atheists or the intolerant; Locke
was further criticized because, though his theory pre-
supposed man*s possession of reason and a capacity for
moral discipline, it failed to consider adequately the
place of minorities in a system of majority rule. His
theory of conditicnal slavery was seen to be grounded on
a minor premise and inconsistent with his major, namely,
his Christian view of man and it was further seen to be
wholly untenable on any grounds. It was concluded that
his economic theory, if adequate for his own day, v/as now
no longer sufficient for the needs of a world organically
one, in which the possession of economic pov/er by a few
spelled slavery, or death in war, for the many. But it
was also suggested that Lockers social principles in gen-
eral (the law of nature, the idea of consent, the public
good, the labor theory of value, and the like) were com-
patible with a democratically planned and controlled economy,
or any economic system which served the largest well-being
of man.
Out of all this may be gleaned the further conclusions,
namely, that Locke (as contrasted v/ith Rousseau, for example,
and in his emphasis on individuals) failed to stress enough the
111
organic aspect of political life and that he failed to affirm.
111. Cf, Laski, PTE, 74

explicitly, the modem idea that not only permanence, but
development, in good measure, is a characteristic of social
112
organization; but that, nevertheless, his social theory,
as contrasted, in method, with those of the French theorists
had the advantage of its rooting in the empirical data of
113
actual political life and practical contemporary affairs
in England and that, whatever its inadequacies in detail
or application, his theory not only "annoimced the advent
of modem systems of parliamentary government" and left to
subsequent thinkers the consi<ieration mainly of "the con-
114
ditions under which it is to work," but clarified for pos-
terity certain fundamental and enduring political princi-
ples apart from which mankind's freedom can never be secure.
B. Locke's Influence on the French and
American Revolutions.
The tracing of Locke's influence in social thought and
history, or in other realms, too, would provide a more than
sufficient task for a dissertation writer; to trace, authori
tatively, Locke's influence on the French Revolution alone,
for example, would seem almost an endless undertaking.
Though that is not the essential purpose of this paper,
yet because it suggests so well the powf r of Locke's life
112. Cf. Laski, PTE, 75-76.
113. Tocqueville, SSF, 267.
114. Laski, PTE, 16.

and work, a brief intimation of that influence will be
given here; and with it will be coupled, as veil, a short
survey of Locke's significance for the American Revolution.
This discourse, in the light of remarks already made, should
be understood as being suggestive rather than definitive;
for it would be presumptuous, in a consideration incidental
to the chief concern of this dissertaticn
,
to claim the last
word on a subject on which the authorities, themselves, are
not altogetiier agreed. But one thing is clear, namely, that
115
as VVagner observes:
The evolution of modem society depends,.
not only on material circumstances and tech-
nological advance, but also on human aspira-
tions and the coimsels of philosophers,
and that this truth is clearly exemplified in Locke's impact
on two great revolutions.
1. Locke's influence on the French Revolution.
Even before Locke's death, he was not unknown on the
Continent; he had spent time, as an exile, in Holland, and
his first letter on toleration had been well received. Be-
fore the turn of the century, other men of literary activity
had begun to spread his name abroad; among those who intro-
duced Locke and other Englishmen to Europeans were Bayle
,
116
Le Clerc and Basnage. This was the beginning of a current
which was to flow far and wide throughout the eighteenth
115, vi/agner, SR, v.
116, Texte, JJR, 19, 26.

century in France, Even by the year 1715, the political
117
ideas of locke were making their v/ay« More than any other
English writers, even more than Nevrton, Locke's thought
118
was holding French attention. And during that century,
Locke's teachings "obtained an authority which v/as but
119
feebly disputed." It was not only his political, but, as
well, his metaphysical, ideas which became the fountain-
120
head of French intellectual life. In gfineral, these are
the conclusions at which investigators, have arrived; but
what were the avenues through which Locke's influence ex-
pressed itself?
Locke's influence moved through Montesquieu, Voltaire,
Rousseau, Diderot and the Encyclopaedists generally, Holbach
and Helvetians; in short, through the philosophers of the
century. It moved through the philosophers to the leaders
of the political Revolution, to Mirabeau, Desmoulins, Saint-
Just, but apparently, most of all, to Robespierre; though
it appears that some of these read Locke directly, too.
It moved through the philosophers and the political leaders
to the people; though it appears that even some of tnem read
Locke in translations. France felt his influence indi—
rect2y, too, through the impact of the American Revolution
and the writings of Jefferson, both of which show the marks
117. Texte, JJR, 20.
118. Texte, JJR, 77, 85-86; cf. Lecky, FR, 3.
119. Lowell, EFR, 243.
120. Lowell, EFR, 56.

of the molding hand of Locke, and both of which, especially
the former, added fuel to the fire which one day was to
flame in France.
But, turning to more specific details, what was the
precise relationship of the leading. thinkers of France to
the master, Locke?
Montesquieu (1689-1755), for one, had spent two years
in England, and the effect of that visit was apparent
121
throughout his life. No doubt he read Locke v/hile he was
there; certainly he knew his works well, for, as Parelle
has said, "la pluport des principes que Montesquieu pose
dans chapitie (the chapter on the Enf^lish Constitution in
Montesquieu* s Spirit of the Lav/s
)
sont tirls du Traite du
122
Gouverniaent civil , de Locke, ch, XII«" Montesquieu had,
123
in fact, "looked on England as the model state." And that
was the England which Locke had in mind when he wrote his
political works. Though Montesquieu improved on insights
124
of Locke, it appears quite clear that Locke's influence on
Monte s quieu was
.
great
•
Like Montesquieu, Voltaire (1694-1778), too, had lived
125
in England, and for almost three years. The influence of
121. Lecky, FR, 3.
122. Parelle, OM, 265, n; cf. Fletcher, MEP, 20-21, and
Lowell, EFR, 120.
123. Lowell, EFR, 332.
124. Fletcher, H'iEP, 136.
125. Leclcy, FR, 3.

that visit on his thought was no less significant than the
influence Montesquieu's visit, had exerted on him. It is
clear beyond the slightest doubt that Voltaire read Locke
extensively and that he was greatly influenced by him. Es-
pecially did Voltaire stress freedom of expression and
toleration in religion; and he v/as n.o less convinced, with
126
Locke, of certain metaphysical theories. That he esteemed
Locke, apparently above all thinkers, is evident from his
127
words:
Apres tant de courses malheureuses, fatigu6
,
harasse, honteux d* avoir cherche tant de
verites, et d» avoir trouve tant de chime res,
je suis revenu a Locke, corame l»enfant pro-
digal qui retoume chez son pere; je ne suis
rejete entre les bras d»un homme modeste, qui
ne fient jamais de savoir ce qu*il ne sait
pas; qui, a la v€rite, nepossede pas des
richesses immenses, mais dont les fonds sont
bien assures, et qui jouit du bien le plus
solide sans aucune ostentation, II ne con-
firme dans 1» opinion que j*ai toujours eue,
que rien n* entre dans notre entendement que
par nos sens, • • • •
He also says: "Jamais il ne fut peut-'etre un esprit plus sage,
128
plus methodique, un logicien plus exact que Ivi. Locke."
Again he writes: "Je conviens, avec le sage Locke "
And he speaks in the same place of "Locke, qui m»instruit,
129
et qui m'apprend ^ me jdefier de moi-mlme,, . . ."
126. Cf. Texte, JJR, 60.
127. Voltaire, Art. (1766), 34-35.
128. Voltaire, LA, 45; cf, Lovrell, EFR, 60.
129. Voltaire, Art, (1766), 38.
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Highly probable it is, then, that Voltaire is think-
ing of Englishmen in general and perhaps of Locke in par-
ticular when he writes in a letter to Helvetius:
Nous ne somraes pas faits en France
,
pour arriver
les premiers, Les Veritas nous sont venues 130
d'ailleurs; mais c*est beaucoup de les adapter.
For he goes on in the letter to speak of tolerance, a theme
made urgently popular by Locke, So enthusiastic is Voltaire
for Locke that he expresses the hope that Locke and his
131
follov/ers might become the instructors of all mankind. Of
Locke's tremendous influence on Voltaire there can be no
doubt
•
Nor in the minds of some does there seem to be any
doubt about Locke's influence on Rousseau; though it seems
clear that Rousseau is a unique mind, not content with em-
piricism or rfltionalism, but appealing also to feeling, being
132
romantic and sentimental in temperament. Nevertheless, he,
133
too, read Locke, and, for a while, he shared the sunlight
cast by Locke over the fellov/ship of the Encyclopaedists,
• •
According to Hoffding, Locke was "in so many respects
134
Rousseau's precursor" that "he can be called a disciple of
135
Locke," In a poem, Hoffding notes, Rousseau, himself.
130, Voltaire, Oeuvres, 579; suggested, in English, by Texte,
JJR, 97,
131, Texte, JJR, 248,
132, Gf, Lowell, EFR, 275,
133, Texte, JJR, 111,
134, JJR, 95, cf. 144, 145, 147.
135, Gf. Fletcher, IvOEP, 14, JJR, 35,
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had said: *^Avec Locke je fais l^histoire des idees, " As
a student at Les Charmettes , he had also read the Locke-
favoring Voltaire's Lettres sur les Angilais ^"^*^^
As already has been suggested, Rousseau, though a
follower of Locke, is best understood as imique in his
nature and method. It is the judgment of Lowell and Lecky
which, is to be preferred to the intimations of Laski. In
his dissatisfaction with rationalism, in his deep feeling
for nature, Rousseau, though expounding doctrines reminis-
cent of Locke, nevertheless, gave them a new turn, and
137
"a new direction to the human mind," Though Lecky may
contrast too sharply the thought of England and America
as opposed to that of France, he is sound in suggesting
that Rousseau best represents the contrast and exerted its
138
strongest influence* But just as there is the danger of
underestimating the indebtedness of Rousseau to Locke,
there is even graver danger of overstating it and of in-
accurately reducing Rousseau to a mere copy of Locke, This
is Laskl*s tendency when he affirms that "with Rousseau
there is no contrast, forvthe simDle reason that his teach-
^ ' 139
ing is only a broadening of the channel, dug by Locke."
Yet Laski does recognize that Rousseau adds something to
139
Locke's "thought.
136. HSffding, JJR, 36; 35.
137. Lowell, EFR, 56.
138. Lecky, DL, I, 12.
139. Laski, PTil, 74; cf. 61.

These three, then, Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Rousseau,
together with other encyclopaedists, notably Diderot, the
editor, d'Alemhert, and Jancourt, publishing their writings
in their journal from 1751 to 1771, and exerting almost un-
140
comparable influence, were, all of them, deeply dyed with
141
the colors of Locke • H&ffding says that their
attempts may be described as the application of
the philosophy of Locke and the new science to
a criticism of the traditional We Itanschauungen
and of existing institutions. From Locke' they "
borrowed particularly the principle that all
conceptions are derived from experience; of all
dogmatic philosophical beliefs they demanded to
know to what concrete experience they could be
referred. And from Locke they obtained too, the
idea of society as foijnded on a mutual contract
assuring individuals happiness and freedom; all
institutions whose workings went counter to this
idea were rejected as the products of imperious-
ness and imposture,
V/ith a different spirit, but not inconsistently, so far as
Lockers view of the self in the Essay is concerned, the so-
142
called selfish school, including Holbach and Helvetius^ also
contributed to the dissemination of Locke's thought; and on
the very eve of the Revolution, when such a rain of politi-
cal pamphlets as the world had never seen before or since
descended on the people of France, Locke's spirit, one may
be sure, was in them. One of the outstanding pamphlets,
written by Abbe Siey^s, was scarcely more than a populariza-
143
tion of Rousseau's Social Contract*
140. Lecky, FR, 7.
141. H!Jffding, JJR, 49; cf. Lowell, EFR, 250, 259.
142. EFR, 322.
143. Lowell, EFR, 333, 338.

Locke lived, then, in the works of the French philoso-
phers who read him directly; Locke lived also in the words
and acts of the revolutionary political figures who read
him directly or received him as interpreted by the philoso-
144
phers. Miraabeau knew and opposed Rousseau's Social Contract ;
145
Vergnlaud was influenced by Montesquieu and Rousseau; it is
probsblp that Robespierre read Locke directly—certainly,
he had known Rousseau, through reading his works and through
personal contact* Meynier describes him as " le continuateur
146
et l*adapteur de Rousseau* " Faquet notes that the ideas
that are in Rousseau " sont dans les disc ours et declarations
147
des. , « « «Robespierre " beraud suggests that the latter
studied Rousseau under Jesuit teachers and that nothing
pleased him more than his visit, in his youth, with the great
148
French writer. So, too, Saint-Just felt the impulse of
Locke's thought, perhaps directly, more surely through the
writings of Rousseau and especially his personal association
149
with Robespierre,
Locke lived in France not only through its philosophers
and its political leaders, but also through the inspiration
that cane to them from the historic fact of the American
144. /iUlard, OR, 16.
145. Aulard, OR, 84-85,
146. Meynier, RR, 254; cf. Aulard, OR, 238,
147, Faquet, mY , 289,
148, Beraud, TP, 61-62,
149, Faquet, LiRV, 289,
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Revolution and the Locke-permeated v/ritings of Jefferson.
That event gave impetus to their grov/ing feeling for equal-
ity and liberty and their dislike for the monarchical state.
As a consequence, too, "Voltaire, Rousseau, d»Alembert,
151
even Montesquieu, became more widely read than ever." The
American Revolution gave them nothing nev/; it rather, drove
152
on old flame to a nev/ heat.
It is almost needless to note, and it is not the pur-
pose of these remarks to attempt to demonstrate, the fact
that these follov/ers of Locke differed in varied v/ays from
153
their master and from each other; it is essential to em-
phasize here only the fact that for all of them, in varying
measure, and in some instances in great measure, Locke v/as
a significant fountain-head of their thought and, through
them, or directly, of the papular political ideas of the
century which culminated in the French Revolution.
Locke was thus indirectly but vitally connected with
the French Revolution, His fiindamental theses of liberty
and lust ice, through the writers, politicians, American
150. Hazen, Art. (1895) 456,
151. Lowell, EFR, 332.
152. Tocqueville, SSF, 268.
153. This matter may be illuminated through a comparison of
their works and through reference to such sources as
the following: particularly Faquet, ITRY , an excellent
comparison of the three great French thinkers; Aulard,
CFR^, 3, 32; Lecky, FR, 7, 13; Lecky, DL, II, 238-240;
Lowell, EFR, 42-43, 67, 292; Tocqueville, SSF, 255,
262-263, 267,484-485,
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influence, and popular reading, penneated French life and
thought and contributed to the fire that broke out in 1789
In this sense, then, Locke's influence was inseparable from
the influence of those minds whose principles he helped to
shape. And the influence of those minds, especially those
of the philosophers, was tremendous, Tocqueville maintains
that
the writers of the time became a great political
power, and ended by being the first power in the
country,..,. The whole political education of a
great people (was) formed by its literary men.,,,
so that, when the time for action came, it trans-
ported into the arena of politics all the habits
of literature, 154
Lecky asserts that the Encyc lopaedia , edited by Diderot who
was largely encouraged and assisted by Voltaire, "became
the focus of an intellectual influence which has rarely
been equalled," so that by 1771 "popular favour ran
155
with an irresistible force in favour of the philosophers,"
Their influence reached to all classes, nobility, middle
156
class, and even the poor who could read and think. So it .
was that, in conjunction with other historic causes, ideas,
in good measure rooted in Locke (ideas of patriotism, loyalty,
157
liberty, equality, hur.'ianity)^ pervaded the masses of French-
men and, in fundamental ways, determined their course of
154, SSF, 267; cf, 253; cf, Lowell, EFR, 302, 124, n.
155, Lecky, FR, 7,
156, Lowell, EFR, 322,
157, Lowell, EFR, 375-376.
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action in the Revolution of 1789 and the years that followed,
Locke »s influence on the French Revolution vvas significant,
indeed.
2, Locke »s influence on the American Revolution.
Particularly in the discussion of Locke »s economic
theory, it was suggested that two types or levels of
thought mark his exposition. The one was referred to as his
principles , the other, as his application of them; the one
appeared to have an enduring nature; the other, even if
Locke did not see it clearly, carried the overtones of
transitory things, une was characterized by his theory
of consent, majority, rule, the dignity of human souls,
the well-being of all mankind; the other was sumriarized
in the idea of unlimited private property. One was the
aspirations of a great humanitarian, the other, the prac-
tical conviction that the capitalistic system was the only
adequate means to those humanitarian ends. of freedom, lib-
erty, justice, and the sanctity of conscience. One con-
tained the impulse of ethical idealism and ardent devotion
toliie well-being of humanity; the other contained the pro-
prietarian conviction of the .indispensability of the capital-
istic economy,
Nov/ it would be absurd to say that either the principles
or their application did not influence thought and history
in France and America. Postively or negatively, both aspects

of Lockers thought appear to have done that. Nevertheless,
in the main, it does seem that Locke »s humanitarian prin-
ciples were dominant in his influence on France, while his
specific application of the capitalistic economy found the
largest place in American thought, Rousseau, even
Montesquieu, had definitely socialistic tendencies; and
many Americans feared just this leveling influence near the
close of the eighteenth century. Thomas Paine, for one,
and even Thomas Jefferson, showed definite marks of the
Locke -Rousneau humanitarian tradition. And even though
the frame rs of the Constitution seemed resolved, above all,
on a kind of government which would foster their proprietar-
ian interests, they, too, were caught in the stream of in-
fluence with which Locke's humanitarian views had stamped
democracy. And yet, despite the real presence of that
humanitarian concern, the clear and consistent interest of
the Constitution's framers appears to have been the protec-
tion of the privilege of possessing unlimited private pro-
perty. One might even suggest this thesis, namely, that
Locke's humanitarian impulse inspired the Revolution while
his proprietarian doctrines basically shaped the Constitu-
tion; though no doubt both impulses flowed through the
hearts of Americans as they struggled for their new world.
Since this discussion is but incidental to the problem
of this dissertation, secondary sources have been widely
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used though original writings have also been examined. This
again, then, is a suggestive rather than definitive exposi-
tion; it leaves open the door for further detailed investiga-
tion of great difficulty and great value. Nevertheless,
certain opinions of the authorities, by way of suggestion,
will be relied on and here- set down,
Charles A, Beard, after extensive investigation of orig-
inal sources, cites numerous data to support his thesis
which appears quite convincing, namely, that the majority
of those who were influential in framing the Constitution
were vitally concerned with property ownership. Five-sixths
of them were personally and directly interested in the out-
come of the convention and benefited economically from the
Constitution's adoption.
Not one member represented in his immediate per-
sonal economic interests the small farming or
mechanical classes, 158
He mentions only isolated individuals, John Mercer and Luther
Martin^ who were violently in "opposition to the adoption of
the Constitution because of its protection of pro-perty in-
159
terests," But in the main, these men sought to set up a
16^
government which supported all types of property interests.
The Constitution was formulated "under the pressure of eco-
161
natrdc interests," So pronounced was the self-interest of these
158, Beard, EIC, 149; cf, 73-151,
159. Beard, EIC, 131,
3 60, Beard, EIC, 100 ff,
161, Beard, EIC, 152-153.

groups of owners that, after the government was established,
even Madisonbe came disgusted when he saw how those who had
pushed the Constitution openly v.ent out after the financial
162
gains it enabled them to make. It is significant, too, that
when the Constitution was ratified in Pennsylvania (possibly
this is indicative of the conditions in other states, also),
it was strongly supported by lawyers, doctors, ministers,
and capitalists, but was opposed by a majority of the
farmers.
Strong in the support of this kind of social order
were the writers of The Federalist
.
Hamilton, Madison, and
Jay. They were interested in democratic government; they
163
believed sovereignty should rest in the people; they believed
in a balance of power which prevented individual or oligar-
164 165
chical rule; they believed in religious tolerance; they be-
lieved in all these things, but, most of all, they appear
to have believed in the protection of private ov/nership of
unlimited property. Beard boldly insists that they wanted
a government
so constructed as to break the force of majority
rule and prevent invasions on the property rights
of minorities. (They v/anted) restrictions on the
state legislatures which had been so vigorous in
their attacks on capital. 166
162. Beard, EIC, 125-126.
163. Harailton or mdison, Fea; 256.
164. Madison, Fed . . 195
165. Hamilton, Fed., 356
166. Beard, EIC, 154.
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They sought, in government, "a foil against the attacks '
167
of levelling democracy." These men and this emphasis were
the representatives of that tradition which laid hold of
Locke's application and gave it first place while they
retained what they could of thoroughgoing democracy, too.
But there was another tradition, inspiring the revo-
lution and carrying on through the early days of the found-
ing of the Republic; this tradition, too, had roots in
Locke, but especially in the humanitarian principles of
Locke, And the rising tide of the French spirit, in the
decade following 1880, gave this tradition a new inspira-
tion; especially did it exert a leveling influence, re-
pudiating the pomp and glory of public servants like George
168
Washington and John Adams.
Representative of this tradition were Paine, (though
169
Paine 's Quaker influence was also great ) , Jefferson and
James Wilson. Paine 's stirring articles were read before
the American troops to rekindle their faith in their cause.
170
He defended the right of revolution; he v/as the champion
171
of natural rights; he believed that, as for government,
rs
"it is the living only that has any right to it!* ; that men
167. Beard, EIG, 154.
168. Hazen, Art. (1895), 459; cf. 457, 459, 462.
169. Conway, Art. (1895), ix.
170. Brailsford, SCO, 63.
171. Paine, RM, 305; Fletchetj w£P, 251; cf. Adams, PIAR,113.
172. RIVI, 281.
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173
must be governed by reason, not terror; he believed in the
174
social contract; he sav; that freedom could not exist with
175
ignorance; he despised tyranny and glorified freedom. In
his now famous words, he says it:
These are the times that try men»s souls. The
summer soldier and the sunshine patriot will,
in the crisis, shrink from the service of his
country; but he that stands it NOW, deserves the
love and thanks of man and woman. Tyranny,
like hell, is not easily conquered; yet we have
this consolation with us, that the harder the
conflict, the more glorious f^e triumph. What
we obtain too cheap, we esteem too lightly;
*tis deamess only that gives every thing its
value. Heaven knows how to put a proper price
on its goods; and it vrauld be strange indeed,
if so celestial an article as FREEDOM should
not be highly rated, Britain, with an army to
enforce her tyranny, has declared that she has
a right ( not only to TAX) but «to BBID us in
ALL CASES V/HATSOEVER,»and if being bound in
that manner , is not slavery, then is there not
such a thing as slavery upon earth, 176
Jefferson, like Paine, v/as moved particularly by that
humanitarian impulse. He feared and opposed Hamilton and
his associates thinking their stress on federal power opened
the way to monarchy, that it woula deprive the people of
their freedom. In that basic conflict between order and
freedom , he emphasized the latter; his opponents had an eye
on the former. He v/as not a member of the convention that
drafted the property-protecting Constitution or of the
173. m, 295.
174. RM, 307.
175. RM, 38S.
176. Crisis , 3
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Virginia convention that ratified it. In his most famous
words, his thought is best represented—and in that thought,
clearly, he did not stand alone; in the monumental Declaration
of Independence he had said:
V/e hold these truths to be self-evident; that all
men are created equal; that they are endowed by
their Creator with certain unalienable rights;
that among these are life, liberty, and the pur-
suit of happiness; that to secure these rights
governments are instituted among men, deriving
their just pov/ers from the consent of the governed,
Another view of Jefferson's thought is caught in the words
quoted from Jefferson by John Dev/ey: "A more beautiful or
precious morsel of ethics I have never seen"—than that of
178
Jesus of NazarethJ
James Wilson, a revolutionary lawyer who had studied
with John Dickinson, who had signed the Declaration of In-
dependence and the Constitution, was the representative of
the new American legal institutions and philosophy as opposed
to the English, In his interpretations, he followed in
179
Locke's steps. Though he may well have shared the belief
in the protection of private property, he had apparently
no interest in curbing the free movement of the democratic
spirit, "The sovereignty of the state was not a term in
which he thought; the sovereignty of the people was all he
180
understood,"
177. Beard, SCC , 126.
178. Dewey, TJ, 93.
179. Adams, PIAR, 134, 146.
180. Adams, PIAR, 142,
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But it is not the purpose here to discuss at length
the conflicting emphases of the founders of the government
of the United States; it is more to the point simply to
affirm that these men, with their varied views, represented
two streams of Locke's thought and to note that almost all
of them had been directly influenced by him—those who
stressed his principles and those who preferred, above all,
Locke's economic application of those principles,
Locke's influence on them was truly great, greater than
181
Rousseau's, It, with the influence of the latter and
Montesquieu, and Hobbes and Hume, "v/as the one green oasis
182
in the arid desert of "American intellectual attainment,"
Hamilton and, presumably, his asj:ociates, Madison and Jay,
183
had read him, V/ilson traced his "ideas of the nature of
184
law back to Locke,"
What a clear relationship between Jefferson and Locke,
especially with regard to the two references made above,
Jefferson, even in his own day, was twitted for borrowing
his Declaration of Independence from Locke's Second Treatise
185
on Government , Even the language sounds like the language
186
of Locke, especially the reference to "life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness," the last phrase being reminiscent
181, Adams, PIAR, 164,
182, Van Tyne
,
FAR, I, 343-344,
183, Van Tyne, FAR, I, 343-344; cf. Adams, PIAR, 169.
184, Adams, PIAR, 164, 172,
185, Lee, SC
,
86, n. 1.
186, Cf. Laski, PTE, 70.
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not only of Locke's theory of government but also of his
analysis of man in the Essay * And his words about the
ethics of Jesus might well have dropped from the lips of
the British empiricist. According to Jefferson, -Locke's
187
writings were "nearly perfect," According to nimerous
188
studies, Jefferson was steeped in the philosophy of Locke,
Thomas Paine, too, seems to have felt Locke's strong
influence; though one author cautions against over-
emphasizing this, claiming that much of Paine is to be traced
189
to his Quaker background. Nevertheless, one can scarecly
read Paine without feeling the spirit ard hearing the voice
of Locke, Consider, for example, the bits of Paine »s-
thO'ight cited above. As Adams suggests, surely, in a meas-
ure at least, Paine 's "theories of politics are merely
190
copied from Locke and Rousseau,
What has been suggested of these men might also be
said of others; enlightened men in America had, in general,
191
read Locke, And the seed had fallen upon fertile soil. In
addition to those already mentioned, it had fallen on John
Adams, Franklin, Josiah Quincy, Jonathan Mayhew, Robert
192
Carter, Samuel Adams, and John Dickinson, That Locke was
187, Dewey, TJ, 15.
188, Van Tjnie
,
FAR, II. 355; Egerton, AR, 125.
189, Conv7ay, Art. (1895), ix.
190, Adams, PIAR, 110, 113; cf, Fletcher, I^P, 265, 108,
191, Van Tyne, FAR, I, 228-229, II, 354.
192, Van Tyne, I, 343-344; cf. II, 353-354, and Adams,
PIAR, 108.
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read even more widely than that is suggested by the fact
that, in 1773, shortly before the Revolutionary War, Lookers
Essay on Civil Government had been published in America in
the city of Boston. Clear it is beyond doubt, then, that
Locke's influence was tremendous, that, as Corwin says,
"in justifying one Revolution," Locke "laid the ideological
193
groundwork for another," though he might have said, for two*
And chief among the ideas which he helped to inspire and
clarify for Americans were those of the natural rights of
man, of sovereignty in the people, of a balance of power in
government (though, in the distinctive place given to the
194
Supreme Court, the Constitution far transcended Locke), of
the protection of unlimited private property,- of liberty of
opinion and religious tolerance, and of the distinct separa-
tion of church and state.
So it was that a British empiricist of the seventeenth
century, arguing in his famous Essay for the necessary deter
mination of men's wills and inspired by the Christian reli-
gi m v/ith a great humanitarian concern for all mankind and
for man's dignity and freedom, in his social theory, ming- -
ling self-interest and altruism, unlimited private property
protection and sovereignty in the people, transcended time
and space and helped, in succeeding centuries, to shape the
193. Corwin, Art. (1940), 95.
194, Cf. Beard, EIC, 161-162; SCC , 17, 1^9.

destinies of two great nati ois beside his own and to leave
the marks of his pen on a whole V/estern civilization,
Propbecy is dangerous ; yet one can' scarcely restrain the inti-
mation that Locke's spirit is still living
and is^ in fundamental ways, destined to give direction even
to the day that is dawning.
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ABSTRACT
The piirpose of this dissertation is to examine John
Lookers conception of freedom, as related to the self and
to society.
In Chapter I, freedom is defined as having "both a
personal and a social meaning and democracy is defined as
representative government in which sovereignty resides in
the people v/hose elected representatives express the people's
wills in the laws of the land. Locke's life is reviewed,
the procedure for gathering data and the structure of the
dissertation are set forth, and the literature of the study
is surveyed.
In Chapter II, Locke's conception of the freedom of the
self is examined. In a preliminary study of the problem of
determinism (the theory that the total life of the self is
explained by the principle of necessary causality) and free-
domism (the general theory that the self is, in some manner
and to an indefinite degree, independent of mechanistic
causality, physical and mental, and free through a principle
of its own nature) it is maintained that freedomism is the
more adequate theory since (1) determinism lacks much that
is required to demonstrate it as universally valid; (2) though
relatively true, it depends on minds which transcend given
atomic data to formulate a whole law; and (3) proof of it by
a person, as proof of any claim, necessarily presupposes
freedom as, otherwise, all conclusions would be merely
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effects of causes, neither true nor false; (4) freedomism
is comprehensive in that, in addition, it is not only nec-
essary to an adequate interpretation of morality, of human
control of nature and society, of idealism and theistic
religion, but admits and coherently includes the fact of
determinism or, at least, of a high degree of uniformity
and predictability in certain realms. As free spirit then,
man is superior to nature, which may be necessitated; as
spirit, he may freely surrender to reason or ignore it, do
what he ought to do or what he desires to do, is morally
responsible, is a person, not a process.
On subsequent examination, Locke's conception of free-
dom as the power to perform \i^at one wills is held to be
only incidental to the real problem of the freedom of the
self. His theory that desire or uneasiness, naturally given,
naturally determines volition is criticized as (1) minimiz-
ing man's rational and spiritual nature; (2) excluding free-
dom of thought and choice; (3) mailing ought and should
meaningless; (4) destroying moral responsibility and grounds
for praise and blame; 15) making ciod responsible for all
men's acts including their evil ones; (6) destroying the
distinction between good and evil; and (7) failing to see
that ideas frequently determine desires.
His theory of deliberation, connected, as it is, with
his hedonistic determinism, is first criticized as untenable
because (1) if all volitions are necessitated, one cannot
I
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be free to think since thought requires volition and
(2) because in failing unequivocally to affirm the self's
nature as spirit, Locke excludes the only theory which
provides an adequate basis for man's partial independence
of necessity. But even if one allov;ed that Lockers theory
of deliberation provides real freedom for the self, his
theory would still be criticized because (1) his relativis-
tic theory of good and evil excludes man's escape from the
necessity of pursuing his own happiness only; (2) it allows
only mercenary morality and religion; (3) subordinates reason
to desire; and (4) contradicts the clearly experienced facts
of man's unnecessitated devotion to ideals and other persons.
In the concluding section of the chapter, Locke's view as
a whole is considered. It is criticized, negatively, because
(1) his incoherent hedonistic theory is inconsistent with
his objective altruism; (2) his several basic conceptions
of freedom are left unrelated; (3) he admits that the principle
of necessity is not necessary knowledge; (4) his psychology
of motivation is inadequate; (5) adequate grounds for moral
judgments are destroyed; (6) as a consequence of a narrowly
empiricistic interest in what men can know, his theory fails
to consider sufficiently how and why men can know; (7) and
his determinism leads to an infinite regress. Yet, however
inconsistently, he also supports a theory of freedom in his
assertion of (1) a real distinction between good and evil;
1
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(2) an enlightened pursuit of happiness; (3) moral responsibil-
ity for avoidable ignorance and inadvertency, for thinking,
and for choosing; and (4) five explicit freedoraistic state-
ments. In conclusion, the influence of Locke's view of the
self's freedom is noted.
Chapter III begins with a prelijninary synopsis of
Locke's social thought, in the light of which the fundamental
relation between his view of man and his theory of society
is set forth. Locke's social theory?-, i'\faich combines self-
interest and true altruism, transcends the Essay ' s hedonistic,
deterministic view of man in that it supposes men to be not
means to my happiness but ends in themselves and advocates
an objectivity of thought and action which rises above mere
self-interest. Not his philosophical analysis of man
in the Essay
,
then, but his acceptance of the Christian faith,
leads Locke to affirm, in his political writings, freedom
of the will, a so-called law of nature or reason which
is, more truly, the command of Christ to seek the
preservation and well-being of all mankind, that a human
soul is of greater v/orth than the whole v/orld, and that
loyalty to God and conscience takes precedence over obedience
to the state. His social thought is further founded firmly
upon religion since no atheists, because their oaths are
thereby worthless, are to be tolerated by the state.
Clearly, Locke's full conception of man and his social freedom
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are, in good measure, rooted in religion.
Lookers theory of social contract is discounted as an
interpretation of history in favor of theories of organic ism,
utility, and man*s lack of reflectiveness; but as implying
the ethical-political principles of consent, popular
sovereignty, majority rule, and respect for personality,
it is deemed basic in the defense of man's social freedom.
Locke's form of government—his means of securing the
ends of government (the preservation of liberty, justice,
the public good, private property)
,
especially his balancing
of povrers between legislative and executive— is a sound
safeguard of freedom, though it v/as more perfectly developed
(with a more prominent place given to the judiciary) by the
framers of the Constitution of the United States of America .
Another sound emphasis of Locke affirms the authority of the
laws rather than the prince's will .
His teaching that force is essential to governient rule
and that enslaved peoples may rightfully use it to throw off
tyranny is clearly sound; but Locke fails to note that war may
conceivably be removed from society only with the passing of
rampant economic competition, the creation of a world political
federation, and the dissolution of nationalistic armies.
Constructive though it was, Locke's view of tolerance
is criticized because its intolerance of opinions contrary
to government, of atheists, and of the intolerant, does,
itself, exclude tolerance and undermines free expression and
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free govermnent . Locke is right in affirming that, under
popular government , lavfbreakers must be penalized even if
they breali the law for conscience' saiie. But his theory is
criticized because it fails to give sufficient consideration
to the wills of minorities though it does rightfully pre-
suppose possibilities of reason and moral discipline in man.
The majority-minority problem can be solved only through
intelligence and moral discipline vdiich renders possible
majority-minority co-operation, as well as rivalry, in the
interest of all people. His view is at its best in its
separation of church and state.
Contrary to Locke, it is held that even conditional
slavery is untenable.
It is finally argued that Lockers theory of unlinited
private ov^niership of property is not today compatible v/ith
the social freedom and well-being of man. This is held because
the accumulation of vast v.^eilth frequently means economic
exploitation of the masses and their inipoverishnent , and
leads to wars \vhich take away both -vealth and lives. In a
necessarily organic world, a democratically planned and
controlled economy together with a political federation
of nations is indispensable to securing and safeguarding
the best possible social freedom of men. It is pointed
out, however, that the principles from which Locke derives
his capitalism contain the gern of just such a society;
some of these principles are: the earth was given by God
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to all mankind in common; labor accounts for almost all the
value of things; ownership of private property beyond capacity
to use is justified only on the basis of common consent or
majority rule and, by inference, can be denied on the same
basis; the unalterable and supreme object of society is the
public good .
To these may be added further conclusions, namely, that
Locke, with his emphasis on individuals, failed (in contrast
with Rousseau, for example) sufficiently to stress the
organic aspect of political life and failed to affirm
explicitly the modem idea that not only permanence but also
development are characteristics of sound social organization.
His social theory, nevertheless, as contrasted in method
with those of the French theorists, had the advantage of
rooting in the empirical data of actual political life and
practical affairs in England and, whatever its inadequacies
in detail or application, clarified for posterity certain
fundamental and enduring political principles apart from
which mankind's freedom can never be secure.
Locke's social theories had highly important and varied
effects on the French and Aiaerican revolutions.
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